Contributions

Law enforce­ment agen­cies are increas­ing­ly seek­ing to com­pel the dis­clo­sure of pass­words from the own­ers of pass­word-pro­tect­ed encrypt­ed devices, such as cell phones. Does the gov­ern­ment have the right to com­pel this dis­clo­sure? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Diego Wright (‘22) argues that the Fifth Amend­ment right against self-incrim­i­na­tion pro­tects an indi­vid­ual from being forced to dis­close their pass­code when ana­lyzed under the “fore­gone con­clu­sion” doc­trine unless the gov­ern­ment can demon­strate they already know the tes­ti­mo­ni­al com­mu­ni­ca­tions tac­it in the act of pro­vid­ing the passcode.

Contributions

Crim­mi­gra­tion is the inter­sec­tion of immi­gra­tion law and crim­i­nal law. At this inter­sec­tion, offi­cials are widen­ing the net of deportable offens­es at an alarm­ing rate to make immi­grants more sus­cep­ti­ble to removal. The “crime involv­ing moral turpi­tude” pro­vi­sion of the Immi­gra­tion and Nation­al­i­ty Act has been one means by which offi­cials have arbi­trar­i­ly expand­ed the rea­sons why a per­son may be deport­ed out of the Unit­ed States. But is the moral turpi­tude pro­vi­sion in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immi­gra­tion and Nation­al­i­ty Act—used to jus­ti­fy deport­ing “crim­i­nal aliens,” includ­ing law­ful per­ma­nent residents—void for vague­ness pur­suant to the Fifth Amend­ment? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kameron John­ston (’21) argues that the recent Supreme Court deci­sions John­son v. Unit­ed States and Ses­sions v. Dimaya require that the exact­ing vague­ness test used in crim­i­nal con­texts be applied to immi­gra­tion law as well. Final­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion demon­strates that the moral turpi­tude pro­vi­sion has pro­voked unpre­dictabil­i­ty and judi­cial con­fu­sion that sim­ply can­not be rec­on­ciled with the fair notice and enforce­ment stan­dards that due process demands.

Contributions

When a motorist is arrest­ed on sus­pi­cion of intox­i­cat­ed dri­ving, the gov­ern­ment can­not com­pel him to sub­mit to a blood draw with­out a war­rant or war­rant excep­tion, nor can it make his refusal to sub­mit to a blood draw a crime. But can the gov­ern­ment use the refusal as evi­dence of guilt in a sub­se­quent DUI pros­e­cu­tion on the basis of an implied con­sent statute? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Max Baum­bach (’21) argues that the Fourth Amend­ment pro­hibits the use of blood test refusal evi­dence in a DUI pros­e­cu­tion where the test itself would have been unlaw­ful to con­duct in the first instance.

Contributions

Does the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Car­pen­ter v. Unit­ed States con­strain the government’s war­rant­less use of pole cam­eras to sur­veil peo­ple it sus­pects are engag­ing in crim­i­nal activ­i­ty? In this con­tri­bu­tion, Jack Derewicz (’21) argues that the Car­pen­ter opin­ion does not impli­cate this par­tic­u­lar inves­ti­ga­to­ry tech­nique because pole cam­eras do not retroac­tive­ly col­lect the type of infor­ma­tion that, when aggre­gat­ed, present the gov­ern­ment with infor­ma­tion it could not have oth­er­wise obtained.

Contributions

This Con­tri­bu­tion exam­ines whether police have effec­tu­at­ed a Fourth Amend­ment seizure by show of author­i­ty when an indi­vid­ual flees from a momen­tary encounter. Dean S. Ache­son (’21) argues that, under Fourth Amend­ment prece­dent, pre-flight com­pli­ance does not con­sti­tute sub­mis­sion to a show of author­i­ty in a police inter­ac­tion that con­sists of answer­ing brief ques­tions and engag­ing in eva­sive behavior.

Contributions

Should the qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine be revis­it­ed to bet­ter allow civil­ians to sue gov­ern­ment offi­cials for vio­la­tions of fun­da­men­tal rights? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Vic­to­ria del Rio-Guarn­er (’18) dis­cuss­es how the Supreme Court’s deci­sions in Har­low v. Fitzger­ald and Pear­son v. Calla­han essen­tial­ly ren­dered qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty to Sec­tion 1983 claims unqual­i­fied. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine should be recal­i­brat­ed in order to bet­ter ful­fill its under­ly­ing pur­pose while not dis­abling Sec­tion 1983 claims.

Contributions

Can an employ­ee who has accessed com­put­er data­base infor­ma­tion in vio­la­tion of use restric­tions and direct instruc­tions from his employ­er be con­vict­ed under the Com­put­er Fraud and Abuse Act for access­ing data “with­out autho­riza­tion” or “exceed[ing] autho­rized access”? Susan­na Grif­fith (’17) reflects on this ques­tion, based on her expe­ri­ence at the 2016 Spong Moot Court Tour­na­ment, host­ed by William & Mary Law School. Her Con­tri­bu­tion dis­cuss­es the legal land­scape and cir­cuit split regard­ing the applic­a­bil­i­ty of the statute to employ­ees who have vio­lat­ed use restric­tions and direc­tives from employ­ers. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the nar­row, code-based view is prefer­able as the clear­ly con­sti­tu­tion­al read­ing that also com­ports with stan­dards of excel­lence in the field of cyber-security.