by Conor Gaffney1

Title II of the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act (ADA) con­tains a sim­ple, but pow­er­ful antidis­crim­i­na­tion rule: pub­lic enti­ties must make rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions in their activ­i­ties if fail­ing to do so would deny indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties the ben­e­fits of those activ­i­ties.2 This pref­er­en­tial treat­ment rule is unique among fed­er­al antidis­crim­i­na­tion laws, most of which pro­hib­it inten­tion­al or express dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment, but do not require accom­mo­dat­ing treat­ment of peo­ple who are dif­fer­ent­ly sit­u­at­ed.3 More­over, Title II’s lan­guage sweeps broad­ly, apply­ing this affir­ma­tive antidis­crim­i­na­tion duty to prac­ti­cal­ly any pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty.4 But the statute does have lim­its, both from the statu­to­ry text itself, and—more substantively—from inter­act­ing con­sti­tu­tion­al provisions.

This Con­tri­bu­tion exam­ines the role of the ADA in gov­ern­ing arrests and inves­ti­ga­tions by police of per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties and argues that the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment mod­i­fies what search­es and seizures of indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties are con­sid­ered rea­son­able under the Fourth Amend­ment. This is for one basic rea­son: rea­son­able­ness under the Fourth Amend­ment ana­lyzes the total­i­ty of cir­cum­stances, and the ADA expands those cir­cum­stances to include the con­gres­sion­al judg­ment as to whether there must be an accom­mo­da­tion or not.

* * * * *

In 2015, the Unit­ed States Supreme Court grant­ed cer­tio­rari in City and Coun­ty of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han to decide whether and how the ADA applies to police activ­i­ties dur­ing arrests.5 In the sev­er­al decades since Con­gress passed the ADA, and espe­cial­ly fol­low­ing the Court’s expan­sive inter­pre­ta­tion of Title II’s applic­a­bil­i­ty in Penn­syl­va­nia Depart­ment of Cor­rec­tions v. Yeskey,6 the Cir­cuit Courts of Appeals have frag­ment­ed on what law enforce­ment con­duct the ADA reach­es, and what exact­ly a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion is in the uncer­tain and poten­tial­ly dan­ger­ous cir­cum­stances that police reg­u­lar­ly encounter dur­ing arrests.7 But Shee­han did not resolve the issue, as a sud­den change in posi­tion by the peti­tion­er, San Fran­cis­co, pushed a some­what exas­per­at­ed Court to deem cer­tio­rari improv­i­dent­ly grant­ed on this issue, leav­ing the circuit’s var­i­ous splits in place.8

The rules in the cir­cuits vary wide­ly. In the Fifth Cir­cuit, the ADA cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly does not apply dur­ing an officer’s on-the-street response until the offi­cer secures the scene and ensures that there is no threat to human life.9 In the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir­cuits, the ADA applies gen­er­al­ly to arrests, and the law’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment is inte­grat­ed into the Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness analy­sis of the arrest.10

The method­olo­gies behind the cir­cuits’ var­i­ous analy­ses, though, appear to con­verge. All asked whether a threat to offi­cer and pub­lic safety—classically rec­og­nized exi­gent cir­cum­stances in Fourth Amend­ment jurispru­dence11—also intro­duced judi­cial­ly deter­minable excep­tions to the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion analy­sis. Thus, the Fifth Cir­cuit was able to for­mu­late a cat­e­gor­i­cal rule that unse­cured street arrests are ADA-exempt sce­nar­ios because requir­ing a police offi­cer to make an accom­mo­da­tion before ensur­ing his own safe­ty is per se unrea­son­able.12 The Fourth Cir­cuit came the oppo­site con­clu­sion because it thought that since the rea­son­able­ness of a giv­en accom­mo­da­tion requires ana­lyz­ing the total­i­ty of cir­cum­stances, cat­e­gor­i­cal exemp­tions for arrests are inap­pro­pri­ate, even though exi­gent cir­cum­stances com­mon to arrests can ren­der the pro­ce­dures used “rea­son­able under the ADA.”13

