Arrests and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Towards a Unitary Reasonableness Standard

by Conor Gaffney1

Title II of the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act (ADA) con­tains a sim­ple, but pow­er­ful antidis­crim­i­na­tion rule: pub­lic enti­ties must make rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions in their activ­i­ties if fail­ing to do so would deny indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties the ben­e­fits of those activ­i­ties.2 This pref­er­en­tial treat­ment rule is unique among fed­er­al antidis­crim­i­na­tion laws, most of which pro­hib­it inten­tion­al or express dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment, but do not require accom­mo­dat­ing treat­ment of peo­ple who are dif­fer­ent­ly sit­u­at­ed.3 More­over, Title II’s lan­guage sweeps broad­ly, apply­ing this affir­ma­tive antidis­crim­i­na­tion duty to prac­ti­cal­ly any pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty.4 But the statute does have lim­its, both from the statu­to­ry text itself, and—more substantively—from inter­act­ing con­sti­tu­tion­al pro­vi­sions.

This Con­tri­bu­tion exam­ines the role of the ADA in gov­ern­ing arrests and inves­ti­ga­tions by police of per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties and argues that the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment mod­i­fies what search­es and seizures of indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties are con­sid­ered rea­son­able under the Fourth Amend­ment. This is for one basic rea­son: rea­son­able­ness under the Fourth Amend­ment ana­lyzes the total­i­ty of cir­cum­stances, and the ADA expands those cir­cum­stances to include the con­gres­sion­al judg­ment as to whether there must be an accom­mo­da­tion or not.

* * * * *

In 2015, the Unit­ed States Supreme Court grant­ed cer­tio­rari in City and Coun­ty of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han to decide whether and how the ADA applies to police activ­i­ties dur­ing arrests.5 In the sev­er­al decades since Con­gress passed the ADA, and espe­cial­ly fol­low­ing the Court’s expan­sive inter­pre­ta­tion of Title II’s applic­a­bil­i­ty in Penn­syl­va­nia Depart­ment of Cor­rec­tions v. Yeskey,6 the Cir­cuit Courts of Appeals have frag­ment­ed on what law enforce­ment con­duct the ADA reach­es, and what exact­ly a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion is in the uncer­tain and poten­tial­ly dan­ger­ous cir­cum­stances that police reg­u­lar­ly encounter dur­ing arrests.7 But Shee­han did not resolve the issue, as a sud­den change in posi­tion by the peti­tion­er, San Fran­cis­co, pushed a some­what exas­per­at­ed Court to deem cer­tio­rari improv­i­dent­ly grant­ed on this issue, leav­ing the circuit’s var­i­ous splits in place.8

The rules in the cir­cuits vary wide­ly. In the Fifth Cir­cuit, the ADA cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly does not apply dur­ing an officer’s on-the-street response until the offi­cer secures the scene and ensures that there is no threat to human life.9 In the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir­cuits, the ADA applies gen­er­al­ly to arrests, and the law’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment is inte­grat­ed into the Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness analy­sis of the arrest.10

The method­olo­gies behind the cir­cuits’ var­i­ous analy­ses, though, appear to con­verge. All asked whether a threat to offi­cer and pub­lic safety—classically rec­og­nized exi­gent cir­cum­stances in Fourth Amend­ment jurispru­dence11—also intro­duced judi­cial­ly deter­minable excep­tions to the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion analy­sis. Thus, the Fifth Cir­cuit was able to for­mu­late a cat­e­gor­i­cal rule that unse­cured street arrests are ADA-exempt sce­nar­ios because requir­ing a police offi­cer to make an accom­mo­da­tion before ensur­ing his own safe­ty is per se unrea­son­able.12 The Fourth Cir­cuit came the oppo­site con­clu­sion because it thought that since the rea­son­able­ness of a giv­en accom­mo­da­tion requires ana­lyz­ing the total­i­ty of cir­cum­stances, cat­e­gor­i­cal exemp­tions for arrests are inap­pro­pri­ate, even though exi­gent cir­cum­stances com­mon to arrests can ren­der the pro­ce­dures used “rea­son­able under the ADA.”13

ADA arrest cas­es present a col­li­sion, then, between the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ments and the con­sti­tu­tion­al pro­nounce­ments on what con­sti­tutes rea­son­able law enforce­ment con­duct dur­ing the course of an arrest, and com­men­ta­tors looked with great antic­i­pa­tion towards the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Shee­han.14 How­ev­er, clar­i­ty would be denied as the peti­tion­er, San Fran­cis­co, shift­ed argu­ments before the Supreme Court. Instead of argu­ing, as it had before the Ninth Cir­cuit, that the ADA did not require offi­cers to make any addi­tion­al accom­mo­da­tions when pre­sent­ed with safe­ty exi­gen­cies per Hainze,15 San Fran­cis­co instead argued that a pre­vi­ous­ly unmen­tioned reg­u­la­tion con­trolled the ques­tion. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139 states that Title II does not require pub­lic enti­ties to allow peo­ple to par­tic­i­pate in their pro­grams or activ­i­ties if that per­son pos­es a “direct threat to the health or safe­ty of oth­ers.”16 Fol­low­ing this reg­u­la­tion, the City argued, Shee­han is exclud­ed from the Title II’s pro­tec­tions because she posed a direct threat.

The Supreme Court decid­ed that San Francisco’s posi­tion con­ced­ed that Title II does gen­er­al­ly apply to arrests—a posi­tion it had opposed below in the Ninth Cir­cuit.17 The ques­tion of whether, and how, the ADA applies to arrests such as Sheehan’s remains open.

* * * * *

There are two major inter­pre­tive ques­tions that a case like Shee­han presents. Are arrests the kind of ben­e­fit-con­fer­ring activ­i­ty of a pub­lic enti­ty cov­ered by Title II?18 And if so, how might Title II’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment be cir­cum­scribed by exi­gency excep­tions for law enforce­ment found in Fourth Amend­ment jurispru­dence?

In Penn­syl­va­nia Depart­ment of Cor­rec­tions v. Yeskey, writ­ing for the Court, Jus­tice Scalia gave a first, author­i­ta­tive gloss on the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 12132’s phrase “ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic enti­ty.”19 There, the Court ana­lyzed whether an incar­cer­at­ed indi­vid­ual reject­ed from a prison boot camp because of his hyper­ten­sion was denied the ben­e­fit of a pub­lic enti­ty pro­gram under Title II. He was, the Court found, read­ing § 12132 to apply broad­ly to state insti­tu­tions “with­out any excep­tions” and to con­tain a notion of ben­e­fit-con­fer­ring activ­i­ties that cap­tures a wide range of activ­i­ties, from med­ical care to voca­tion­al pro­grams, with­out any appar­ent lim­i­ta­tion from the text of the statute or its leg­isla­tive his­to­ry.20 Apply­ing this rea­son­ing, the Ninth Cir­cuit fig­ured that “ser­vices pro­grams or activ­i­ties … encom­pass any­thing [a police depart­ment] does,”21 so the remain­ing lim­i­ta­tion on the sweep of Title II’s lia­bil­i­ty is found in the phrase “ben­e­fit.” And since a per­son with dis­abil­i­ties must be denied the ben­e­fit of some pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty for there to be dis­crim­i­na­tion, the activ­i­ty has to be capa­ble of con­fer­ring a ben­e­fit in the first place.

