by Randi Brown*
When patent holders gain standard-essential status, should antitrust law treat the monopoly conferred on them like every other monopoly? In this Contribution, Randi Brown (’19) argues that the best approach to such monopolies is not to expose them to antitrust scrutiny, but instead to allow contract and patent remedies to maintain the benefits to competition and innovation afforded by standardization.
by Micaela Heery*
Can a term in a collective bargaining agreement displace state law under any circumstance? How should a court balance the need for consistent, nationwide labor standards with constitutional concerns for preserving States’ police powers? In this Contribution, Micaela Heery (’19) offers an analytical framework for resolving these preemption issues under the Labor Management Relations Act. This Contribution argues that the right legal analysis must consider both whether a claim arises independently of the collective bargaining agreement and whether preemption would be appropriate given Congress’ power over interstate commerce and notions of state sovereignty.
by Avery Medjuck*
May a school restrict a student’s online speech without violating the First Amendment? In this Contribution, Avery Medjuck (’18) explains how the omnipresence of digital communication challenges the Tinker framework for determining when a school administrator can lawfully restrict speech. This Contribution argues that only a test that considers the intent of the student speaker can adequately balance students’ free speech rights against administrators’ need to protect the school environment.
by Emily Several*
Can a public university terminate a professor for speech made related to the university? In this Contribution, Emily Several (’18) analyzes the scope of public employees’ First Amendment rights with regard to speech made in their personal and professional capacities. This Contribution ultimately argues that the Supreme Court should establish an exception to the threshold requirement set in Garcetti v. Ceballos in order to preserve academic freedom on public university campuses.
by Jason A. Driscoll*
Is damage to a lunar mining facility actionable under the Outer Space Treaty when the facility is built on the surface of the Moon and made entirely from lunar rock? In this Contribution, Jason A. Driscoll (’18) analyzes a wrinkle in the law of outer space, contemplating whether the current outer space tort regime protects damage to property crafted entirely from materials mined in outer space. The Contribution argues that the current regime does not protect and cannot account for the unprecedented, though possible, practice of manufacturing objects in outer space using extraterrestrial materials.
by Victoria del Rio-Guarner*
Should the qualified immunity doctrine be revisited to better allow civilians to sue government officials for violations of fundamental rights? In this Contribution, Victoria del Rio-Guarner (’18) discusses how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Pearson v. Callahan essentially rendered qualified immunity to Section 1983 claims unqualified. This Contribution argues that qualified immunity doctrine should be recalibrated in order to better fulfill its underlying purpose while not disabling Section 1983 claims.
by Savannah Ashby*
Should the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule apply when an officer acts in good faith in the execution of a warrant based on tainted evidence? In this Contribution, Savannah Ashby (’18) discusses the differing ways in which Courts of Appeals have applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in situations where the warrant is based on tainted evidence. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence obtained in execution of a warrant based on tainted evidence as it more consistent with the goal of the exclusionary rule: deterring officers from committing Fourth Amendment violations.
by Kimberly La Fronz*
When conducting a warrantless search or seizure, must a police officer have probable cause for all elements of the crime, including mens rea? In this Contribution, Kimberly La Fronz (’18) discusses what the circuits include in their totality of the circumstances analysis to determine probable cause. This Contribution argues that in order to effect a warrantless arrest a police officer must have probable cause with respect to every element of the crime in order to effect a warrantless arrest and must not ignore exonerating evidence in their totality of the circumstances analysis.
by Chelsea Ireland*
Is discharging the liability of a third-party non-debtor within the authority of the bankruptcy courts? In this Contribution, Chelsea Ireland (’18) addresses the circuit split as to whether bankruptcy courts can confirm reorganization plans that discharge the acquiring company’s liability to a class of creditors. This Contribution will argue that the discretion to discharge the liability of a third-party non-debtor is within the authority bankruptcy courts.
by Sharon Turret*
How long may Immigration and Customs Enforcement detain a noncitizen before he or she must go before a judge? In this Contribution, Sharon Turret (’18) analyzes the Due Process Clause issues with a “reasonableness” test for length of detention and the need for a bright-line rule. This Contribution argues that the Due Process Clause requires a bright-line rule that the length of detention be presumed unreasonable after six months. That very bright-line rule is now before the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez.
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