ADA arrest cas­es present a col­li­sion, then, between the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ments and the con­sti­tu­tion­al pro­nounce­ments on what con­sti­tutes rea­son­able law enforce­ment con­duct dur­ing the course of an arrest, and com­men­ta­tors looked with great antic­i­pa­tion towards the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Shee­han.14 How­ev­er, clar­i­ty would be denied as the peti­tion­er, San Fran­cis­co, shift­ed argu­ments before the Supreme Court. Instead of argu­ing, as it had before the Ninth Cir­cuit, that the ADA did not require offi­cers to make any addi­tion­al accom­mo­da­tions when pre­sent­ed with safe­ty exi­gen­cies per Hainze,15 San Fran­cis­co instead argued that a pre­vi­ous­ly unmen­tioned reg­u­la­tion con­trolled the ques­tion. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139 states that Title II does not require pub­lic enti­ties to allow peo­ple to par­tic­i­pate in their pro­grams or activ­i­ties if that per­son pos­es a “direct threat to the health or safe­ty of oth­ers.”16 Fol­low­ing this reg­u­la­tion, the City argued, Shee­han is exclud­ed from the Title II’s pro­tec­tions because she posed a direct threat.

The Supreme Court decid­ed that San Francisco’s posi­tion con­ced­ed that Title II does gen­er­al­ly apply to arrests—a posi­tion it had opposed below in the Ninth Cir­cuit.17 The ques­tion of whether, and how, the ADA applies to arrests such as Sheehan’s remains open.

* * * * *

There are two major inter­pre­tive ques­tions that a case like Shee­han presents. Are arrests the kind of ben­e­fit-con­fer­ring activ­i­ty of a pub­lic enti­ty cov­ered by Title II?18 And if so, how might Title II’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment be cir­cum­scribed by exi­gency excep­tions for law enforce­ment found in Fourth Amend­ment jurisprudence?

In Penn­syl­va­nia Depart­ment of Cor­rec­tions v. Yeskey, writ­ing for the Court, Jus­tice Scalia gave a first, author­i­ta­tive gloss on the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 12132’s phrase “ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic enti­ty.”19 There, the Court ana­lyzed whether an incar­cer­at­ed indi­vid­ual reject­ed from a prison boot camp because of his hyper­ten­sion was denied the ben­e­fit of a pub­lic enti­ty pro­gram under Title II. He was, the Court found, read­ing § 12132 to apply broad­ly to state insti­tu­tions “with­out any excep­tions” and to con­tain a notion of ben­e­fit-con­fer­ring activ­i­ties that cap­tures a wide range of activ­i­ties, from med­ical care to voca­tion­al pro­grams, with­out any appar­ent lim­i­ta­tion from the text of the statute or its leg­isla­tive his­to­ry.20 Apply­ing this rea­son­ing, the Ninth Cir­cuit fig­ured that “ser­vices pro­grams or activ­i­ties . . . encom­pass any­thing [a police depart­ment] does,”21 so the remain­ing lim­i­ta­tion on the sweep of Title II’s lia­bil­i­ty is found in the phrase “ben­e­fit.” And since a per­son with dis­abil­i­ties must be denied the ben­e­fit of some pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty for there to be dis­crim­i­na­tion, the activ­i­ty has to be capa­ble of con­fer­ring a ben­e­fit in the first place.