What is the ben­e­fit in an arrest? Low­er courts have found sev­er­al, and from this it becomes clear that arrests are com­plex, mul­ti-phase events and that not all arrests may be equal for Title II pur­pos­es. At one end of the spec­trum are arrests that are high­ly anal­o­gous to the pos­i­tive mate­r­i­al ben­e­fits Con­gress iden­ti­fied in its pur­pos­es and find­ings sec­tion of the ADA.22 In Gor­man v. Bartch,23 the Eighth Cir­cuit held that the ADA applied to trans­porta­tion in a police van after cus­to­di­al arrest. The court not­ed that includ­ing “trans­porta­tion of an arrestee to the sta­tion­house” with­in the ambit of “ser­vices” cov­ered by the ADA fit both with stat­ed pur­pos­es of the leg­is­la­tion in 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and with the statute’s accom­pa­ny­ing reg­u­la­tions.24 And in Bir­coll v. Mia­mi-Dade Coun­ty,25 the Eleventh Cir­cuit sug­gest­ed that the ben­e­fit of effec­tive com­mu­ni­ca­tion, described specif­i­cal­ly in 28 C.F.R. § 35.160, would be denied if an offi­cer did not pro­vide a hear­ing-impaired indi­vid­ual with an inter­preter or oth­er aux­il­iary aid dur­ing a DUI stop.26

Fur­ther from the ben­e­fits described in the reg­u­la­tions and iden­ti­fied by Con­gress in the ADA’s find­ings and pur­pos­es is the argu­ment that any part of an arrest is a ben­e­fit-pro­vid­ing activ­i­ty because the arrestee ben­e­fits from the arrest­ing officer’s train­ing. A num­ber of con­sti­tu­tion­al and statu­to­ry rights are at stake dur­ing an arrest, and police are high­ly trained to ensure that those rights are hon­ored. Ques­tion­ing tech­niques, de-esca­la­tion train­ing, and rules gov­ern­ing the use of force are all pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ties or pro­grams that an arrestee con­crete­ly ben­e­fits from. This idea also squares with the the­o­ry of Title II lia­bil­i­ty for Indi­vid­u­als with Dis­abil­i­ties Edu­ca­tion Act vio­la­tions, in which the fail­ure to pro­vide an ade­quate indi­vid­u­al­ized edu­ca­tion plan denies a claimant edu­ca­tion­al ben­e­fits through inad­e­quate teacher train­ing.27 Even the Fifth Cir­cuit, with its cat­e­gor­i­cal rule exempt­ing police con­duct pri­or to secur­ing the scene from the ADA,28 rec­og­nized that there is a ben­e­fit in men­tal health train­ing for offi­cers that the arrestee was denied.29

The more sig­nif­i­cant hur­dle for advo­cates of ADA lia­bil­i­ty dur­ing arrests is argu­ing that exi­gent circumstances—like those that pose a threat to the arrest­ing officer’s safety—do not, as a mat­ter of law, ren­der any accom­mo­da­tion unrea­son­able. Fourth Amend­ment jurispru­dence con­tains a detailed set of excep­tions to the Amendment’s stan­dard rea­son­able­ness require­ments of a war­rant and prob­a­ble cause. These stan­dards are solic­i­tous of offi­cer safe­ty and of the split-sec­ond deci­sion-mak­ing required in many street inter­views. The com­mu­ni­ty care­tak­ing excep­tion in Brigham City v. Stu­art, for instance, frees police from the con­straints of the war­rant require­ment when they respond to a scene where vio­lence is immi­nent.30 Sim­i­lar­ly, the inves­ti­ga­tion evi­dence exi­gency “does not require police offi­cers to delay in the course of an inves­ti­ga­tion if to do so would grave­ly endan­ger their lives or the lives of oth­ers.”31 But per­haps the strongest state­ment of the Supreme Court’s def­er­ence to police judg­ment in arrests was expressed in Ter­ry v. Ohio, when the Court artic­u­lat­ed Fourth Amend­ment doctrine’s goal of pro­vid­ing law enforce­ment with “an esca­lat­ing set of flex­i­ble respons­es, grad­u­at­ed in rela­tion to the amount of infor­ma­tion [offi­cers] pos­sess.”32 These doc­trines, and the Ter­ry prin­ci­ple, pro­vide ample room for police to claim that on-the-street encoun­ters and arrests present excep­tion­al cir­cum­stances and that rea­son­able offi­cer con­duct is safe, defen­sive offi­cer con­duct. Any pos­si­ble fur­ther accom­mo­da­tion would, under these cir­cum­stances, be unrea­son­able and thus not required by the ADA.

