N.Y.U. Proceedings – Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Boxing Out Racial Gerrymandering Claims: When Legislative Privilege and Discriminatory Intent Standards Collide

On December 2, 2024

by Benjamin Lerude*

Courts have long recognized that legislative privilege—an evidentiary rule that allows legislators to avoid compelled disclosure of evidence related to aspects of the lawmaking process—is qualified, not absolute. This qualification enables plaintiffs to gain access to the evidence necessary to hold state legislatures accountable for laws predicated upon unconstitutional bias. However, two recent developments, operating in tandem, threaten to block plaintiffs from challenging biased legislation in the redistricting context: first, lower courts are expanding legislative privilege to obscure more of the state lawmaking process, and second, the Supreme Court has imposed new requirements for racial gerrymandering claims that demand from plaintiffs a heightened understanding of that process. In other words, voting rights plaintiffs are now expected to possess detailed knowledge of the motivations underpinning state legislation while some courts are simultaneously expanding legislative privilege to block them from acquiring that knowledge. This Contribution exposes this untenable position and argues that, in a legal system that already requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory legislative intent to realize their civil rights, plaintiffs must have a viable means of piercing the veil of legislative secrecy. The longstanding qualifications and exceptions to legislative privilege must be maintained. Otherwise, state legislatures will be free to act with impunity, unbeholden to the constraints of the Constitution, and at great cost to their constituents.

Closing the Loophole: A Case for the Narrow Interpretation of ‘Corruptly’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On December 2, 2024

In Contributions

by Cole Fanning-Haag*

In the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2001 to strengthen federal criminal laws against corporate crime and fraud. In part, the Act created 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which makes it a crime to “corruptly” obstruct an official proceeding. Given the breadth and power of this statute, questions have arisen about the proper interpretation of “corruptly” and two primary answers have been put forth. This Contribution argues for the narrower interpretation: that acting “corruptly” requires that the defendant act with intent to obtain an unlawful benefit. Not only does this reflect the term’s longstanding meaning, but it also better reflects the structure of the statute, avoids supercharging relatively minor crimes into felonies with significant punishments, and more closely adheres to the statute’s purpose.

Cautious Derogation: Why States Should Not Be Permitted to Recover Under Gambling Loss Recovery Acts

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On November 5, 2024

In Contributions

by Luke Pluta-Ehlers*

For the bulk of American history, most forms of gambling have been illegal or heavily regulated. To further deter unlawful gambling, 30 states have passed Loss Recovery Acts (“LRAs”), which allow the loser of an illegal gambling transaction to sue the winner. Some states’ LRAs go further, allowing a third party to sue for doubled or tripled damages if the loser does not bring suit. One such state is Kentucky. In 2020, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings, ruling that the state of Kentucky qualified as “any other person” and could thus sue for treble damages under the state’s LRA. The court reasoned that because the state has exclusive domain over prosecuting criminal cases, the state should not be presumed excluded from the group of persons with standing to sue under the LRA. This Contribution argues that the appellate court decision overturned by the Kentucky Supreme Court better handled the novel question of whether a state can sue under an LRA. The appellate court’s approach was more in line with the cautious manner in which other courts have interpreted who can sue and be sued under penal qui tam gambling statutes. Further, this Contribution argues that permitting a state to sue under an LRA is a troubling grant of authority, as it allows the state to delegate and pursue enforcement of its criminal laws under the more generous standard of a civil lawsuit. This Contribution briefly discusses the history of LRAs, compares the holdings of the Kentucky appellate court and Supreme Court, and explains why the appellate court better examined the state’s role in law enforcement via a penal LRA.

Nothing to Latch Onto: Trademark Law’s Unpredictability in Laches Defenses Calls for a Statute of Limitations

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On October 29, 2024

In Contributions

by Max Schneider*

Trademark ownership is on the rise, and with it comes an increase in trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act. This uptick may be in part because the Lanham Act does not have a statute of limitations. Alleged infringers therefore, often raise the laches defense. Under a laches defense, if the trademark owner unreasonably delays in asserting their claim, and the delay unduly prejudices the alleged infringer, then courts may find that the infringement suit is time-barred, or they may say the equities weigh in favor of letting the case proceed. While an equitable doctrine like laches balances the harms in each case, it opens the door for far more infringement suits that may otherwise have been clearly time-barred by a statute of limitations. Given the sharp increase in infringement suits, more and more defendants are asserting laches defenses. This Contribution suggests that Congress should amend the Lanham Act to include a statute of limitations. Doing so would create uniformity across areas of intellectual property law, provide concrete notice to trademark owners, reduce infringement suits that crowd courts, and alleviate inconsistent rulings that muddle the meanings of “unreasonable” and “prejudice.”

Fishers Meet Fischer: How Fischer May Help Loper Bright Weaken the Administrative State

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On October 29, 2024

In Contributions

by Joshua Averbach*

On June 28, 2024, the United States Supreme Court decided two controversial, seemingly unrelated cases: Fischer v. United States and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Fischer narrowly interprets a federal criminal obstruction statute, vacating the convictions of some January 6 insurrectionists and weakening the related prosecution of Donald Trump. Loper Bright overturned Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a landmark case requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. This Contribution will discuss how Loper Bright weakens the administrative state by expanding courts’ ability to strike down agency action. It argues that Fischer stands for a narrow brand of statutory interpretation that may bolster the regulatory challenges made possible by Loper Bright.

Is Theft Truly a Dishonest Act?