What is the ben­e­fit in an arrest? Low­er courts have found sev­er­al, and from this it becomes clear that arrests are com­plex, mul­ti-phase events and that not all arrests may be equal for Title II pur­pos­es. At one end of the spec­trum are arrests that are high­ly anal­o­gous to the pos­i­tive mate­r­i­al ben­e­fits Con­gress iden­ti­fied in its pur­pos­es and find­ings sec­tion of the ADA.22 In Gor­man v. Bartch,23 the Eighth Cir­cuit held that the ADA applied to trans­porta­tion in a police van after cus­to­di­al arrest. The court not­ed that includ­ing “trans­porta­tion of an arrestee to the sta­tion­house” with­in the ambit of “ser­vices” cov­ered by the ADA fit both with stat­ed pur­pos­es of the leg­is­la­tion in 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and with the statute’s accom­pa­ny­ing reg­u­la­tions.24 And in Bir­coll v. Mia­mi-Dade Coun­ty,25 the Eleventh Cir­cuit sug­gest­ed that the ben­e­fit of effec­tive com­mu­ni­ca­tion, described specif­i­cal­ly in 28 C.F.R. § 35.160, would be denied if an offi­cer did not pro­vide a hear­ing-impaired indi­vid­ual with an inter­preter or oth­er aux­il­iary aid dur­ing a DUI stop.26

Fur­ther from the ben­e­fits described in the reg­u­la­tions and iden­ti­fied by Con­gress in the ADA’s find­ings and pur­pos­es is the argu­ment that any part of an arrest is a ben­e­fit-pro­vid­ing activ­i­ty because the arrestee ben­e­fits from the arrest­ing officer’s train­ing. A num­ber of con­sti­tu­tion­al and statu­to­ry rights are at stake dur­ing an arrest, and police are high­ly trained to ensure that those rights are hon­ored. Ques­tion­ing tech­niques, de-esca­la­tion train­ing, and rules gov­ern­ing the use of force are all pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ties or pro­grams that an arrestee con­crete­ly ben­e­fits from. This idea also squares with the the­o­ry of Title II lia­bil­i­ty for Indi­vid­u­als with Dis­abil­i­ties Edu­ca­tion Act vio­la­tions, in which the fail­ure to pro­vide an ade­quate indi­vid­u­al­ized edu­ca­tion plan denies a claimant edu­ca­tion­al ben­e­fits through inad­e­quate teacher train­ing.27 Even the Fifth Cir­cuit, with its cat­e­gor­i­cal rule exempt­ing police con­duct pri­or to secur­ing the scene from the ADA,28 rec­og­nized that there is a ben­e­fit in men­tal health train­ing for offi­cers that the arrestee was denied.29

The more sig­nif­i­cant hur­dle for advo­cates of ADA lia­bil­i­ty dur­ing arrests is argu­ing that exi­gent circumstances—like those that pose a threat to the arrest­ing officer’s safety—do not, as a mat­ter of law, ren­der any accom­mo­da­tion unrea­son­able. Fourth Amend­ment jurispru­dence con­tains a detailed set of excep­tions to the Amendment’s stan­dard rea­son­able­ness require­ments of a war­rant and prob­a­ble cause. These stan­dards are solic­i­tous of offi­cer safe­ty and of the split-sec­ond deci­sion-mak­ing required in many street inter­views. The com­mu­ni­ty care­tak­ing excep­tion in Brigham City v. Stu­art, for instance, frees police from the con­straints of the war­rant require­ment when they respond to a scene where vio­lence is immi­nent.30 Sim­i­lar­ly, the inves­ti­ga­tion evi­dence exi­gency “does not require police offi­cers to delay in the course of an inves­ti­ga­tion if to do so would grave­ly endan­ger their lives or the lives of oth­ers.”31 But per­haps the strongest state­ment of the Supreme Court’s def­er­ence to police judg­ment in arrests was expressed in Ter­ry v. Ohio, when the Court artic­u­lat­ed Fourth Amend­ment doctrine’s goal of pro­vid­ing law enforce­ment with “an esca­lat­ing set of flex­i­ble respons­es, grad­u­at­ed in rela­tion to the amount of infor­ma­tion [offi­cers] pos­sess.”32 These doc­trines, and the Ter­ry prin­ci­ple, pro­vide ample room for police to claim that on-the-street encoun­ters and arrests present excep­tion­al cir­cum­stances and that rea­son­able offi­cer con­duct is safe, defen­sive offi­cer con­duct. Any pos­si­ble fur­ther accom­mo­da­tion would, under these cir­cum­stances, be unrea­son­able and thus not required by the ADA.

