by Morgan Hale*

This Contribution argues that disability testers challenging non-compliant websites under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) have Article III standing by analogizing to Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) testers in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. Despite the Supreme Court’s increasingly restrictive standing jurisprudence, the broad statutory language of the ADA parallels that of the FHA, preserving a private right of action for ADA testers. By challenging the notion that testers’ voluntary encounters with discrimination undermine their injury, this Contribution asserts that both informational and stigmatic harms remain cognizable injuries under the ADA for testers. The ADA has the unique goal of addressing both animus-based and ability-based discrimination resulting from unaccommodating goods and services. To eradicate ability-based discrimination and ensure that people with disabilities can fully and equally partake in society, the availability of accessibility information is paramount. Moreover, when people with disabilities encounter unaccommodating goods or services, they are injured with equivalent stigmatic force as individuals facing animus-based discrimination. Thus, recognizing tester standing through informational and stigmatic theories of harms is essential to achieving the ADA’s aim of eradicating systemic disability discrimination.

Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of “Cases” or “Controversies.”1 For a dispute to constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, a “plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’ in the case.”2 This “personal stake” is what courts now recognize as standing, which is established through a plaintiff showing “(i) that [they] suffered an injury in fact . . . (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.”3

This Contribution focuses solely on the first of the three standing requirements: that a plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact.” Plaintiffs can allege many kinds of injuries that satisfy this prong, from traditional tangible harms like physical injuries or money losses, to intangible harms like emotional distress from discrimination or the withholding of information that a person was legally due.4 However, only those injuries which are “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” constitute an injury-in-fact for standing purposes.5 The Supreme Court has nonetheless made clear that certain intangible injuries can be sufficiently concrete to satisfy Article III standing.6 Of the kinds of intangible harms a plaintiff can allege as an injury, two are relevant to this Contribution: informational injuries, e.g., the harm caused by the denial of access to information a plaintiff is due by right;7 and stigmatic injuries, like the harm a plaintiff experiences after having been personally discriminated against.8

In addition to asking whether a particular injury is sufficiently concrete, standing doctrine requires plaintiffs to have actually been injured or in immediate danger of injury.9 Four decades ago, the Supreme Court ruled that “tester plaintiffs”—individuals who access a defendant’s goods or services “for the [sole] purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful [] practices”—can be concretely and actually injured, even if they did not intend to use or enjoy the goods or services themselves.10 As is relevant to this Contribution, various courts have recognized that Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) testers can have standing in limited circumstances.11 However, this Contribution argues ADA testers should be able to more broadly establish standing through either informational or stigmatic theories of injury, so long as the testers are themselves disabled and personally encounter a noncompliant public accommodation.12

Tester standing was first established in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, wherein the plaintiffs argued they had a cause of action arising under § 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).13 Section 804(d) outlaws the discriminatory practice of racial steering, or misrepresenting the availability of rental units based on a prospective renter belonging to a protected class.14 Contrary to the mandates of § 804(d), the defendant rental agency in Havens informed the white tester plaintiff that certain units were available, while telling their Black tester counterparts that those same units were unavailable.15 The Court found that, even though the Black plaintiffs admitted they had no intention of renting from the defendant and were merely testing for FHA compliance, they were sufficiently injured when given erroneous rental information on account of their race.16 The Court reasoned that because the FHA’s text protects “any person” from erroneous rental information based on their belonging to a protected class, Congress intended the FHA to protect testers with as much force as individuals seeking rental information for the purpose of actually securing housing.17 At Havens’s core, the Court maintained that because the FHA “establishe[d] an enforceable right to truthful information,” and because the Black testers had been given erroneous information, they had suffered “injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against.”18 While the Supreme Court had not yet formally recognized what is now known as “informational” harm when deciding Havens, the Court has since acknowledged the Havens plaintiffs’ injuries as such.19

Following Havens, the extent to which Congress can create injuries ex nihilo sufficient for Article III standing has been seriously called into question through the Supreme Court’s heightened focus on the need for alleged injuries to be “concrete.”20 As a result, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that not every plaintiff protected by a particular statutory scheme will have standing for every statutory violation.21 Otherwise, a “[B]lack person in Hawaii could challenge . . . racially discriminatory school[s] in Maine” without any clear personal stake in correcting the discriminatory practice.22 This distinction is why the Black testers in Havens were found to have standing while their white tester counterparts did not. Although the white testers were part of the same scheme aimed to identify racial steering, because they had not been given erroneous rental information and thus had not faced discrimination themselves, the Court did not find they had any clear stake in the matter to constitute a concrete injury.23