* * * * *

But in the col­li­sion of the ADA and the Fourth Amend­ment, it isn’t clear that one would over­ride the oth­er. Some inte­gra­tion of the stan­dards is pos­si­ble. Both the ADA and the Fourth Amend­ment require rea­son­able­ness. Though the for­mer uses rea­son­able­ness to lim­it what Con­gress affir­ma­tive­ly requires of pub­lic enti­ties, while the lat­ter uses rea­son­able­ness to deter­mine neg­a­tive pro­hi­bi­tions on law enforce­ment con­duct, in arrests that is often a dis­tinc­tion with­out a dif­fer­ence. A police officer’s deci­sion to pro­vide an ASL inter­preter when ques­tion­ing a deaf dri­ver is the same as her deci­sion to refrain from con­duct­ing a street inter­view before the appro­pri­ate accom­mo­da­tion is in place. The officer’s choice both pro­vides a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion and refrains from an unrea­son­able stop and search. Ergo, a par­tic­u­lar course of action dur­ing an arrest can be rea­son­able for both ADA and Fourth Amend­ment pur­pos­es, and that con­duct can con­fer ben­e­fits on the arrestee.

Aside from a few gen­er­al floor state­ments dur­ing the ADA’s pas­sage and a brief men­tion in a House Report, Con­gress was large­ly silent on the appli­ca­tion of the statute to law enforce­ment activ­i­ties,33 and com­plete­ly so on the ques­tion of whether the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment mod­i­fies the Fourth Amendment’s rea­son­able­ness stan­dards. But there are good pol­i­cy reasons—in addi­tion to Congress’s tex­tu­al invitation—for har­mo­niz­ing ADA and Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness into a sin­gle stan­dard in a way that pre­serves the effect of the statute. Pro­vid­ing a clear, work­able legal stan­dard to police offi­cers has long been a con­cern of the Court’s, lest judge-cre­at­ed law inap­pro­pri­ate­ly bur­den the dif­fi­cult task of law enforce­ment.34

More­over, though the ADA does not speak with any speci­fici­ty about its appli­ca­tion to arrests, it does speak to what counts as rea­son­able actions for pub­lic enti­ties inter­act­ing with disability—they are accom­mo­da­tions. The pref­er­en­tial nature of the ADA’s antidis­crim­i­na­tion pro­vi­sions, “a more com­pre­hen­sive view of the con­cept of dis­crim­i­na­tion” accord­ing to the Supreme Court,35 impos­es an affir­ma­tive duty on police to make accom­mo­da­tions for indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties. Though these accom­mo­da­tions are lim­it­ed by the con­cept of “rea­son­able­ness,” Con­gress nonethe­less adjust­ed upward the care that police must take when arrest­ing a per­son with a dis­abil­i­ty. This new duty alters the bound­aries of rea­son­able search­es and seizures under the Fourth Amend­ment,36 and in the statute’s lim­i­ta­tion of its duty to only rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions, Con­gress indi­cat­ed that the affir­ma­tive actions required under the ADA rep­re­sents the new bound­ary for rea­son­able gov­ern­ment con­duct.