* * * * *

But in the col­li­sion of the ADA and the Fourth Amend­ment, it isn’t clear that one would over­ride the oth­er. Some inte­gra­tion of the stan­dards is pos­si­ble. Both the ADA and the Fourth Amend­ment require rea­son­able­ness. Though the for­mer uses rea­son­able­ness to lim­it what Con­gress affir­ma­tive­ly requires of pub­lic enti­ties, while the lat­ter uses rea­son­able­ness to deter­mine neg­a­tive pro­hi­bi­tions on law enforce­ment con­duct, in arrests that is often a dis­tinc­tion with­out a dif­fer­ence. A police officer’s deci­sion to pro­vide an ASL inter­preter when ques­tion­ing a deaf dri­ver is the same as her deci­sion to refrain from con­duct­ing a street inter­view before the appro­pri­ate accom­mo­da­tion is in place. The officer’s choice both pro­vides a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion and refrains from an unrea­son­able stop and search. Ergo, a par­tic­u­lar course of action dur­ing an arrest can be rea­son­able for both ADA and Fourth Amend­ment pur­pos­es, and that con­duct can con­fer ben­e­fits on the arrestee.

Aside from a few gen­er­al floor state­ments dur­ing the ADA’s pas­sage and a brief men­tion in a House Report, Con­gress was large­ly silent on the appli­ca­tion of the statute to law enforce­ment activ­i­ties,33 and com­plete­ly so on the ques­tion of whether the ADA’s rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion require­ment mod­i­fies the Fourth Amendment’s rea­son­able­ness stan­dards. But there are good pol­i­cy reasons—in addi­tion to Congress’s tex­tu­al invitation—for har­mo­niz­ing ADA and Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness into a sin­gle stan­dard in a way that pre­serves the effect of the statute. Pro­vid­ing a clear, work­able legal stan­dard to police offi­cers has long been a con­cern of the Court’s, lest judge-cre­at­ed law inap­pro­pri­ate­ly bur­den the dif­fi­cult task of law enforce­ment.34

More­over, though the ADA does not speak with any speci­fici­ty about its appli­ca­tion to arrests, it does speak to what counts as rea­son­able actions for pub­lic enti­ties inter­act­ing with disability—they are accom­mo­da­tions. The pref­er­en­tial nature of the ADA’s antidis­crim­i­na­tion pro­vi­sions, “a more com­pre­hen­sive view of the con­cept of dis­crim­i­na­tion” accord­ing to the Supreme Court,35 impos­es an affir­ma­tive duty on police to make accom­mo­da­tions for indi­vid­u­als with dis­abil­i­ties. Though these accom­mo­da­tions are lim­it­ed by the con­cept of “rea­son­able­ness,” Con­gress nonethe­less adjust­ed upward the care that police must take when arrest­ing a per­son with a dis­abil­i­ty. This new duty alters the bound­aries of rea­son­able search­es and seizures under the Fourth Amend­ment,36 and in the statute’s lim­i­ta­tion of its duty to only rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions, Con­gress indi­cat­ed that the affir­ma­tive actions required under the ADA rep­re­sents the new bound­ary for rea­son­able gov­ern­ment conduct.