Pursuant to this heightened need for concreteness, the Supreme Court has had to address how the Black testers in Havens were concretely injured, despite lacking any real interest in renting from the discriminatory agency and having no actual need for the rental information. To reconcile this apparent disconnect, the Court has explained that the Black Havens plaintiffs only had standing because the FHA conferred an explicit “statutory right to information,” the denial of which was per se injurious.24 In framing Havens as a case involving principally “informational” standing, the Court has avoided discussing in what other contexts, if any, testers have standing. Instead, the Court has suggested, without substantial elaboration, that “Havens was an unusual case [which] the Court has been careful not to extend . . . beyond its context.”25 However, this hesitancy is misplaced. If the Black testers in Havens suffered a concrete injury by receiving false information, then disabled ADA testers who encounter inaccessible public accommodations that impede the availability of accessibility information suffer an injury at least as concrete as that in Havens: namely, the denial of an equal opportunity to participate in public accommodations.

Unlike the racial steering in Havens, disability discrimination often results in total exclusion. Indeed, disability discrimination can be uniquely othering in that it creates a feeling of having been forgotten; while the Black testers in Havens were given false information, they were at least able to inquire about rental opportunities and receive some response.26 In contrast, a person with a disability encountering an inaccessible website or one without accessibility information may be unable to engage with the underlying business or service at all. Many individuals with disabilities must plan their outings in advance, relying on accurate accessibility information to determine whether they can safely and effectively access a business or service. When such information is absent, disabled testers face a significant barrier to equal participation—one that directly contradicts the ADA’s goal of ensuring “full and equal” enjoyment of public accommodations.27 Thus, the denial of accessibility information to disabled testers is not only comparable to the informational harm in Havens but, in many cases, more severe, as it forecloses meaningful engagement with the public sphere altogether.

Although never addressed by the Court, the testers in Havens could be understood as having also suffered stigmatic injuries—the social-emotional injuries resulting from having been personally discriminated against—sufficient for standing regardless of their status as testers. In addition to jurisprudence post-Havens clarifying that stigmatic injuries can suffice for standing,28 there is nothing in Havens cabining tester standing to informational theories of harm. Indeed, the Havens plaintiffs’ injuries were principally rooted not in whether accurate information was provided—for they had no use of truthful information as testers—but rather in the fact that it was discriminatorily provided to them based on their belonging to a protected class.29 Accordingly, the harms endured by the plaintiffs in Havens could have also been categorized as falling under a stigmatic theory of injury. Although the Court in Havens framed the harm in terms of misinformation rather than discrimination, it neither implicitly nor explicitly rejected stigmatic injury as a basis for standing. Rather, the case was decided before the Court had fully developed its modern standing doctrine regarding intangible harms, including stigmatic injuries. Because the Havens plaintiffs were subjected to differential treatment based on race, which aligns with later cases recognizing stigmatic harm,30 the argument that such harm was present, even if not explicitly labeled as such by the Court at the time, is sufficiently supported.

Under this reading of Havens, disabled testers assessing ADA accessibility compliance should also have standing under a stigmatic theory of harm when they personally encounter discriminatory conduct. Havens should not be read as requiring ADA testers to establish anything beyond discrimination itself to have standing. To find otherwise would severely undermine the ADA’s efficacy and would run counter to the logic of Havens for two reasons.

First, the ADA’s broad statutory language suggests that Congress intended robust protections against disability-based discrimination, at least as expansive as those under the FHA, if not broader. Like the FHA, which protects “any person” from discriminatory misrepresentations31—a phrase the Court in Havens found to dispositively include testers32—the ADA’s protections extend to “any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability.”33 Moreover, the ADA’s stated purpose is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate [to] eliminat[e] discrimination against individuals with disabilities” by ensuring that those individuals can “full[y] and equal[ly] enjoy[] . . . public accommodations.”34 Because the ADA mirrors the FHA’s broad “any person” language and institutes equally sweeping protections against discriminatory barriers, Havens should be read to support ADA tester standing pursuant to a stigmatic theory of harm.

