Can plain­tiffs bring state law claims of neg­li­gence per se based only on alleged vio­la­tions of the Health Insur­ance Porta­bil­i­ty and Account­abil­i­ty Act (HIPAA)? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ryan Knox (’19) dis­cuss­es the inter­ac­tion of HIPAA with state neg­li­gence claims and the legal and pol­i­cy rea­sons chal­leng­ing these pri­vate claims. This Con­tri­bu­tion ulti­mate­ly argues that neg­li­gence per se claims under state law should not be per­mit­ted to be brought when based only on alleged HIPAA vio­la­tions.

To what extent can a SEP hold­er can dis­crim­i­nate in how it licens­es to sup­pli­ers with­out vio­lat­ing its FRAND com­mit­ment? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Arielle Kop­pell (’19) con­sid­ers whether and how SEP hold­ers can dis­crim­i­nate in licens­ing. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that a SEP hold­er should be able to arrange dif­fer­en­tial licens­ing terms for ver­ti­cal­ly inte­grat­ed and non-ver­ti­cal­ly inte­grat­ed licensee coun­ter­parts require its licensees to pur­chase tied non-SEP com­po­nents when those non-SEP com­po­nents are func­tion­al­ly relat­ed.

When does the use of the Exchange Act cross the line into for­bid­den extrater­ri­to­ri­al­i­ty? In this con­tri­bu­tion, Math­ews R. de Car­val­ho (’19) exam­ines recent fed­er­al court deci­sions which try to devel­op a body of law under which Sec­tion 10(b) might be applied to par­ties out­side the Unit­ed States with­out con­tra­ven­ing the pre­sump­tion against extrater­ri­to­ri­al­i­ty. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that one approach tak­en by cir­cuit courts – the irrev­o­ca­ble lia­bil­i­ty test – rep­re­sents the most faith­ful appli­ca­tion of the Supreme Court’s dic­tates in Mor­ri­son v. Nation­al Aus­tralia Bank Ltd.

Are plain­tiffs who raise hybrid claims for unsea­wor­thi­ness under the com­mon law of admi­ral­ty and neg­li­gence under the Jones Act inel­i­gi­ble to obtain pre­judg­ment inter­est? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Nate Blevins (’19) dis­cuss­es the inter­ac­tion of admi­ral­ty com­mon law and the Jones Act—along with the Fed­er­al Employ­ers Lia­bil­i­ty Act incor­po­rat­ed therein—that has led to a cir­cuit split on this issue. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that, con­trary to the rule in most cir­cuits, a plain­tiff who pre­vails on both counts of a hybrid claim should be eli­gi­ble for pre­judg­ment inter­est.

Must inter­preters be avail­able for cross exam­i­na­tion under the Con­fronta­tion Clause? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Caleb Younger (’19) dis­cuss­es the con­duit the­o­ry in light of the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Craw­ford v. Wash­ing­ton and sub­se­quent low­er court find­ings. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Craw­ford Court prop­er­ly inter­pret­ed the Sixth Amend­ment and that the lan­guage con­duit the­o­ry fails under both Supreme Court jurispru­dence and the Con­sti­tu­tion­al text.

Do alle­ga­tions of ter­ror­ist con­duct along with the accused’s unre­lat­ed crim­i­nal records, estab­lish prob­a­ble cause under the Fourth Amend­ment? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Daniel Kugler (’19) dis­cuss­es how cir­cuits have approached this and sim­i­lar ques­tions using the Supreme Court’s total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances frame­work. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that an ex-spouse’s alle­ga­tions of terrorism—such as stock­pil­ing weapons and post­ing ter­ror­ist pro­pa­gan­da on social media—are insuf­fi­cient to estab­lish prob­a­ble cause to search for con­tra­band when accom­pa­nied only by the accused’s unre­lat­ed crim­i­nal records.

When does a pub­lic official’s pri­vate social media account become a tool of gov­er­nance sub­ject to con­sti­tu­tion­al analy­sis? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Leah Rosen­berg (’19) argues that pub­lic offi­cials who use their per­son­al social media pages to inter­act with the pub­lic and announce pol­i­cy should be required to pro­tect con­stituents’ con­sti­tu­tion­al rights and may not engage in view­point dis­crim­i­na­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion rec­om­mends that courts apply a con­text-spe­cif­ic approach to cen­sor­ship claims against state offi­cials and that court con­sid­er the spe­cif­ic activ­i­ties chal­lenged by assess­ing whether state resources and employ­ees were used to take those actions, if the con­tent per­tained to gov­ern­ment activ­i­ties or pol­i­cy, and whether the offi­cial was act­ing as an agent of the state at the time the cen­sor­ship occurred.

Does a state offi­cial engage in view­point dis­crim­i­na­tion in a state-spon­sored forum when they delete a constituent’s com­ments or block them from their social media pages? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Mag­gie Seery (’19) dis­cuss­es the pos­si­ble con­sti­tu­tion­al vio­la­tions an offi­cial may make when using social media to inter­act with the pub­lic. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that delet­ing a com­ment or block­ing a user from a pub­lic social media page con­sti­tutes uncon­sti­tu­tion­al view­point dis­crim­i­na­tion.

Does a plain­tiff alleg­ing sex­u­al ori­en­ta­tion dis­crim­i­na­tion state a valid cause of action under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Eri­ka Mur­dock (’19) dis­cuss­es whether sex­u­al ori­en­ta­tion dis­crim­i­na­tion is encom­passed with­in the lan­guage of Title VII after recent EEOC and appel­late court cas­es. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that Title VII’s pro­hi­bi­tion of dis­crim­i­na­tion on the basis of “sex” inher­ent­ly encom­pass­es sex­u­al ori­en­ta­tion as a sub­set of the sex dis­crim­i­na­tion it bans.