As the major­i­ty of the cir­cuits have rec­og­nized, the Fourth Amend­ment rea­son­able­ness analy­sis is a flex­i­ble, total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances analy­sis, and the bound­aries of rea­son­able con­duct adjust with fac­tu­al cir­cum­stances.37 One such fac­tu­al cir­cum­stance is the def­i­n­i­tion (or rede­f­i­n­i­tion) of a police officer’s duties towards arrestees pur­suant to a con­gres­sion­al act. At a min­i­mal lev­el, the sub­stance of applic­a­ble law par­tial­ly deter­mines rea­son­able offi­cer con­duct. By defin­ing the sub­stance of crim­i­nal offens­es, a leg­is­la­ture affects the rea­son­able­ness of a prob­a­ble cause deter­mi­na­tion from a set of facts. But stronger still, leg­is­la­tures can impose addi­tion­al duties on police dur­ing search­es and arrests, and these can adjust what is rea­son­able under the Fourth Amend­ment. Manda­to­ry arrest laws adjust the thresh­old of rea­son­able­ness for cer­tain arrests by impos­ing an affir­ma­tive duty on police offi­cers to depart from the con­sti­tu­tion­al min­i­mum in cer­tain arrest sce­nar­ios.; for exam­ple, laws man­dat­ing the arrest of vio­la­tors of pro­tec­tion orders—passed to address the dan­ger­ous dynam­ics of domes­tic violence—have been upheld as con­sti­tu­tion­al under the Fourth Amend­ment.38

An offi­cer arrives at the scene of an arrest with the affir­ma­tive duty to make a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion for an ADA-qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual already in place. Congress’s com­mand is part of the fac­tu­al land­scape that makes up such an arrest. In this way, the law always min­i­mal­ly adjusts the rea­son­able­ness of the arrest. But by specif­i­cal­ly impos­ing the affir­ma­tive duty to make a rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tion, how­ev­er, Con­gress leg­is­lat­ed a con­cept of rea­son­able­ness that requires more than mere rea­son­able­ness under the Fourth Amend­ment.39 It requires rea­son­able­ness under the ADA.

* * * * *

The Fourth Amend­ment describes a con­sti­tu­tion­al min­i­mum for what is rea­son­able law enforce­ment con­duct dur­ing an arrest. It does not place a ceil­ing on what Con­gress may leg­is­late as rea­son­able pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty dur­ing an arrest.40 Because duties and oth­er sub­stan­tial pro­vi­sions of laws may make up the fac­tu­al cir­cum­stances of an arrest, Con­gress can adjust the bound­aries of rea­son­able­ness upward through leg­is­la­tion. And because the ADA requires specif­i­cal­ly that law enforce­ment make rea­son­able accom­mo­da­tions, and not mere­ly act rea­son­ably under the Fourth Amend­ment, the ADA mod­i­fies upward the rea­son­able­ness analy­sis courts should employ when assess­ing ADA arrest claims.


