by Noah Noonan*
The New York Family Court Act defines a “person legally responsible” for child abuse and neglect as a custodian, guardian, or any individual responsible for a child’s care. Matter of Yolanda D., the seminal case on this definition, held that to satisfy the third ‘catch-all’ category, the respondent must be the “functional equivalent” of a parent. Following that decision, New York State Family Courts deciding whether a respondent is a person legally responsible for a child’s care focused on the respondent’s role in the child’s life. Recently, though, the New York Court of Appeals readdressed the issue of how to characterize persons legally responsible in Matter of Trenasia J. The Court in Matter of Trenasia J. nominally applied the holding from Matter of Yolanda D.—that a person legally responsible must be a “functional equivalent” of a parent— but fundamentally changed the nature of this inquiry by allowing the simple existence of a familial relationship to be practically determinative. This Contribution argues that Matter of Trenasia J. improperly diverged from Matter of Yolanda D. and contravened the legislative intent behind the definition of a “person legally responsible.”