Second, unlike the FHA, which primarily addresses animus-based discrimination, the ADA extends further by prohibiting both intentional discrimination and the maintenance of structural barriers that may foreseeably exclude individuals with disabilities.35 Eradicating both is essential because an unaccommodating service is not merely an oversight, but a denial of equal dignity and inclusion. Congress explicitly recognized that “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis,” thus necessitating proactive enforcement mechanisms.36 This broader protection is best effectuated through diligent testing by disabled individuals who, by personally encountering accessibility barriers, serve as essential enforcers of ADA compliance. When enacting the ADA eight years after Havens, Congress understood that ensuring “full participation” in public life required more than simply eliminating overt animus; it demanded the removal of structural barriers as well—an ambition that sets the ADA apart from the FHA’s narrower focus. Given this intent, the statute’s language can be read to intentionally allow for tester standing whenever a disabled individual personally experiences noncompliance, as the denial of accessibility itself constitutes a concrete injury.

The question of which, if any, theory of injury will suffice for standing for ADA testers was recently given heightened attention when one disabled ADA website compliance tester challenged a non-compliant hotel reservation website.37 Specifically, in Acheson v. Laufer, the plaintiff, Ms. Laufer, allegedly logged onto the defendant hotel’s reservation website and found that it lacked accessibility information about the hotel’s various rooms and services.38 Ms. Laufer argued that, under Havens, she had standing despite her status as a “self-described tester,”39 who “[did] not even harbor ‘some day’ intentions of travelling to the [Defendant’s hotel].”40 Specifically, she asserted that she had been both informationally and stigmatically injured as a tester: informationally because she had a statutory right to accessibility information under the ADA, which the defendant had failed to post; and stigmatically because the hotel had failed to accommodate her needs as a person with a disability, resulting in her exclusion and amounting to unlawful discrimination.41

While the majority in Acheson ultimately dismissed Ms. Laufer’s case as moot,42 future disabled ADA testers who similarly allege informational and stigmatic injuries should be found to have standing under the Havens tester framework. Prior to visiting a public accommodation, people with disabilities must plan ahead and evaluate whether the goods or services will be sufficiently accommodating based on their particular needs. Thus, for many public accommodations, especially those like hotels which require advanced planning to visit, one’s “full and equal enjoyment” requires that accessibility information be obtainable prior to physically travelling to the site. Nonetheless, a tester may lack standing when alleging that accessibility information is unavailable through a particular means when an adequate alternative exists—for example, when a website lacks the information, but an available phone number permitting customer calls provided any relevant accessibility information. Still, the information must be available through some accessible means. When there is no means by which prospective patrons can evaluate whether there will be sufficient accommodations to meet their needs, they are not able to equally enjoy the accommodation. Like in Havens, a plaintiff’s status as a tester does not preclude their ability to allege this form of informational injury in order to enforce ADA compliance.

In addition to being informationally harmed, the Supreme Court’s stigmatic standing jurisprudence should be read as establishing that disabled ADA testers who personally encounter unaccommodating services suffer paradigmatic stigmatic injuries. In Allen v. Wright, the Court made clear that “stigmatizing injur[ies] often caused by [] discrimination” can suffice for standing if the plaintiff was “personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”43 Disabled ADA testers, like Ms. Laufer, attempt to personally evaluate a defendant’s goods or services. However, they cannot do so when the defendant has failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. As a result, these testers meet the Allen standard for stigmatic injury because they were personally denied equal treatment on account of their disability. Structural inaccessibility signals that disabled individuals are an afterthought, reinforcing the social exclusion that the ADA was enacted to dismantle. To suggest otherwise would frustrate the ADA’s primary purpose of  eliminating systemic barriers that relegate people with disabilities to second-class status.44 Discriminatory inaccessibility is no less injurious than withheld information, as both signal that certain people do not belong. The refusal to recognize stigmatic harm for testers not only weakens the protections Congress sought to guarantee under the ADA, but also undermines the long-accepted principle that discrimination in and of itself constitutes a concrete injury.

