Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Tag: Constitutional Law Page 1 of 4

Lending a Helping or Harmful Hand? Why Federal Magistrate Judges Should Not Accept Felony Guilty Pleas

by Mariana Lopez*

Magistrate judges perform a crucial role in the federal judiciary system by reducing the administrative burden on Article III judges. Courts, however, remain divided on the scope of magistrates’ duties, and importantly, whether they have  final decision-making authority to accept felony guilty pleas under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Vesting this duty in a magistrate judge violates the Federal Magistrates Act, which allows district judges to delegate “additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”1 The weightiness of this task, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution should prohibit magistrate judges from accepting guilty pleas, regardless of a criminal defendant’s consent, and require magistrates to submit a report and recommendation to an Article III judge who may then accept the plea. As the consequences of a felony verdict weigh heavily on defendants and our judicial system, this task should remain in the hands of a constitutionally endorsed Article III Judge.

Striking “the Average Person as Quite Strange”: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Heed Justice Alito’s Concerns if It Chooses to Take Up the Issue of Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing

by Lindsay Campbell*

The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in McClinton v. United States—a case which would have required the Court to consider whether the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing violates criminal defendants’ rights under the Constitution. This piece considers and responds to Justice Alito’s concurrence in the Court’s denial, arguing that Justice Alito misconstrues the constitutional issues presented by Petitioner’s claims. Specifically, he inaccurately conflates acquitted conduct and uncharged conduct; he overemphasizes the role stare decisis would play in the Court’s ruling; and he expresses concerns over the workability of criminal sentencing absent the use of acquitted conduct—concerns which only serve to highlight the unconstitutionality of the United States’ present sentencing scheme. If the Supreme Court were to take up this issue, Justice Alito’s considerations should not bar the Court from finding that the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing violates criminal defendants’ right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and their right to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment.

Resisting the Essentialist Trap: Title IX, School Bathrooms, and Nonbinary Identities in a Post-Bostock World

by Zachary Kasdin*

Should courts extend the protections of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act to protect not only transgender students who identify within the binary genders “male” or “female,” but also to nonbinary, gender-nonconforming (“GNC”), and intersex students? In this Contribution, Zachary Kasdin (’24) analyzes the two leading doctrinal approaches to the question of whether a school discriminates against a transgender student “because of sex” when it denies that student access to whichever bathroom aligns with their gender identity. He then argues that, despite some difficulties, both approaches leave room for nonbinary, GNC, and intersex students to bring compelling Title IX claims in the school bathroom-access context.

An Exception that Swallows the Rule: Limiting the Automobile Exception to Prohibit Warrantless Searches of Electronic Data in Cars

by Lucy Sundelson*

The Supreme Court has long held that under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,” except in a few limited circumstances.1 One exception to the rule is the automobile exception, which allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle and its contents with probable cause. Over time, the automobile exception has expanded beyond its original purpose, allowing police to search cars and their contents indiscriminately, and its modern application threatens to swallow the warrant requirement altogether. Computer technology offers an opportunity for courts to limit the breadth of the automobile exception and ensure it remains faithful to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment: given the profoundly private information computers and cell phones store, courts must hold that the exception does not extend to such devices. While the Court has not ruled directly on this issue, two recent decisions dealing with other exceptions to the warrant requirement make clear that the Justices agree electronic data must be handled differently than other belongings in the Fourth Amendment context. Courts should use these decisions to prohibit the warrantless search of cell phones and other similar electronic devices, even when they are found within cars.

“You’re Blocked”: Section 1983 Liability in the Age of Social Media

by Emma Becker*

With the advent of social media, a digital “town square” was created whereby elected officials and their constituents could interact in new, unforeseen ways. With the creation of this new space, however, came difficult First Amendment questions regarding digital access to officials via social media. When elected officials block constituents from their social media accounts are they acting under “color of state law,” thereby violating the First Amendment rights of those who are blocked? This Contribution argues that to determine whether an elected official is acting under “color of state law” when blocking constituents, courts should undertake a totality of the circumstances analysis, focusing on whether the social media account is swathed in the trappings of the official’s office, and whether the social media account was used as a tool of governance.

A SLAPP in the Face: How State Anti-SLAPP Statutes Can Still Apply in Federal Courts Exercising Diversity Jurisdiction

by Conner Kozisek*

A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) is a meritless lawsuit designed to chill constitutionally protected speech, thereby posing a dangerous threat to First Amendment rights. To challenge the chilling effects of SLAPP suits, more than 30 states and the District of Columbia have adopted anti-SLAPP legislation, many of which create a special motion to strike a claim based on a defendant’s speech in furtherance of their First Amendment rights. Because there is no federal anti-SLAPP legislation, the federal judiciary is divided on whether anti-SLAPP laws should apply in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, especially in the wake of the Court’s fractured opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. This Contribution argues that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply the approach set forth in Justice Stevens’s Shady Grove concurrence to recognize the potential substantive rights created by or protected through anti-SLAPP legislation.

Federal Abortion Legislation: Looking to Dobbs, State Legislation, and the Commerce Clause to Chart a Path Forward

by Soleil Ball Van Zee *

The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization opened the door to states individually regulating, controlling, and criminalizing abortion and abortion-related care. In the emerging state legislative patchwork, conflicts between state laws demonstrate the increasing need for federal abortion legislation to ensure uniformity and halt interstate constitutional litigation before it begins. This Contribution proposes a framework for federal abortion legislation that can protect long-standing principles of federalism in this new age.

The Inadequacy of Brandenburg’s Imminence: Incitement Regulation in the Internet Era

by Matthew Uvas*

Certain classes of speech are deemed to be so dangerous that they fall outside of the protections of the First Amendment. Regulation of one such class, incitement, seeks to prevent speech which would encourage lawless and violent action. The modern test for whether speech qualifies as incitement hinges upon whether the speech is likely to produce imminent lawless action. However, when hateful or violent speech is spread online, there may be a delay from when a post is made to when someone sees it and responds violently. Therefore, in these cases, imminence may not be an appropriate measure for identifying incitement language online. This Contribution argues that history, case law, and other First Amendment jurisprudence suggests shifting focus to context rather than imminence when regulating online incitement.

You Vote What You Eat? Assessing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions on Food Distribution to Voters

by Shara Safer*

A controversial Georgia law, the Election Integrity Act of 2021, prohibits non-profit organizations from handing out food or water to individuals waiting in line to vote. This Contribution argues that the law constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on free speech in a public forum.

Barred from Birthright: The Constitutional Case for American Samoan Citizenship

by Tess Saperstein*

Unlike those born in any other United States territory, American Samoans are saddled with the ambiguous legal status of “nationals, but not citizens, of the United States.” American Samoans have repeatedly sued, arguing that they are entitled to birthright citizenship. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Tenth Circuit have denied their claims, relying on the Insular Cases, a series of early twentieth century Supreme Court decisions dealing with territories acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War. Nonetheless, the modern Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to extend the logic of the Insular Cases because of their racist underpinnings. This Contribution argues for the Court to overturn the Insular Cases and grant American Samoans birthright citizenship.

Page 1 of 4

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén