Contributions

Should the qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine be revis­it­ed to bet­ter allow civil­ians to sue gov­ern­ment offi­cials for vio­la­tions of fun­da­men­tal rights? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Vic­to­ria del Rio-Guarn­er (’18) dis­cuss­es how the Supreme Court’s deci­sions in Har­low v. Fitzger­ald and Pear­son v. Calla­han essen­tial­ly ren­dered qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty to Sec­tion 1983 claims unqual­i­fied. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine should be recal­i­brat­ed in order to bet­ter ful­fill its under­ly­ing pur­pose while not dis­abling Sec­tion 1983 claims.

Contributions

Can an employ­ee who has accessed com­put­er data­base infor­ma­tion in vio­la­tion of use restric­tions and direct instruc­tions from his employ­er be con­vict­ed under the Com­put­er Fraud and Abuse Act for access­ing data “with­out autho­riza­tion” or “exceed[ing] autho­rized access”? Susan­na Grif­fith (’17) reflects on this ques­tion, based on her expe­ri­ence at the 2016 Spong Moot Court Tour­na­ment, host­ed by William & Mary Law School. Her Con­tri­bu­tion dis­cuss­es the legal land­scape and cir­cuit split regard­ing the applic­a­bil­i­ty of the statute to employ­ees who have vio­lat­ed use restric­tions and direc­tives from employ­ers. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the nar­row, code-based view is prefer­able as the clear­ly con­sti­tu­tion­al read­ing that also com­ports with stan­dards of excel­lence in the field of cyber-secu­ri­ty.