Can a pub­lic uni­ver­si­ty ter­mi­nate a pro­fes­sor for speech made relat­ed to the uni­ver­si­ty? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Emi­ly Sev­er­al (’18) ana­lyzes the scope of pub­lic employ­ees’ First Amend­ment rights with regard to speech made in their per­son­al and pro­fes­sion­al capac­i­ties. This Con­tri­bu­tion ulti­mate­ly argues that the Supreme Court should estab­lish an excep­tion to the thresh­old require­ment set in Garcetti v. Cebal­los in order to pre­serve aca­d­e­m­ic free­dom on pub­lic uni­ver­si­ty cam­pus­es.

Is dam­age to a lunar min­ing facil­i­ty action­able under the Out­er Space Treaty when the facil­i­ty is built on the sur­face of the Moon and made entire­ly from lunar rock? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Jason A. Driscoll (’18) ana­lyzes a wrin­kle in the law of out­er space, con­tem­plat­ing whether the cur­rent out­er space tort regime pro­tects dam­age to prop­er­ty craft­ed entire­ly from mate­ri­als mined in out­er space. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the cur­rent regime does not pro­tect and can­not account for the unprece­dent­ed, though pos­si­ble, prac­tice of man­u­fac­tur­ing objects in out­er space using extrater­res­tri­al mate­ri­als.

Should the Fourth Amend­ment exclu­sion­ary rule apply when an offi­cer acts in good faith in the exe­cu­tion of a war­rant based on taint­ed evi­dence? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Savan­nah Ash­by (’18) dis­cuss­es the dif­fer­ing ways in which Courts of Appeals have applied the good faith excep­tion to the exclu­sion­ary rule in sit­u­a­tions where the war­rant is based on taint­ed evi­dence. Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the good faith excep­tion to the exclu­sion­ary rule should not apply to evi­dence obtained in exe­cu­tion of a war­rant based on taint­ed evi­dence as it more con­sis­tent with the goal of the exclu­sion­ary rule: deter­ring offi­cers from com­mit­ting Fourth Amend­ment vio­la­tions.

When con­duct­ing a war­rant­less search or seizure, must a police offi­cer have prob­a­ble cause for all ele­ments of the crime, includ­ing mens rea? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Kim­ber­ly La Fronz (’18) dis­cuss­es what the cir­cuits include in their total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis to deter­mine prob­a­ble cause. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that in order to effect a war­rant­less arrest a police offi­cer must have prob­a­ble cause with respect to every ele­ment of the crime in order to effect a war­rant­less arrest and must not ignore exon­er­at­ing evi­dence in their total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis.

Is dis­charg­ing the lia­bil­i­ty of a third-par­ty non-debtor with­in the author­i­ty of the bank­rupt­cy courts? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Chelsea Ire­land (’18) address­es the cir­cuit split as to whether bank­rupt­cy courts can con­firm reor­ga­ni­za­tion plans that dis­charge the acquir­ing company’s lia­bil­i­ty to a class of cred­i­tors. This Con­tri­bu­tion will argue that the dis­cre­tion to dis­charge the lia­bil­i­ty of a third-par­ty non-debtor is with­in the author­i­ty bank­rupt­cy courts.

How long may Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment detain a nonci­t­i­zen before he or she must go before a judge? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Sharon Tur­ret (’18) ana­lyzes the Due Process Clause issues with a “rea­son­able­ness” test for length of deten­tion and the need for a bright-line rule. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Due Process Clause requires a bright-line rule that the length of deten­tion be pre­sumed unrea­son­able after six months. That very bright-line rule is now before the Supreme Court in Jen­nings v. Rodriguez.

How should the law deter­mine whether a true threat was made with intent suf­fi­cient to not mer­it First Amend­ment pro­tec­tion? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ben Lazarus (’18) ana­lyzes the dif­fer­ent approach­es cir­cuit courts have tak­en to answer this ques­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that an objec­tive test for what con­sti­tutes a threat is most in line with the Supreme Court’s prece­dents and rea­son­ing when con­fronting threat­en­ing speech.