by Cole Fanning-Haag*

In the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2001 to strengthen federal criminal laws against corporate crime and fraud. In part, the Act created 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which makes it a crime to “corruptly” obstruct an official proceeding. Given the breadth and power of this statute, questions have arisen about the proper interpretation of “corruptly” and two primary answers have been put forth. This Contribution argues for the narrower interpretation: that acting “corruptly” requires that the defendant act with intent to obtain an unlawful benefit. Not only does this reflect the term’s longstanding meaning, but it also better reflects the structure of the statute, avoids supercharging relatively minor crimes into felonies with significant punishments, and more closely adheres to the statute’s purpose.

18 U.S.C § 1512(c) is one of several provisions in federal law that criminalizes obstruction of justice. Before 2002, § 1512 “imposed criminal liability on anyone who ‘knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person’ to, among other things, shred documents.”1 However, the 2001 Enron collapse exposed a significant loophole in the statute which shielded culpable individuals from criminal liability.2 Specifically, the statute failed to reach persons who destroyed records themselves—the “corruptly persuades” language limited prosecution to those that persuaded someone else to, for instance, shred documents.3 Congress then passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, including § 1512, in part to plug the Enron gap in the statute.4

Section 1512(c) now targets anyone who “corruptly—(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding . . . .”5 Because “corruptly” represents the mens rea requirement for a Section 1512(c) violation, and because violators face up to twenty years of imprisonment, the meaning of “corruptly” is highly consequential. Yet, its precise definition remains unsettled. Some argue for a narrow interpretation, defining “corruptly” as acting “with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit either for [one]self or for some other person.”6 Others favor a broader definition, suggesting that “corruptly” means acting “with independently unlawful means” or purpose.7 Courts differ slightly in their precise language, but for simplicity’s sake, this Contribution will discuss the two as the “unlawful benefit” and “unlawful means or purpose” interpretations, respectively. This Contribution argues for the narrow, “unlawful benefit” definition as it reflects the term’s longstanding meaning, is consistent with § 1512’s broader structure, and prevents overly broad application of the provision—far beyond its gap-filling purpose.

 The words “corrupt” and “corruptly” have deep roots in criminal law. Their origins trace back to English extortion and bribery cases, where courts required that defendants acted with an “unlawful purpose, that is, as the purpose to give, take, receive, or accept, anything of value that is illegal or inappropriate.”8 This meaning was eventually adopted into American federal law.9 For instance, “corruptly” emerged in federal obstruction-of-justice statutes. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), enacted in 1954, criminalizes corrupt obstruction of the administration of the tax code.10 The courts of appeals that have considered the issue agree that under this statute, corrupt intent requires intent to obtain an unlawful benefit.11 18 U.S.C. § 201, enacted in 1962, imposes liability on anyone who “corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official . . . to influence any official act.”12 Courts interpret “corruptly” in this context to require that a defendant have the intent to procure unlawful benefit.13 Modern dictionaries and various state laws reinforce this interpretation.14 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “corruptly,” when used in criminal statutes, as indicating a “wrongful desire for pecuniary gain or other advantage.”15 Similarly, the California Penal Code defines corrupt intent as the “wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage.”16 Oklahoma state law echoes this standard.17

Despite the longstanding meaning of “corruptly” as the pursuit of an unlawful benefit, § 1512(c) does not explicitly define the term. However, both its history and the federal code more broadly indicate Congress intended to apply the word’s traditional meaning. The Supreme Court in Morrissette v. United States said “where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it . . . adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word” as well.18 Given the consistent usage of “corruptly,” from English common law to modern federal statutes, dictionaries, and state laws, the Morrissette rule indicates that narrower definition should apply to § 1512(c). Furthermore, in 18 U.S.C. § 1505—which concerns obstructing department, agency, and committee proceedings—Congress explicitly defined “corruptly” broadly as acting with an “improper purpose.”19 Proponents of the broader “unlawful means or purpose” definition could plausibly argue this indicates the meaning of “corruptly” within the statute differs from its historical meaning and the Section 1505 definition should govern § 1512(c) as well. But this argument is flawed. By expressly assigning an “unusually broad definition” to “corruptly” in § 1505, Congress acknowledged that the term’s ordinary meaning is narrower.20 Moreover, had Congress wanted the same broad definition read into § 1512(c), it could have made that wish explicit, as it did under § 1505.

Moreover, the “unlawful benefit” definition of “corruptly” is more consistent with the broader structure of § 1512. For one, it greatly reduces surplusage. While some surplusage is common in criminal statutes, courts should prefer constructions that avoid it.21 The broader interpretation of “corruptly,” however, would render several parts of § 1512 redundant. To illustrate, consider the following parts of the statute: § 1512(a)(1)(A) prohibits killing someone to prevent their attendance at an official proceeding, § 1512(b)(1) punishes those who use intimidation to influence the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, and § 1512(d)(1) outlaws harassing someone, thereby preventing them from testifying in an official proceeding.22 If “corruptly” merely required an unlawful means or purpose, then these sections would become unnecessary, as § 1512(c) would already address killing, intimidating, or harassing witnesses.23

Further, the “unlawful benefit” definition helps explain the penalty differences between the various parts of § 1512. The law recognizes “that the same conduct, when committed with a higher mens rea” warrants greater punishment.24 Therefore, stark sentencing disparities between subsections prohibiting similar conduct strongly suggest Congress intended to assign different mens rea requirements. One such disparity exists here. Section 1512(d) punishes intentional (a decidedly less culpable mental state than “corruptly”) harassment of a witness with up to three years of imprisonment.25 This contrasts sharply with § 1512(c), under which violators face up to twenty years.26 The narrower definition of “corruptly,” which requires the pursuit of an unlawful benefit, justifies this disparity. On the other hand, interpreting “corruptly” as merely involving an unlawful means or purpose, a definition much closer to (and, in reality, not meaningfully distinct from) the intent requirement of § 1512(d), would make the vast punishment gap harder to justify. One could explain the distinction in punishment through the actus reus of each section, but because intentional harassment (governed by subsection (d)) is often more morally reprehensible in practice than destroying documents, this argument is weak.

