Contributions

Is dam­age to a lunar min­ing facil­i­ty action­able under the Out­er Space Treaty when the facil­i­ty is built on the sur­face of the Moon and made entire­ly from lunar rock? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Jason A. Driscoll (’18) ana­lyzes a wrin­kle in the law of out­er space, con­tem­plat­ing whether the cur­rent out­er space tort regime pro­tects dam­age to prop­er­ty craft­ed entire­ly from mate­ri­als mined in out­er space. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the cur­rent regime does not pro­tect and can­not account for the unprece­dent­ed, though pos­si­ble, prac­tice of man­u­fac­tur­ing objects in out­er space using extrater­res­tri­al mate­ri­als.

Contributions

Should the qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine be revis­it­ed to bet­ter allow civil­ians to sue gov­ern­ment offi­cials for vio­la­tions of fun­da­men­tal rights? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Vic­to­ria del Rio-Guarn­er (’18) dis­cuss­es how the Supreme Court’s deci­sions in Har­low v. Fitzger­ald and Pear­son v. Calla­han essen­tial­ly ren­dered qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty to Sec­tion 1983 claims unqual­i­fied. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that qual­i­fied immu­ni­ty doc­trine should be recal­i­brat­ed in order to bet­ter ful­fill its under­ly­ing pur­pose while not dis­abling Sec­tion 1983 claims.

Contributions

Should the Fourth Amend­ment exclu­sion­ary rule apply when an offi­cer acts in good faith in the exe­cu­tion of a war­rant based on taint­ed evi­dence? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Savan­nah Ash­by (’18) dis­cuss­es the dif­fer­ing ways in which Courts of Appeals have applied the good faith excep­tion to the exclu­sion­ary rule in sit­u­a­tions where the war­rant is based on taint­ed evi­dence. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the good faith excep­tion to the exclu­sion­ary rule should not apply to evi­dence obtained in exe­cu­tion of a war­rant based on taint­ed evi­dence as it more con­sis­tent with the goal of the exclu­sion­ary rule: deter­ring offi­cers from com­mit­ting Fourth Amend­ment vio­la­tions.

Contributions

When con­duct­ing a war­rant­less search or seizure, must a police offi­cer have prob­a­ble cause for all ele­ments of the crime, includ­ing mens rea? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kim­ber­ly La Fronz (’18) dis­cuss­es what the cir­cuits include in their total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis to deter­mine prob­a­ble cause. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that in order to effect a war­rant­less arrest a police offi­cer must have prob­a­ble cause with respect to every ele­ment of the crime in order to effect a war­rant­less arrest and must not ignore exon­er­at­ing evi­dence in their total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis.

Contributions

Is dis­charg­ing the lia­bil­i­ty of a third-par­ty non-debtor with­in the author­i­ty of the bank­rupt­cy courts? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Chelsea Ire­land (’18) address­es the cir­cuit split as to whether bank­rupt­cy courts can con­firm reor­ga­ni­za­tion plans that dis­charge the acquir­ing company’s lia­bil­i­ty to a class of cred­i­tors. This Con­tri­bu­tion will argue that the dis­cre­tion to dis­charge the lia­bil­i­ty of a third-par­ty non-debtor is with­in the author­i­ty bank­rupt­cy courts.

Contributions

How long may Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment detain a nonci­t­i­zen before he or she must go before a judge? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Sharon Tur­ret (’18) ana­lyzes the Due Process Clause issues with a “rea­son­able­ness” test for length of deten­tion and the need for a bright-line rule. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Due Process Clause requires a bright-line rule that the length of deten­tion be pre­sumed unrea­son­able after six months. That very bright-line rule is now before the Supreme Court in Jen­nings v. Rodriguez.

Contributions

Does a bun­dled dis­count offered by a dom­i­nant firm in the mar­ket vio­late Sec­tion 2 of the Sher­man Antitrust Act? Megan Hare (’18) address­es this ques­tion based on her expe­ri­ence at the 2017 Glob­al Antitrust Insti­tute Moot Court Com­pe­ti­tion. Antitrust doc­trine strong­ly favors aggres­sive pric­ing and oth­er dis­count schemes that encour­age com­pe­ti­tion with­in a giv­en mar­ket. Bun­dled dis­counts fall square­ly with­in the pro­com­pet­i­tive pric­ing schemes praised by the Supreme Court’s antitrust doc­trine. These rebates com­pel firms to com­pete for con­sumers, there­by allow­ing con­sumers to pay low­er prices for prod­ucts than they oth­er­wise would pay with­out such mar­ket com­pe­ti­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues, how­ev­er, that bun­dled dis­counts may be anti­com­pet­i­tive and unlaw­ful under the Sher­man Act when unjus­ti­fi­ably used by a dom­i­nant firm to gain addi­tion­al mar­ket share or to main­tain the firm’s exist­ing mar­ket pow­er.

Contributions

How should the law deter­mine whether a true threat was made with intent suf­fi­cient to not mer­it First Amend­ment pro­tec­tion? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ben Lazarus (’18) ana­lyzes the dif­fer­ent approach­es cir­cuit courts have tak­en to answer this ques­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that an objec­tive test for what con­sti­tutes a threat is most in line with the Supreme Court’s prece­dents and rea­son­ing when con­fronting threat­en­ing speech.

Contributions

Does the Fourth Amend­ment pro­tect a tenant’s pri­va­cy in a shared stor­age unit? Can law enforce­ment search the whole space if her cotenant con­sents? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Rachel Lern­er (’18) ana­lyzes whether a ten­ant has a rea­son­able expec­ta­tion of pri­va­cy in the space and whether it is rea­son­able for police to search the space upon a third-party’s con­sent. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Fourth Amend­ment pro­tects a shared stor­age unit either as curit­lage under Dunn or under the Katz test, and law enforce­ment can­not rea­son­ably search a well-demar­cat­ed sec­tion of the unit if anoth­er cotenant con­sents.

Contributions

Does a board of direc­tors’ pow­er to direct a cor­po­ra­tion allow it to tie its own hands in the course of nego­ti­at­ing debt agree­ments? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Caitlin Mil­lat (’18) ana­lyzes the prob­lem of dead-hand proxy puts under Delaware law, con­sid­er­ing whether these pro­vi­sions are ever allowed, and if they are, under what stan­dard of scruti­ny they should be reviewed. This con­tri­bu­tion argues that dead-hand proxy put pro­vi­sions should be eval­u­at­ed under the busi­ness judg­ment rule, not the Uno­cal enhanced scruti­ny stan­dard.