As the major­i­ty of the cir­cuits have rec­og­nized, the Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness analy­sis is a flex­i­ble, total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis, and the bound­aries of rea­son­able con­duct adjust with fac­tu­al cir­cum­stances.37 One such fac­tu­al cir­cum­stance is the def­i­n­i­tion (or rede­f­i­n­i­tion) of a police officer’s duties towards arrestees pur­suant to a con­gres­sion­al act. At a min­i­mal lev­el, the sub­stance of applic­a­ble law par­tial­ly deter­mines rea­son­able offi­cer con­duct. By defin­ing the sub­stance of crim­i­nal offens­es, a leg­is­la­ture affects the rea­son­able­ness of a prob­a­ble cause deter­mi­na­tion from a set of facts. But stronger still, leg­is­la­tures can impose addi­tion­al duties on police dur­ing search­es and arrests, and these can adjust what is rea­son­able under the Fourth Amend­ment. Manda­to­ry arrest laws adjust the thresh­old of rea­son­able­ness for cer­tain arrests by impos­ing an affir­ma­tive duty on police offi­cers to depart from the con­sti­tu­tion­al min­i­mum in cer­tain arrest sce­nar­ios.; for exam­ple, laws man­dat­ing the arrest of vio­la­tors of pro­tec­tion orders—passed to address the dan­ger­ous dynam­ics of domes­tic violence—have been upheld as con­sti­tu­tion­al under the Fourth Amend­ment.38

An offi­cer arrives at the scene of an arrest with the affir­ma­tive duty to make a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion for an ADA-qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual already in place. Congress’s com­mand is part of the fac­tu­al land­scape that makes up such an arrest. In this way, the law always min­i­mal­ly adjusts the rea­son­able­ness of the arrest. But by specif­i­cal­ly impos­ing the affir­ma­tive duty to make a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion, how­ev­er, Con­gress leg­is­lat­ed a con­cept of rea­son­able­ness that requires more than mere rea­son­able­ness under the Fourth Amend­ment.39 It requires rea­son­able­ness under the ADA.

* * * * *

The Fourth Amend­ment describes a con­sti­tu­tion­al min­i­mum for what is rea­son­able law enforce­ment con­duct dur­ing an arrest. It does not place a ceil­ing on what Con­gress may leg­is­late as rea­son­able pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty dur­ing an arrest.40 Because duties and oth­er sub­stan­tial pro­vi­sions of laws may make up the fac­tu­al cir­cum­stances of an arrest, Con­gress can adjust the bound­aries of rea­son­able­ness upward through leg­is­la­tion. And because the ADA requires specif­i­cal­ly that law enforce­ment make rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions, and not mere­ly act rea­son­ably under the Fourth Amend­ment, the ADA mod­i­fies upward the rea­son­able­ness analy­sis courts should employ when assess­ing ADA arrest claims.