Finally, the broader “unlawful means or purpose” interpretation would inappropriately supercharge relatively minor crimes into felonies with significant punishment. To illustrate, consider an example: a group of protestors demonstrating outside of a courthouse prevent documents or evidence from being carried into the proceeding. These people have plainly used unlawful means in order to obstruct a proceeding—it’s illegal to demonstrate outside of a courthouse.27 While the underlying demonstration crime is relatively minor (and carries a sentence of up to one year of imprisonment), the “unlawful means” definition of “corruptly” transforms the conduct into a § 1512(c) violation. This would significantly ratchet up the punishment—up to twenty years—and disrupt the careful delineation of punishments Congress created for the underlying crimes.

Proponents of the “unlawful means or purpose” definition will cite the recent Fischer v. United States decision to downplay concerns about the breadth of § 1512(c).28 In Fischer, the Supreme Court limited the reach of the omnibus clause in § 1512(c)(2). While the clause’s wording of “otherwise obstructs . . . any official proceeding” seems broad, the Court held that the government must prove that a defendant “impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or, . . . other things used in the proceeding” to prevail.29 This narrow construction of the actus reus does admittedly do some work to limit the statute. It refines the statute to more closely reflect the scenarios which prompted the legislation and, conversely, removes liability for some scenarios that were wholly outside the minds of Congress when enacting the statute.30 The Court’s construction, however, still leaves too much room for overreach. Specifically, it allows the government to prosecute people for impairing the “availability” of evidence in a proceeding, which is far too open-ended and ripe for abuse. For instance, actions unrelated to documentary evidence, such as those involving protestors outside an official proceeding (as mentioned earlier), can still affect the availability of evidence. The Court’s interpretation also leaves intact the surplusage concerns outlined above—killing, intimidating, or harassing witnesses can easily affect the availability of evidence. Therefore, this ruling fails to adequately confine § 1512(c) to its intended target—closing the Enron gap—underscoring the need for the “unlawful benefit” interpretation of “corruptly.”

In sum, courts should interpret corrupt intent in § 1512(c) to require proof of an intent to procure an unlawful benefit, as indicated by the term’s longstanding plain meaning, the broader text and structure of § 1512, and the specific and narrow purpose behind this section of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. While a broad interpretation might allow the law to pursue a broader array of punish worthy behavior, for example in Fischer and other January 6th cases, we should be extremely careful about the increasing expansion of criminal laws.

* Cole Fanning-Haag is a J.D. Candidate (2025) at New York University School of Law. This Contribution is a commentary on the problem at the 2024 Herbert Wechsler Criminal Moot Court Competition, hosted by the University at Buffalo School of Law. One of the questions presented was whether the “corrupt” intent requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) mandated the government prove the defendant merely acted through unlawful means or with an unlawful purpose, or with the intent to procure an unlawful benefit. This Contribution distills one side of the argument, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the author’s views.

1. Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176, 2186 (2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2000) (amended 2002)).

2. Id.

3. Id. (citing Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 536 (2015)).

4. Id. at 2180.

5. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).

6. United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2023) rev’d on other grounds (Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. 1, 20 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

7. United States v. Robinson, 103 F.4th 1, 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (upholding jury instructions with the same language).

8. Fischer, 64 F.4th at 352–53 (Walker, J., concurring).

9. Id. at 353.

10. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).

11. United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).

12. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A).

13. Fischer, 64 F.4th at 354 (Walker, J., concurring).

14. Id. at 6 n.3.

15. Corruptly, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

16. Cal. Penal Code § 7(3) (Deering 2024).

17. Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 94 (LexisNexis).

18. Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).

19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (defining “corruptly” under § 1505).

20. Fischer, 64 F.4th at 357 (Walker, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

21. Id. at 374 (Katsas, J., dissenting).

22. 18 U.S.C. § 1512.

23. Fischer, 64 F.4th at 360 (Walker, J., concurring).

24. Marinello, 584 U.S. at 21 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Shad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643 (1991)).

25. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d).

26. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).

27. 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (prohibiting picketing outside a courthouse with the intent to influence a judge, juror, or witness).

28. See Fischer, 144 S. Ct. at 2182 (discussing a case involving three defendants charged with § 1512(c) violations for their participation in the invasion of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, which delayed the certification of the 2020 Presidential electoral vote. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendants’ § 1512(c) charges by narrowly construing the actus reus element to require a nexus to physical records or objects.).

29. Id. at 2187–90.

30. See id. at 2189 (finding that the court should “resist reading” a statute “to create a coverall” and instead cabining the reading within its relevant context); See also id. at 2180 (“It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress created a . . . provision that reaches beyond the scenarios that prompted the legislation.”).