1. Conor Gaffney is 3L at New York Uni­ver­si­ty School of Law. This piece is a com­men­tary on one issue pre­sent­ed at the Amer­i­can Bar Association’s 2018 Nation­al Appel­late Advo­ca­cy Com­pe­ti­tion. The com­pe­ti­tion prob­lem con­sid­ered whether Title II of the ADA autho­rizes claims against munic­i­pal­i­ties for law enforcement’s fail­ure to mod­i­fy arrest and inter­view tech­niques for per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties. The views expressed in this arti­cle do not nec­es­sar­i­ly rep­re­sent the views of the author on this point of law. Rather, this arti­cle is a dis­til­la­tion of one side of an argu­ment assigned to the author at the Amer­i­can Bar Association’s 2018 Nation­al Appel­late Advo­ca­cy Competition.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty shall, by rea­son of such dis­abil­i­ty, be exclud­ed from par­tic­i­pa­tion in or be denied the ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic entity”).
3. See Olm­stead v. L.C. ex rel. Zim­ring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dis­sent­ing) (“Until today, this Court has nev­er endorsed an inter­pre­ta­tion of the term ‘dis­crim­i­na­tion’ that encom­passed dis­parate treat­ment among mem­bers of the same pro­tect­ed class. Dis­crim­i­na­tion, as typ­i­cal­ly under­stood, requires a show­ing that a claimant received dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment vis-à-vis mem­bers of a dif­fer­ent group on the basis of a statu­to­ri­ly described characteristic.”)
4. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (“this part applies to all ser­vices, pro­grams, and activ­i­ties pro­vid­ed or made avail­able by pub­lic enti­ties”). Title II was upheld as a valid exer­cise of Congress’s sec­tion 5 enforce­ment pow­er under the Four­teenth Amend­ment. Ten­nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
5. 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
6. See gen­er­al­ly 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (hold­ing that the plain lan­guage of the ADA applies to the pro­grams of even a puni­tive pub­lic enti­ty like a state prison).
7. For a help­ful sur­vey and syn­the­sis, see Robyn Levin, Respon­sive­ness to Dif­fer­ence: ADA Accom­mo­da­tions in the Course of an Arrest, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 269, 282–313 (2017).
8. City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–74 (2015) [here­inafter Shee­han II].
9. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an offi­cer’s on-the-street respons­es to report­ed dis­tur­bances or oth­er sim­i­lar inci­dents, whether or not those calls involve sub­jects with men­tal dis­abil­i­ties, pri­or to the offi­cer’s secur­ing the scene and ensur­ing that there is no threat to human life”).
10. See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 673 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hile there is no sep­a­rate exi­gent-cir­cum­stances inquiry, the con­sid­er­a­tion of exi­gent cir­cum­stances is includ­ed in the deter­mi­na­tion of the rea­son­able­ness of the accom­mo­da­tion . . . noth­ing in the text of the ADA sug­gests that a sep­a­rate exi­gent-cir­cum­stances inquiry is appro­pri­ate.”); Shee­han v. City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) [here­inafter Shee­han I] (“[W]e agree with the Eleventh and Fourth Cir­cuits that exi­gent cir­cum­stances inform the rea­son­able­ness analy­sis under the ADA, just as they inform the dis­tinct rea­son­able­ness analy­sis under the Fourth Amend­ment.”); Bir­coll v. Mia­mi-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The exi­gent cir­cum­stances pre­sent­ed by crim­i­nal activ­i­ty and the already oner­ous tasks of police on the scene go more to the rea­son­able­ness of the request­ed ADA mod­i­fi­ca­tion than whether the ADA applies in the first instance.”).
11. See gen­er­al­ly Brigham City v. Stu­art, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); Ter­ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
13. Seremeth, 673 F.3d at 336.
14. See Lyle Den­nis­ton, Argu­ment pre­view: Police and dis­abil­i­ty rights, SCO­TUS­blog (Mar. 21, 2015, 12:03 AM),
15. In Shee­han, the offi­cers respond­ed to a call from a group care facil­i­ty for peo­ple with intel­lec­tu­al and devel­op­men­tal dis­abil­i­ties. They believed that the plain­tiff, armed with a knife, suf­fer­ing from a psy­chot­ic episode, and dis­play­ing vio­lent behav­iors was like­ly to escape from the room she had locked her­self in and posed a threat to pub­lic safe­ty. Shee­han I, 743 F.3d at 1217–21.
16. See Brief for Peti­tion­er at 22, City and Cty. of San Fran­cis­co v. Shee­han, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13–1412), 2015 WL 254639, at *22 (cit­ing 28 C.F.R. § 35.139).
17. See Shee­han II, 135 S. Ct. at 1773 (2015).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
19. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (Scalia, J.).
