Can a bank­rupt­cy court may approve a pri­or­i­ty-skip­ping “gift” set­tle­ment in a Chap­ter 11 pro­ceed­ing pri­or to the approval of a final plan over the objec­tion of a dis­ad­van­taged class of cred­i­tors? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Nathan Gen­car­el­la (’19) argues that the prin­ci­ples of the recent Supreme Court deci­sion Czyzews­ki v. Jevic Hold­ing Corp. neces­si­tate the appli­ca­tion of the absolute pri­or­i­ty rule to pre-plan set­tle­ments in order to pre­serve the integri­ty of the Bank­rupt­cy Code’s care­ful­ly cal­i­brat­ed pri­or­i­ty scheme. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion estab­lish­es that this exten­sion of Jevic is re-affirmed by both the dic­tates of pub­lic pol­i­cy and the under­ly­ing text of the statute itself.

Non-prof­it health­care sys­tems may seek to cre­ate an inte­grat­ed care deliv­ery sys­tem by acquir­ing oth­er health­care com­pa­nies. Par­tic­u­lar risks arise when non­prof­it health­care sys­tems pur­chase for-prof­it man­age­ment ser­vices orga­ni­za­tions. In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Vic­to­ria Ham­scho, Daniel Wein­stein, and Ryan Knox (’19) call atten­tion to some sig­nif­i­cant risks non-prof­it health­care sys­tems face in acquir­ing for-prof­it man­age­ment ser­vices orga­ni­za­tions (includ­ing fraud and abuse, cor­po­rate prac­tice of med­i­cine laws, antitrust vio­la­tions, and tax vio­la­tions) and sug­gest pos­si­ble means of mit­i­gat­ing these risks.

Do undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants have Sec­ond Amend­ment rights? Can they be cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly banned from pos­sess­ing firearms? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kathy Buckalew (’19) exam­ines the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of a cat­e­gor­i­cal ban on pos­ses­sion of firearms and ammu­ni­tion by undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants liv­ing in the Unit­ed States have the same indi­vid­ual right to keep and bear arms for pur­pos­es of self-defense as do Unit­ed States cit­i­zens. There­fore, undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants can­not be cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly pro­hib­it­ed from pos­sess­ing firearms absent an affir­ma­tive show­ing by the gov­ern­ment that such a pro­hi­bi­tion is sub­stan­tial­ly relat­ed to the achieve­ment of an impor­tant gov­ern­ment inter­est.

What prin­ci­ples should courts keep in mind when inquir­ing into a defendant’s finan­cial sit­u­a­tion? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Leah Romm (’19) dis­cuss­es the equal pro­tec­tion and due process chal­lenges to incar­cer­at­ing indi­vid­u­als because of their inabil­i­ty to pay fees or fines. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that courts are con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly required to inquire into and deter­mine the finan­cial sta­tus of indi­vid­u­als who fail to pay the fees or fines they owe.

How should courts address the con­tra­dic­tion between the pre­emp­tion rules for pre-1972 record­ings in the Copy­right Act and the safe har­bors in the Dig­i­tal Mil­len­ni­um Copy­right Act? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ari Lip­sitz (’18) ana­lyzes the statu­to­ry con­flict between these pro­vi­sions and exam­ines how courts have dealt with issues under these statutes. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion dis­cuss­es the poten­tial effects of the Sec­ond Circuit’s deci­sion in Capi­tol Records v. Vimeo and pro­pos­es leg­isla­tive reform and judi­cial inter­pre­ta­tions to pro­tect inter­net pol­i­cy and copy­right law.

Under what stan­dard should courts of appeals review deci­sions of the Board of Immi­gra­tion Appeals regard­ing sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion in asy­lum cas­es? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Deirdre Dlu­goles­ki (’19) explains the role of sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion entered into evi­dence in asy­lum cas­es by the appli­cant, the gov­ern­ment, and the Immi­gra­tion Judge and the stan­dard for admis­sion. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the scope of sub­stan­tial evi­dence review of sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion should be broad, and that courts play an impor­tant role in hold­ing the BIA account­able for bas­ing its deci­sions on reli­able infor­ma­tion.

How should police offi­cers take into account the dif­fer­ent needs of a per­son with dis­abil­i­ties dur­ing an arrest? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Andrew Bre­land (’18) exam­ines the role of the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act in gov­ern­ing arrests and inves­ti­ga­tions by police of per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment mod­i­fies what search­es and seizures of indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties are con­sid­ered rea­son­able under the Fourth Amend­ment.

In a cap­i­tal case, can a defense attor­ney, against his client’s express objec­tions, con­cede his client’s guilt to the jury? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Rona Li (’19) dis­cuss­es the tri­al strat­e­gy of a defense attor­ney con­ced­ing guilt to avoid a death sen­tence and the con­flict with his client’s Sixth Amend­ment right to con­duct his own defense. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that when a defense attor­ney admits his client’s guilt to the jury over his client’s unequiv­o­cal objec­tion, he vio­lates the defendant’s Sixth Amend­ment right to make fun­da­men­tal deci­sions about his case, and fur­ther, that his actions con­sti­tute inef­fec­tive assis­tance of coun­sel.

When an auto­mo­bile is parked in a dri­ve­way in the cur­tilage of the home, does the auto­mo­bile excep­tion to the Fourth Amend­ment still apply? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kristin Mul­vey (’19) argues that the auto­mo­bile excep­tion to the Fourth Amend­ment should not apply when the vehi­cle is in the cur­tilage of the home. Fur­ther, this Con­tri­bu­tion demon­strates that the under­ly­ing jus­ti­fi­ca­tions for the auto­mo­bile excep­tion do not sup­port a war­rant­less search of an auto­mo­bile parked in a dri­ve­way.