1. Conor Gaffney is 3L at New York Uni­ver­si­ty School of Law. This piece is a com­men­tary on one issue pre­sent­ed at the Amer­i­can Bar Association’s 2018 Nation­al Appel­late Advo­ca­cy Com­pe­ti­tion. The com­pe­ti­tion prob­lem con­sid­ered whether Title II of the ADA autho­rizes claims against munic­i­pal­i­ties for law enforcement’s fail­ure to mod­i­fy arrest and inter­view tech­niques for per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties. The views expressed in this arti­cle do not nec­es­sar­i­ly rep­re­sent the views of the author on this point of law. Rather, this arti­cle is a dis­til­la­tion of one side of an argu­ment assigned to the author at the Amer­i­can Bar Association’s 2018 Nation­al Appel­late Advo­ca­cy Com­pe­ti­tion.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty shall, by rea­son of such dis­abil­i­ty, be exclud­ed from par­tic­i­pa­tion in or be denied the ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic enti­ty”).
3. See Olm­stead v. L.C. ex rel. Zim­ring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dis­sent­ing) (“Until today, this Court has nev­er endorsed an inter­pre­ta­tion of the term ‘dis­crim­i­na­tion’ that encom­passed dis­parate treat­ment among mem­bers of the same pro­tect­ed class. Dis­crim­i­na­tion, as typ­i­cal­ly under­stood, requires a show­ing that a claimant received dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment vis-à-vis mem­bers of a dif­fer­ent group on the basis of a statu­to­ri­ly described char­ac­ter­is­tic.”)
4. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (“this part applies to all ser­vices, pro­grams, and activ­i­ties pro­vid­ed or made avail­able by pub­lic enti­ties”). Title II was upheld as a valid exer­cise of Congress’s sec­tion 5 enforce­ment pow­er under the Four­teenth Amend­ment. Ten­nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
5. 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
6. See gen­er­al­ly 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (hold­ing that the plain lan­guage of the ADA applies to the pro­grams of even a puni­tive pub­lic enti­ty like a state prison).
7. For a help­ful sur­vey and syn­the­sis, see Robyn Levin, Respon­sive­ness to Dif­fer­ence: ADA Accom­mo­da­tions in the Course of an Arrest, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 269, 282–313 (2017).
8. City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–74 (2015) [here­inafter Shee­han II].
9. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street respons­es to report­ed dis­tur­bances or oth­er sim­i­lar inci­dents, whether or not those calls involve sub­jects with men­tal dis­abil­i­ties, pri­or to the officer’s secur­ing the scene and ensur­ing that there is no threat to human life”).
10. See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 673 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hile there is no sep­a­rate exi­gent-cir­cum­stances inquiry, the con­sid­er­a­tion of exi­gent cir­cum­stances is includ­ed in the deter­mi­na­tion of the rea­son­able­ness of the accom­mo­da­tion … noth­ing in the text of the ADA sug­gests that a sep­a­rate exi­gent-cir­cum­stances inquiry is appro­pri­ate.”); Shee­han v. City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) [here­inafter Shee­han I] (“[W]e agree with the Eleventh and Fourth Cir­cuits that exi­gent cir­cum­stances inform the rea­son­able­ness analy­sis under the ADA, just as they inform the dis­tinct rea­son­able­ness analy­sis under the Fourth Amend­ment.”); Bir­coll v. Mia­mi-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The exi­gent cir­cum­stances pre­sent­ed by crim­i­nal activ­i­ty and the already oner­ous tasks of police on the scene go more to the rea­son­able­ness of the request­ed ADA mod­i­fi­ca­tion than whether the ADA applies in the first instance.”).
11. See gen­er­al­ly Brigham City v. Stu­art, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); Ter­ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
13. Seremeth, 673 F.3d at 336.
14. See Lyle Den­nis­ton, Argu­ment pre­view: Police and dis­abil­i­ty rights, SCO­TUS­blog (Mar. 21, 2015, 12:03 AM),
15. In Shee­han, the offi­cers respond­ed to a call from a group care facil­i­ty for peo­ple with intel­lec­tu­al and devel­op­men­tal dis­abil­i­ties. They believed that the plain­tiff, armed with a knife, suf­fer­ing from a psy­chot­ic episode, and dis­play­ing vio­lent behav­iors was like­ly to escape from the room she had locked her­self in and posed a threat to pub­lic safe­ty. Shee­han I, 743 F.3d at 1217–21.
16. See Brief for Peti­tion­er at 22, City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13–1412), 2015 WL 254639, at *22 (cit­ing 28 C.F.R. § 35.139).
17. See Shee­han II, 135 S. Ct. at 1773 (2015).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
19. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (Scalia, J.).
20. See id. at 210.
21. Shee­han I, 743 F.3d at 1232 (fol­low­ing Yeskey’s approach to inter­pret­ing pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty broad­ly).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (express­ly iden­ti­fy­ing dis­crim­i­na­tion against per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties in “such crit­i­cal areas as employ­ment, hous­ing, pub­lic accom­mo­da­tions, edu­ca­tion, trans­porta­tion,” among oth­ers).
23. 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 912–13.
25. 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007).
26. See id. at 1082. The court resolved the claim on alter­na­tive grounds, hold­ing that even if a ben­e­fit were at stake, the offi­cer did not act unrea­son­ably in pro­ceed­ing with a field sobri­ety test because of the exi­gen­cies pre­sent­ed by a traf­fic stop made wait­ing for an inter­preter unrea­son­able. Id. at 1086.
27. See e.g., K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Uni­fied Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).
28. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
29. Id. at 800–801 (“Hainze was not denied the ben­e­fits and pro­tec­tions of Williamson County’s men­tal health train­ing by the Coun­ty, Sher­iff Richards, or the offi­cers. Rather, Hainze’s assault of Alli­son with a dead­ly weapon denied him the ben­e­fits of that pro­gram” (empha­sis in orig­i­nal)).
30. Brigham City v. Stu­art, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Accord­ing­ly, law enforce­ment offi­cers may enter a home with­out a war­rant to ren­der emer­gency assis­tance to an injured occu­pant or to pro­tect an occu­pant from immi­nent injury.”).
31. War­den v. Hay­den, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
32. Ter­ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 10 (1968).
33. For the lone report, see H.R. Rep. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
34. See Ter­ry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“[I]n deter­min­ing whether the offi­cer act­ed rea­son­ably in such cir­cum­stances, due weight must be given…to the spe­cif­ic rea­son­able infer­ences which he is enti­tled to draw from the facts in light of his expe­ri­ence”) (empha­sis added); Gra­ham v. Con­nor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The cal­cu­lus of rea­son­able­ness must embody allowance for the fact that police offi­cers are often forced to make split-sec­ond judgments—in cir­cum­stances that are tense, uncer­tain, and rapid­ly evolv­ing.”); see also Anna Lvovsky, The Judi­cial Pre­sump­tion of Police Exper­tise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1997, 2025–35 (June 2017).  
35. Olm­stead v. L.C. ex rel. Zim­ring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999).
36. For the view that a leg­is­la­ture can change the bound­aries of rea­son­able­ness around Fourth Amend­ment-relat­ed issues, see the sep­a­rate opin­ion of Jus­tice Ali­to in Riley v. Cal­i­for­nia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Ali­to, J., con­cur­ring in part and con­cur­ring in the judg­ment) (“[I]t would be very unfor­tu­nate if pri­va­cy pro­tec­tion in the 21st cen­tu­ry were left pri­mar­i­ly to the fed­er­al courts using the blunt instru­ment of the Fourth Amend­ment. Leg­is­la­tures … are in a bet­ter posi­tion than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost cer­tain­ly will take place in the future.”).
37. See, e.g., Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Rea­son­able­ness in law is gen­er­al­ly assessed in light of the total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances, and exi­gency is one cir­cum­stance that bears mate­ri­al­ly on the inquiry into rea­son­able­ness.”).
38. See Hedgepeth v. Wash­ing­ton Metro. Area Tran­sit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 158 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Wash­ing­ton Metro. Area Tran­sit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reject­ing a Fourth Amend­ment chal­lenge to a zero tol­er­ance arrest ordi­nance, and exam­in­ing the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of oth­er manda­to­ry arrest laws under the Fourth Amend­ment).
39. See gen­er­al­ly Unit­ed States v. Tor­res, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (bor­row­ing the com­plex war­rant pro­ce­dure Con­gress described in the Wire­tap Act to deter­mine the rea­son­able­ness of sur­veil­lance sim­i­lar to that with­in the Act’s scope); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Leg­is­la­tion on Fourth Amend­ment Pro­tec­tion, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1117, 1122–39 (2017) (pro­vid­ing a typol­o­gy of judi­cial respons­es to the impact of leg­is­la­tion address­ing search­es and seizures on Fourth Amend­ment analy­ses).
40. The lim­it on Congress’s pow­er to impose duties and require­ments under Title II, if any, would come from sec­tion 5 of the Four­teenth Amend­ment. See Ten­nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).