by Shara Safer*
A controversial Georgia law, the Election Integrity Act of 2021, prohibits non-profit organizations from handing out food or water to individuals waiting in line to vote. This Contribution argues that the law constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on free speech in a public forum.
by Tess Saperstein*
Unlike those born in any other United States territory, American Samoans are saddled with the ambiguous legal status of “nationals, but not citizens, of the United States.” American Samoans have repeatedly sued, arguing that they are entitled to birthright citizenship. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Tenth Circuit have denied their claims, relying on the Insular Cases, a series of early twentieth century Supreme Court decisions dealing with territories acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War. Nonetheless, the modern Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to extend the logic of the Insular Cases because of their racist underpinnings. This Contribution argues for the Court to overturn the Insular Cases and grant American Samoans birthright citizenship.
by Catherine Willis*
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 77z‑1(b)(1), provides that discovery should be automatically stayed in Securities Act actions at the motion to dismiss stage. Though Securities Act claims may be brought in either state or federal courts, courts are divided over whether the PSLRA discovery stay applies in both state and federal court or solely applies in federal court. This Contribution argues that the PSLRA discovery-stay provision should apply in any action under the Securities Act, regardless of venue.
by Claire Lisker*
A conviction for a “crime involving moral turpitude” renders an undocumented immigrant ineligible for cancellation of removal, a discretionary form of relief that the Attorney General may grant to individuals who have remained in the United States for ten or more years. This Contribution argues that falsifying a Social Security number, as criminalized under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
by Tina LaRitz*
The Bivens doctrine allows plaintiffs who suffer constitutional violations at the hands of federal officers to claim monetary damages from federal courts, absent the statutory recognition of such a right. Recent jurisprudence has increasingly sought to limit this right in a show of judicial conservatism at the expense of deserving plaintiffs. This Contribution argues that the Bivens doctrine must be preserved broadly within the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search context.
by Zoe Farkas*
Historically, eyewitness identifications have been considered the gold standard of trial evidence. There’s little that’s more convincing than a witness on the stand confidently pointing at a defendant and proclaiming, under oath, “that’s the one!” However, over the last half century it has become clear that eyewitness identification may actually be one of the most fallible evidentiary tools, despite common misconceptions of its accuracy. Even in the face of growing research demonstrating the unreliability of eyewitness identification, courts have been slow to allow experts to testify to that unreliability in the courtroom. Judges instead bar them as unqualified or unhelpful under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This Contribution argues that these experts are not only qualified and helpful, but absolutely essential to help juries fulfill their fact-finder duties.
by Bex Rothenberg-Montz*
Although members of the general public enjoy a right to free speech under the First Amendment, government employees’ speech is more constrained. Courts determine whether a government employee’s speech is protected by balancing the interests of the government and the employee. However, in practice, the deference afforded to the government typically tips the scales. Because courts defer to the government’s interests without requiring substantiating evidence, the government is able to stifle employee speech and erode First Amendment protections for its employees. Consequently, this deference conditions free speech protections upon public employment status. Abandoning this deference will bring First Amendment jurisprudence in line with the principles that animated its enactment.
by Kevin Lissemore*
11 U.S.C. § 365 grants a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in pos-session the power to reject executory contracts and unexpired commercial leases. Subsection (d)(3) specifies that, while the bankrupt party is deciding to assume or reject a lease, the trustee must “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor” under the lease. This subsection has given rise to significant litigation when a debtor opts to reject their lease in the middle of a rental period, particularly where the lease makes the entire period’s rent due in advance on the first day of the period. The landlord and bankrupt parties in this situation disagree about what a bankrupt party is obligated to pay: the entire rent for the final rental period or a prorated cost that covers the period prior to the rejection. However, the plain text of the statute only embraces the former interpretation. Beyond the clear textual basis, additional interpretive resources like the statutory purpose and preferable policy outcomes also align with this interpretation, resulting in an undeniable interpretation in favor of landlords.
by Matthew Dorfman*
In 2021, the Seminole Tribe of the State of Florida and the State of Florida signed a gaming compact that was tacitly approved by Secretary of the Interior Deb Haaland. The compact allowed the Seminole Tribe to operate an online sports gambling application throughout the State by deeming the location of all gaming activity as having taken place exclusively on Native lands. This Contribution argues that the meaning of the word “on” as derived from ordinary usage and from usage under similar statutory circumstances precludes the perspective adopted by the Seminole Tribe and the State of Florida, and thus requires the Secretary of the Interior to reject the gaming compact.
by Heather Globerman*
The majority of courts are in agreement that the implied admissions from a person being forced to produce a cellphone passcode—that the evidence sought exists and is authentic, and that the phone’s owner possessed that evidence—are testimonial and therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. But can the government force this production regardless by arguing for the application of the foregone conclusion exception to the privilege, a doctrine that the Supreme Court has never applied outside of an analogue business or tax context? In this Contribution, Heather Globerman (‘22) argues that both Supreme Court precedent and practical considerations forestall the extreme narrowing of the Fifth Amendment that would follow such an application of the foregone conclusion exception to a modern, personal, and digital context.
Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén