In the con­text of fair use, should courts fac­tor moral harms into their analy­ses? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Yonatan She­fa (’19) chal­lenges the applic­a­bil­i­ty – in the con­text of fair use – of a recent line of research by legal aca­d­e­mics who argue that copy­right law should grant artists a degree of pro­tec­tion against moral harms since those pro­tec­tions bet­ter incen­tivize cre­ation. This Con­tri­bu­tion ulti­mate­ly argues that courts must not con­sid­er moral harms in the fair use scheme absent such a direc­tive by Con­gress, and that Con­gress would be ill-advised to effect such a change to the law.

Should the Copy­right Office be able to vet copy­right appli­ca­tions before any action for copy­right infringe­ment is insti­tut­ed? This term, in the upcom­ing case Fourth Estate, the Supreme Court will con­sid­er whether “reg­is­tra­tion” with­in the mean­ing of the Unit­ed States Copy­right Act mere­ly mean that the com­po­nents of the appli­ca­tion need to be sub­mit­ted to the Copy­right Office (the “appli­ca­tion” approach) or that the Copy­right Office has affir­ma­tive­ly approved or refused the appli­ca­tion (the “reg­is­tra­tion” approach). In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Jonathan Wieder (’19) dis­cuss­es the tex­tu­al and leg­isla­tive ori­gins and con­se­quences of each approach and the dif­fer­ing cir­cuit inter­pre­ta­tions that led to the grant of cer­tio­rari in Fourth Estate. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the reg­is­tra­tion approach bet­ter effec­tu­ates con­gres­sion­al pol­i­cy of vest­ing the Copy­right Office with dis­cre­tion over copy­righta­bil­i­ty and bal­anc­ing pro­tec­tions for all par­ties to a copy­right dis­pute.

The bal­anc­ing act that is the Unit­ed States Bank­rupt­cy Code some­times leads to a ten­sion between sec­tions of the Code that grant rights to debtors and those that pro­vide pro­tec­tions for par­ties with an inter­est in the debtor’s prop­er­ty. In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Gavin Mack­ie (’19) explores the con­flict between Sec­tions 363(f) and 363(h) and how courts have approached sit­u­a­tions where this con­flict aris­es. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion will argue that the pos­ses­so­ry rights guar­an­teed by sec­tion 365(h) should be pro­tect­ed in any sale, and that a sale under 363(f) can­not elim­i­nate the lessee’s inter­est.

Can a bank­rupt­cy court may approve a pri­or­i­ty-skip­ping “gift” set­tle­ment in a Chap­ter 11 pro­ceed­ing pri­or to the approval of a final plan over the objec­tion of a dis­ad­van­taged class of cred­i­tors? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Nathan Gen­car­el­la (’19) argues that the prin­ci­ples of the recent Supreme Court deci­sion Czyzews­ki v. Jevic Hold­ing Corp. neces­si­tate the appli­ca­tion of the absolute pri­or­i­ty rule to pre-plan set­tle­ments in order to pre­serve the integri­ty of the Bank­rupt­cy Code’s care­ful­ly cal­i­brat­ed pri­or­i­ty scheme. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion estab­lish­es that this exten­sion of Jevic is re-affirmed by both the dic­tates of pub­lic pol­i­cy and the under­ly­ing text of the statute itself.

Non-prof­it health­care sys­tems may seek to cre­ate an inte­grat­ed care deliv­ery sys­tem by acquir­ing oth­er health­care com­pa­nies. Par­tic­u­lar risks arise when non­prof­it health­care sys­tems pur­chase for-prof­it man­age­ment ser­vices orga­ni­za­tions. In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Vic­to­ria Ham­scho, Daniel Wein­stein, and Ryan Knox (’19) call atten­tion to some sig­nif­i­cant risks non-prof­it health­care sys­tems face in acquir­ing for-prof­it man­age­ment ser­vices orga­ni­za­tions (includ­ing fraud and abuse, cor­po­rate prac­tice of med­i­cine laws, antitrust vio­la­tions, and tax vio­la­tions) and sug­gest pos­si­ble means of mit­i­gat­ing these risks.

Do undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants have Sec­ond Amend­ment rights? Can they be cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly banned from pos­sess­ing firearms? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kathy Buckalew (’19) exam­ines the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of a cat­e­gor­i­cal ban on pos­ses­sion of firearms and ammu­ni­tion by undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants liv­ing in the Unit­ed States have the same indi­vid­ual right to keep and bear arms for pur­pos­es of self-defense as do Unit­ed States cit­i­zens. There­fore, undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants can­not be cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly pro­hib­it­ed from pos­sess­ing firearms absent an affir­ma­tive show­ing by the gov­ern­ment that such a pro­hi­bi­tion is sub­stan­tial­ly relat­ed to the achieve­ment of an impor­tant gov­ern­ment inter­est.

What prin­ci­ples should courts keep in mind when inquir­ing into a defendant’s finan­cial sit­u­a­tion? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Leah Romm (’19) dis­cuss­es the equal pro­tec­tion and due process chal­lenges to incar­cer­at­ing indi­vid­u­als because of their inabil­i­ty to pay fees or fines. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that courts are con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly required to inquire into and deter­mine the finan­cial sta­tus of indi­vid­u­als who fail to pay the fees or fines they owe.

How should courts address the con­tra­dic­tion between the pre­emp­tion rules for pre-1972 record­ings in the Copy­right Act and the safe har­bors in the Dig­i­tal Mil­len­ni­um Copy­right Act? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ari Lip­sitz (’18) ana­lyzes the statu­to­ry con­flict between these pro­vi­sions and exam­ines how courts have dealt with issues under these statutes. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion dis­cuss­es the poten­tial effects of the Sec­ond Circuit’s deci­sion in Capi­tol Records v. Vimeo and pro­pos­es leg­isla­tive reform and judi­cial inter­pre­ta­tions to pro­tect inter­net pol­i­cy and copy­right law.

Under what stan­dard should courts of appeals review deci­sions of the Board of Immi­gra­tion Appeals regard­ing sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion in asy­lum cas­es? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Deirdre Dlu­goles­ki (’19) explains the role of sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion entered into evi­dence in asy­lum cas­es by the appli­cant, the gov­ern­ment, and the Immi­gra­tion Judge and the stan­dard for admis­sion. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the scope of sub­stan­tial evi­dence review of sup­port­ing doc­u­men­ta­tion should be broad, and that courts play an impor­tant role in hold­ing the BIA account­able for bas­ing its deci­sions on reli­able infor­ma­tion.