Contributions

Does a bun­dled dis­count offered by a dom­i­nant firm in the mar­ket vio­late Sec­tion 2 of the Sher­man Antitrust Act? Megan Hare (’18) address­es this ques­tion based on her expe­ri­ence at the 2017 Glob­al Antitrust Insti­tute Moot Court Com­pe­ti­tion. Antitrust doc­trine strong­ly favors aggres­sive pric­ing and oth­er dis­count schemes that encour­age com­pe­ti­tion with­in a giv­en mar­ket. Bun­dled dis­counts fall square­ly with­in the pro­com­pet­i­tive pric­ing schemes praised by the Supreme Court’s antitrust doc­trine. These rebates com­pel firms to com­pete for con­sumers, there­by allow­ing con­sumers to pay low­er prices for prod­ucts than they oth­er­wise would pay with­out such mar­ket com­pe­ti­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues, how­ev­er, that bun­dled dis­counts may be anti­com­pet­i­tive and unlaw­ful under the Sher­man Act when unjus­ti­fi­ably used by a dom­i­nant firm to gain addi­tion­al mar­ket share or to main­tain the firm’s exist­ing mar­ket pow­er.