20. See id. at 210.
21. Shee­han I, 743 F.3d at 1232 (fol­low­ing Yeskey’s approach to inter­pret­ing pub­lic enti­ty activ­i­ty broadly).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (express­ly iden­ti­fy­ing dis­crim­i­na­tion against per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties in “such crit­i­cal areas as employ­ment, hous­ing, pub­lic accom­mo­da­tions, edu­ca­tion, trans­porta­tion,” among others).
23. 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 912–13.
25. 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007).
26. See id. at 1082. The court resolved the claim on alter­na­tive grounds, hold­ing that even if a ben­e­fit were at stake, the offi­cer did not act unrea­son­ably in pro­ceed­ing with a field sobri­ety test because of the exi­gen­cies pre­sent­ed by a traf­fic stop made wait­ing for an inter­preter unrea­son­able. Id. at 1086.
27. See e.g., K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Uni­fied Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).
28. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
29. Id. at 800–801 (“Hainze was not denied the ben­e­fits and pro­tec­tions of Williamson Coun­ty’s men­tal health train­ing by the Coun­ty, Sher­iff Richards, or the offi­cers. Rather, Hainze’s assault of Alli­son with a dead­ly weapon denied him the ben­e­fits of that pro­gram” (empha­sis in original)).
30. Brigham City v. Stu­art, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Accord­ing­ly, law enforce­ment offi­cers may enter a home with­out a war­rant to ren­der emer­gency assis­tance to an injured occu­pant or to pro­tect an occu­pant from immi­nent injury.”).
31. War­den v. Hay­den, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
32. Ter­ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 10 (1968).
33. For the lone report, see H.R. Rep. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
34. See Ter­ry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“[I]n deter­min­ing whether the offi­cer act­ed rea­son­ably in such cir­cum­stances, due weight must be given…to the spe­cif­ic rea­son­able infer­ences which he is enti­tled to draw from the facts in light of his expe­ri­ence”) (empha­sis added); Gra­ham v. Con­nor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The cal­cu­lus of rea­son­able­ness must embody allowance for the fact that police offi­cers are often forced to make split-sec­ond judgments—in cir­cum­stances that are tense, uncer­tain, and rapid­ly evolv­ing.”); see also Anna Lvovsky, The Judi­cial Pre­sump­tion of Police Exper­tise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1997, 2025–35 (June 2017).  
35. Olm­stead v. L.C. ex rel. Zim­ring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999).
36. For the view that a leg­is­la­ture can change the bound­aries of rea­son­able­ness around Fourth Amend­ment-relat­ed issues, see the sep­a­rate opin­ion of Jus­tice Ali­to in Riley v. Cal­i­for­nia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Ali­to, J., con­cur­ring in part and con­cur­ring in the judg­ment) (“[I]t would be very unfor­tu­nate if pri­va­cy pro­tec­tion in the 21st cen­tu­ry were left pri­mar­i­ly to the fed­er­al courts using the blunt instru­ment of the Fourth Amend­ment. Leg­is­la­tures . . . are in a bet­ter posi­tion than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost cer­tain­ly will take place in the future.”).
37. See, e.g., Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Rea­son­able­ness in law is gen­er­al­ly assessed in light of the total­i­ty of the cir­cum­stances, and exi­gency is one cir­cum­stance that bears mate­ri­al­ly on the inquiry into reasonableness.”).
38. See Hedgepeth v. Wash­ing­ton Metro. Area Tran­sit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 158 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Wash­ing­ton Metro. Area Tran­sit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reject­ing a Fourth Amend­ment chal­lenge to a zero tol­er­ance arrest ordi­nance, and exam­in­ing the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of oth­er manda­to­ry arrest laws under the Fourth Amendment).
39. See gen­er­al­ly Unit­ed States v. Tor­res, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (bor­row­ing the com­plex war­rant pro­ce­dure Con­gress described in the Wire­tap Act to deter­mine the rea­son­able­ness of sur­veil­lance sim­i­lar to that with­in the Act’s scope); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Leg­is­la­tion on Fourth Amend­ment Pro­tec­tion, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1117, 1122–39 (2017) (pro­vid­ing a typol­o­gy of judi­cial respons­es to the impact of leg­is­la­tion address­ing search­es and seizures on Fourth Amend­ment analyses).
40. The lim­it on Congress’s pow­er to impose duties and require­ments under Title II, if any, would come from sec­tion 5 of the Four­teenth Amend­ment. See Ten­nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).