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On October 15, 2024

In Contributions

By Tommaso Morrione*

Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the impeachment of witnesses with their past criminal convictions. Under Rule 609(a)(2), a court must admit a conviction for impeachment purposes if establishing the elements of the crime “required proving — or the witness’s admitting — a dishonest act or false statement.” Historically, some courts admitted misdemeanor theft convictions under Rule 609(a)(2); however, in 2006 the rule was amended to only admit convictions with a statutory element of deceit. While this amendment should exclude theft-based crimes from Rule 609(a)(2)’s automatic admission, the text of the amended rule still does not explicitly preclude their admission. This Contribution analyzes the arguments for and against the admission of theft-based crimes under Rule 609(a)(2), and ultimately concludes that these crimes should not be automatically admissible under the rule. While the text of Rule 609(a)(2) may be ambiguous, legislative history and policy rationales underscore that theft-based crimes are not sufficiently probative of testimonial dishonesty to be automatically admissible under the rule. Finally, this Contribution puts forward possible solutions that may provide clarity and finality regarding Rule 609(a)(2) and the admission of theft-based crimes.

On Display: Inspecting the Server Test

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On October 15, 2024

In Contributions

by Max Day^*

The Copyright Act provides owners an exclusive right to display their copyrighted works to the public. Despite this seemingly straightforward provision, courts disagree on how the display right applies to images and videos subject to unauthorized embedding on the internet. Since 2007, the Ninth Circuit has read the Copyright Act to impose no infringement liability on a website that embeds copyrighted works so long as the underlying copy of the works exists on an authorized host server. Though this reading of the Act—dubbed the “server test”—derives from a technically accurate understanding of how embedding technology works, its impact is faithless to legislative intentions and sound copyright policy. This Contribution first highlights various arguments for rejecting the server test and affording copyright owners more definite protection for the works they share online. Then, this Contribution puts forward legal alternatives to the unconditional server test, such as sublicensing agreements, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and fair use doctrine. Unlike the server test, these alternatives stem from express Copyright Act provisions and provide favorably balanced protections for limited instances of unauthorized embedding.

A Tool for Judicial Traffic Control: The Pragmatic Case for Why Heck Dismissals Ought Not Always Count as PLRA Strikes

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On September 24, 2024

In Contributions

by Austin Upshaw *

Since Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1996, courts have struggled to harmonize one of its key provisions—the ‘three-strikes rule’—with the Heck bar, a rule derived from Heck v. Humphrey, which prevents district courts from reaching the merits of Section 1983 claims that attack the validity of a conviction before that conviction has been overturned on appeal or through collateral proceedings. The PLRA’s three-strikes rule provides that if an incarcerated person has had three or more of their suits dismissed for failing to state a claim, they can no longer proceed in forma pauperis. Denial of in forma pauperis effectively prevents indigent incarcerated people from accessing relief in federal court. The crux of the Heck issue is a procedural one: is every Heck dismissal equivalent to a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)? The current circuit split mainly concerns whether Heck created a pleading requirement Section 1983 plaintiffs must plead and prove, or whether it is a waivable affirmative defense. But that focus is misplaced because a Heck-barred complaint can be properly dismissed under 12(b)(6) regardless of whether it is a pleading requirement or an affirmative defense. The better way to resolve the issue is on pragmatic, policy-driven grounds. The Heck bar is best treated as a ripeness doctrine that district courts can bypass at their sound discretion. If Heck is treated as a tool for judicial traffic control, rather than a rigid jurisdictional bar, district courts can ensure meritorious claims are not wrongfully treated as ‘strikes’ under the PLRA.

The Free Exercise Clause and School Funding: Why a State’s Exclusion of Jewish Orthodox Schools from Funding Does Not Violate the First Amendment

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On September 17, 2024

In Contributions

by Edward Stein*

Recent disputes over government’s exclusion of religious private schools from public funding shine new light on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which commands that the government “shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) offers states federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities. The question remains whether a state government’s exclusion of Jewish Orthodox schools from IDEA funding triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. This Contribution argues that exclusion of Jewish Orthodox schools from IDEA funding does not impose a sufficiently substantial burden on the religious exercise of Jewish Orthodox schools or their students’ families, and thus does not trigger strict scrutiny. First, this Contribution situates this issue by explaining the difference between direct and indirect burdens. Second, it distinguishes Jewish Orthodox parents from prior free exercise claimants to show that they do not face a substantial burden. Finally, it contends that Jewish Orthodox schools are also not subject to a substantial burden because they face a permissible use-based exclusion.

Filtering Out the Noise: Does the APA Prevent Use of AI/ML tools in Agency Review of Public Comment?

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On September 17, 2024

In Contributions

by Emmett Tabor^*

At times, administrative agencies encounter an overwhelming volume of public comments during the rulemaking process. The review of these comments, as mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), can delay the implementation of regulations and place a significant burden on resource-scarce agencies. The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) tools into the comment review process offers a promising solution to expedite notice-and-comment rulemaking. At the same time, the use of these “black box” solutions may trigger legal challenges for potentially violating the procedural requirements of the APA. This Contribution explores three anticipated legal considerations for agency use of AI/ML tools in the review of public comment: (1) disclosure requirements under APA section 553(b); (2) obligations to “consider” public comments under APA section 553(c); and (3) the rule of prejudicial error under APA section 706. Despite these concerns, this Contribution argues that incorporation of AI/ML tools into the agency comment review process is compatible with the APA.

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