N.Y.U. Proceedings – Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

The Tucker Act and the First Amendment: Core Constitutional Claims Do Not Belong in the Court of Federal Claims

On April 3, 2026

by Wiatt Hinton*

Since October 7th, 2023, protests and encampments nationwide have forced schools to reconsider their balance between free speech and anti-harassment policies. In response to these protests, the Trump administration cut billions of dollars in federal funding from universities to extract settlements and impose speech policies favorable to the administration. Universities subsequently filed suit to reclaim their funding, bringing claims that, inter alia, the Trump administration violated their First Amendment rights. Instead of fighting these First Amendment claims head-on, the Trump administration delayed the conflict by seeking to shift the venue from federal district courts to the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. Although the Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation of the Tucker Act in Administrative Procedure Act claims, its reasoning there should not apply to First Amendment claims. This Contribution argues that a proper reading of the Tucker Act strips the CFC of jurisdiction over First Amendment claims because they are not money-mandating and because the CFC lacks the equitable power needed to remedy these violations. With this construction, the Trump administration can no longer escape liability for their suppressive policies and universities can restore their academic freedom.

From Alvarez to AI: False Speech and Political Deepfakes

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 30, 2026

In Contributions

By Mara Clemons*

Political deepfakes occupy the outer limits of First Amendment protection by combining political expression with uniquely persuasive deception. Their capacity to mislead voters erodes trust in authentic media and challenges the traditional assumption that false political speech can be reliably corrected through the marketplace of ideas. Recent judicial treatment of state-level deepfake regulations illustrates the narrow constitutional space available for regulation. Statutes regulating political deepfakes should not receive strict scrutiny protection when analyzed by courts for First Amendment violations because the defining harm arises not from the communication of false ideas, but from the deliberate deception of speaker identity. By falsely representing who is speaking, deepfakes distort the informational cues that enable voters to assess credibility and accountability, placing them outside the core category of traditional political speech that the First Amendment is intended to protect. Regulations of political deepfakes target this deceptive mechanism, rather than suppressing ideas or viewpoints, and should therefore be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny.

Lanham-Strung: How the Supreme Court Misunderstood the Proper Scope of Extraterritorial Liability under the Lanham Act

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 26, 2026

In Contributions

by Lyndsey Garbee*

The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of construction meant to limit U.S. laws to matters of domestic concern. However, the Supreme Court has held that this presumption can be overcome when domestic conduct occurs that is relevant to the statute’s focus. In Abitron v. Hetronics, the Supreme Court found that the relevant conduct for purposes of the Lanham Act, which regulates trademark rights and liabilities, is domestic use of the infringing mark in commerce. However, the Lanham Act only prohibits uses in commerce that are likely to cause consumer confusion. Based on the text of the Lanham Act, the Court’s extraterritoriality precedent, and the purpose of the Lanham Act, this Contribution argues that the proper analysis of the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act turns not on domestic use in commerce, but on whether such use is likely to cause domestic consumer confusion.

Rethinking the “Foreign Affairs” Exception: A Case for Why Emergency Tariffs Should Not Be Immune from Nondelegation Scrutiny

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 23, 2026

In Contributions

by Olivia Baldwin*

In February of 2025, President Trump declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) in order to impose sweeping tariffs on major U.S. trading partners. Exercising such expansive economic authority on the basis of vague statutory language raises serious separation of powers concerns under the nondelegation doctrine. Although the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes on nondelegation grounds only twice, the current Court has signaled renewed interest in enforcing the doctrine. This resurgence raises a critical question: Should the nondelegation canon apply less rigorously when Congress delegates power to the President in matters of foreign affairs? The asserted “foreign affairs” exception, based largely on the Court’s opinion in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. has long insulated such legislative delegations from meaningful scrutiny. However, a foreign affairs exception has no basis in the text of the Constitution and is inappropriate given modern convergence between foreign and domestic matters. This Contribution argues that the nondelegation doctrine should apply with equal force in both foreign and domestic contexts, and that the proper analysis is whether the President possesses independent power over the delegated matter. Using IEEPA as a focal point, this Contribution demonstrates that “foreign affairs” provide no coherent or constitutionally grounded justification for relaxing the nondelegation doctrine.

Policing by Algorithm: Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the Age of AI Surveillance

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On January 5, 2026

In Contributions

by Elysia Wu*

The Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures were developed when law enforcement investigations relied on publicly exposed information and relatively simple, localized data-collection technologies. The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in law enforcement, however, places increasing strain on these traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Predictive policing software, facial recognition systems, and other algorithmic tools can generate detailed profiles of individuals without a warrant or individualized suspicion, enabling wide-scale police monitoring in a continuous, data-driven way. Treating AI tools as functionally equivalent to traditional policing techniques risks eroding constitutional safeguards and exacerbating existing racial disparities in the criminal legal system. To avoid these harms and ensure that the adoption of AI by law enforcement does not erode the Fourth Amendment’s core protections, courts must find that AI surveillance requires a warrant due to its scale, continuity, and predictive inferences.