Insofar as there exists a concern that recognizing stigmatic tester standing would “open the floodgates” to excessive litigation,45 this concern is unpersuasive for four reasons. First, only plaintiffs who are themselves disabled and personally experience informational or stigmatic harm on account of that status can bring suit as ADA testers.46 Second, because Title III of the ADA only allows for money damages in very rare circumstances “when requested by the Attorney General,” plaintiffs are not incentivized to contrive allegations of discrimination except to rectify actual noncompliance through injunctive relief.47 Third, just as the FHA has eliminated nearly all racial steering,48 it is probable that enforcement of the ADA will similarly incentivize widespread compliance. Thus, even if many ADA compliance suits were brought, the market would likely similarly correct itself over time toward compliance. Lastly, because Congress made explicit that Title III of the ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of [disability] discrimination,”49 an influx of litigation indicates little more than the statute functioning as intended.

Under Havens, ADA testers who personally experience unlawful disability discrimination—regardless of their actual intent to enjoy the underlying goods or services—can suffer harm sufficient for standing under either informational or stigmatic theories. To remain faithful to Congress’s decades-old goal of eradicating disability-based discrimination and guaranteeing full and equal participation by people with disabilities in public life, courts should not narrow Havens’ holding beyond its core logic. Instead, courts must affirm that Havens broadly supports recognizing Article III standing for ADA testers. For people with disabilities, accessibility information is paramount; when that information is unavailable or inaccessible, it is not just an inconvenience—it is a stark reminder of how easily and often disabled people’s needs are forgotten. This is paradigmatic informational and stigmatic harm. Thus, recognizing standing for disabled ADA testers via these theories of injury is essential to realizing the ADA’s promise of fully eradicating the anachronistic norms of disability discrimination it was designed to dismantle.

* Morgan Hale is a J.D. Candidate (2025) at New York University School of Law. This Contribution is a commentary on the problem at the 2024 New York City Bar Association’s National Moot Court Competition. One of the questions presented was whether an ADA tester can be either stigmatically or informationally harmed sufficient to establish Article III standing. This Contribution distills one side of the argument, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the author’s views.

1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

2. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)) (cleaned up).

3. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

4. See id. at 425 (summarizing that while “certain harms readily qualify as concrete injuries under Article III, the most obvious [of which] are tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms . . . various intangible harms can also be concrete” (cleaned up)).

5. Id. at 423.

6. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”).

7. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (holding that the “failure to obtain relevant information” guaranteed by FECA was sufficiently concrete); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (finding that when the “[a]ppellant [] specifically requested, and [was] refused” information about an ABA Committee which they were due under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the refusal “constitute[d] a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing”).

8. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984) (“[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic injuries” sufficient for standing. (emphasis added and cleaned up)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (summarizing that “stigmatizing injur[ies] caused by racial discrimination . . . [are] some of the most serious consequences of discriminatory [] action[s] and [are] sufficient in some circumstances to support standing”).

9. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (“Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

10. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 368, 373–74 (1982).

11. See, e.g., Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiff[’s] [] tester motive . . . does not foreclose standing for his claim under [the ADA].”); Suarez-Torres v. Panaderia Y Reposteria España, Inc., 988 F.3d 542, 550–51 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding that “appellant’s ‘tester’ status does not defeat standing” under the ADA).

12. Title III of the ADA regulates “public accommodations,” which are broadly understood as any private entity which “owns, leases (or leases to), or operates” facilities open to the public, see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), including, for example, hotels, grocery stores, restaurants, and museums among other enumerated examples. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).

13. Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74.

14. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).

15. Havens, 455 U.S. at 368.

16. See id. at 373–74 (“That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of [the FHA]” sufficient for standing (emphasis added)).

17. Id. at 373 (concluding “Congress has thus conferred on all ‘persons’ a legal right to truthful information about available housing. This congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining whether testers have standing”).

18. Id.

19. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 21, 25 (establishing that “informational injur[ies] . . . [can be] sufficiently concrete” for Article III standing and citing Havens as establishing that “a plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to statute”).

20. See, e.g., TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426–27 (clarifying that, while “Congress may enact legal prohibitions and obligations . . . [and] create causes of action for plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate those legal prohibitions or obligations[,] under Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact” (emphasis added)).

21. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (reiterating that, while Congress has the authority to “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law,” the injuries still must be concrete to suffice for standing).

22. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756.

23. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 374–75 (concluding the white plaintiff’s “situation is different [than his Black tester peers]” because “[h]e made no allegation that petitioners misrepresented to him that apartments were unavailable . . . [a]s such, [he] has alleged no injury . . . [and we] thus discern no support for the Court of Appeals’ holding that [he] has standing”).

24. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 454 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Havens as establishing merely that “the unlawful withholding of requested information [serves as] a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing” (cleaned up)); Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 12 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (summarizing that the Havens plaintiffs only had standing because the FHA conferred a “statutory right to [accurate] information”).

25. Food & Drug Admin. v. All. Hipp. Med., 602 U.S. 367, 396.

26. While courts have not normatively compared whether receiving no information is more injurious than receiving false information, the Supreme Court has recognized that disability discrimination is unique in that is one form of discrimination which is “often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). Moreover, when Congress amended the FHA to include disability as one of the Act’s protected classes, legislative history suggests that access, and not the provision of erroneous information, was the principal harm Congress sought to remedy. See H.R. Rep. No. 100‑711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988) (summarizing that “[t]he right to be free from housing discrimination [which] is essential to the goal of independent living” would require, as examples, wide hallways and doorways for wheelchairs, conveniently placed switches, and possibly grab bars in bathrooms—namely, physical accommodations to ensure access); but see id. at 25 (“Acts that have the effect of causing discrimination can be just as devastating as intentional discrimination. A person using a wheelchair is just as effectively excluded from the opportunity to live in a particular dwelling by the lack of access into a unit and by too narrow doorways as by a posted sign saying ‘No Handicapped People Allowed’”).

27. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

28. See cases cited supra note 8.

29. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 374 (summarizing § 804(a) of the FHA, which prohibits specifically “discriminatory refusals to sell or rent” (emphasis added)).

30. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 757 n.22 (“Respondents’ stigmatic injury . . . is judicially cognizable to the extent that respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment.”).

31. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

32. Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74.

33. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).

34. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (defining unlawful discrimination as including “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (“[U]nlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”).

36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).

37. See generally Acheson v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023).

38. Id. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring).

39. In particular, Ms. Laufer had filed approximately 600 lawsuits against hotels across the country over five years, “singlehandedly generat[ing] a circuit split.” Id. at 3 (majority opinion), 9 (Thomas, J., concurring).

40. Id. at 12 (Thomas, J., concurring) (cleaned up).

41. See Oral Argument at 57:15–43, Laufer, 601 U.S. 1 (22-429), supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2023/22-429 [hereinafter “OA”] (summarizing that, because Ms. Laufer faced “a discriminatory denial of information, [] it’s not a pure informational injury . . . [rather] it’s [also] inflicting a dignitary [stigmatic] harm” as well).

42. Ms. Laufer “voluntarily dismissed her pending suits with prejudice” after her attorney was sanctioned by the district court for “defrauding [the defendant] hotels by lying in fee petitions and during settlement negotiations.” Laufer, 601 U.S. at 3–4. However, the Court was careful to note it did not find that Ms. Laufer was “abandon[ing] her case in an effort to evade [the Supreme Court’s] review.” Id. at 5.

43. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (cleaned up).

44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (describing the primary purpose of Title III of the ADA to be “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” (emphasis added)).

45. OA at 21:44–58 (wherein the Government warned that Ms. Laufer contact-ed “more than 500 and perhaps more than 600” hotels intending to bring suit for noncompliance).

46. See, e.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 374–75 (finding that, while the Black testers had standing after receiving false rental information, the white tester had not been discriminated against and thus lacked standing).

47. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B).

48. See Lincoln Quillian et al., Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Lending Markets: A Quantitative Review of Trends, 1976–2016, 12 Race & Soc. Probs. 25, 26 (2020) (finding that, “to the extent that anti-discrimination enforcement is one factor accounting for the decline of explicit forms of discrimination, the Fair Housing Act has been successful” and that, while subtle forms of discrimination persist, “stark form[s] of discrimination . . . now occur[] much less often than it did in the 1980s and 1990s”).

49. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (emphasis added).