Antitrust and Serial Sham Litigation: The Case for a Narrow Universal Test

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On December 29, 2025

In Contributions

by Malory Weigel*

The First Amendment protection to petition the government has led the Supreme Court to recognize certain actions by firms as immunized under antitrust laws. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects from antitrust scrutiny a firm who petitions the government, via Congress, courts, or administrative agencies, to take action against its competitors. The Supreme Court has identified an important exception to this immunity: sham litigation. However, the Court has yet to define a clear test to evaluate allegations of a scheme of repetitious sham litigation by a firm against its competitors. While the majority of circuit courts faced with the question have adopted a dual-test system wherein one strict, defendant-friendly standard applies for evaluating allegations of singular sham litigation and a separate flexible, plaintiff-friendly standard applies for allegations of serial sham litigation, this Contribution argues that the same strict test should apply for both singular and serial sham litigation. Applying a universal, strict test to all allegations of sham litigation is consistent with prior actions of the Supreme Court and Congress, aligns with traditional antitrust jurisprudence, ensures the protection of fundamental freedoms, and presents fewer application obstacles.

Sex, Stigma, and the Best Interests Standard: Demanding Causation in Custody Adjudication

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On December 5, 2025

In Contributions

by Lana Davidoff*

In making custody determinations, a court’s only goal is evaluating and effectuating the child’s best interest. This Contribution argues that courts making child custody decisions must treat a parent’s sexual conduct with greater consistency and analytical rigor. Although the “best interests of the child” standard requires courts to weigh factors like parental fitness, stability, and capacity to provide care, the analysis of sex addiction within this framework remains fragmented and often distorted by moral judgment. This Contribution contends that sex addiction should only be considered by courts making custody determinations through a structured inquiry that distinguishes between diagnosis and conduct, resists moralistic reasoning, and requires a causal nexus between the conduct and potential or actual harm. By reframing courts’ consideration of sex addiction in custody determinations with regard to parenting capacity, courts will be better equipped to protect children’s welfare without encroaching on parents’ liberty.

Search by Geofence Warrant: Why Location Sharing Does Not Relinquish Fourth Amendment Rights

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On December 4, 2025

In Contributions

by Lily Van Petten*

This Contribution argues that the sweeping data retrievals conducted via geofence warrants constitute Fourth Amendment searches for purposes of constitutional protections. The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Chatrie avoided a definitive holding as to whether these investigatory tools pass constitutional muster. The court merely affirmed the district court’s holding that despite the occurrence of a Fourth Amendment violation, evidence would not be suppressed in the defendant’s criminal trial due to the good faith efforts of the investigating officers. The Fourth Circuit should have conclusively held that law enforcement’s use of a geofence warrant constitutes a search because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data under the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States, regardless of the fact that users share that data with third parties. As a result, a particularized search warrant stating probable cause must be obtained for each stage of data acquisition facilitated by a geofence warrant.

Confusion, Not Transformation: A Trademark Approach to the Right of Publicity

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On December 1, 2025

In Contributions

by Samantha O’Connell*

Originating in common law privacy torts, the right of publicity now protects the economic and reputational value of identity instead. However, current holdings by courts have produced vague and inconsistent standards, particularly in the age of AI-generated deepfakes. This Contribution argues that the right of publicity should be re-oriented from copyright-inspired frameworks, such as the transformative use test, toward the trademark-based analysis established in Rogers v. Grimaldi which is centered on misattribution of source. A trademark-inspired analysis of right of publicity cases would yield more consistent results while more clearly targeting the core harms of this tort: misappropriation of goodwill and unjust enrichment. By emphasizing consumer perception over subjective aesthetic judgment, the Rogers test fills loopholes in the current doctrine that infringers might exploit, safeguards valuable social commentary, and better equips courts to address new forms of identity exploitation in digital media.

Zimmer Radio and the Future of Media Ownership: Evidence-Based Modernization Without Deregulation

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On November 29, 2025

In Contributions

by Danielle Resheff*

The Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Zimmer Radio of Mid-Missouri Inc. v. FCC provides a crucial opportunity to advocate for a nuanced and targeted approach to media regulation—one that rejects outdated restrictions like the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) “Top-Four Prohibition” without embracing wholesale abandonment of structural safeguards. While the Eighth Circuit correctly identified that the FCC’s rules fail to account for the competitive realities of modern media—such as multicast streaming—this finding should not be misconstrued as a mandate for complete deregulation of television ownership limits—such as the national audience cap. This Contribution argues that abandoning the long-standing 39 percent national audience cap, a rule designed to prevent excessive media consolidation and protect localism, would be a dangerous overcorrection. Instead of a deregulatory race to the bottom, the Zimmer Radio decision compels a more sophisticated path: one that modernizes the rules to reflect technological advancements, like multicast streaming, while steadfastly retaining foundational regulations that ensure the continued viability of diverse, local new broadcasting operations. This approach acknowledges that a healthy media ecosystem requires both the flexibility to innovate and the structural limitations necessary to protect the public interest.

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