One Means One: The “Per Plan” Approach to Section 1129(a)(10)

by Elaine M. Ander­sen1

Bank­rupt­cy cul­mi­nates in either liq­ui­da­tion, in which the debtors’ assets are all sold to sat­is­fy its debts, or reor­ga­ni­za­tion, in which the debtor enti­ty is restruc­tured and con­tin­ues doing busi­ness with an agree­ment among its cred­i­tors as to the even­tu­al sat­is­fac­tion of their claims. In a reor­ga­ni­za­tion, the plan accord­ing to which the debtor is reor­ga­nized and the cred­i­tors’ claims are admin­is­tered is of para­mount con­cern. Accord­ing­ly, plan con­fir­ma­tion is per­haps the sin­gle most impor­tant phase of the reor­ga­ni­za­tion process.

Usu­al­ly, a Chap­ter 11 plan may be con­firmed only if each class of impaired cred­i­tors con­sents.2 A class of claims is impaired if the claim hold­ers’ rights are changed under the plan. If, for exam­ple, a claim will not be paid in full under the plan, it is impaired. Impair­ment trig­gers extra pro­tec­tions for the claimhold­er, like the afore­men­tioned unan­i­mous plan approval require­ment. This require­ment, how­ev­er, is abridged in cram­down sit­u­a­tions in which a plan is con­firmed over the objec­tions of one or more of the cred­i­tors.3 Sec­tion 1129 lists the require­ments for approval of a cram­down plan and “con­tains a num­ber of safe­guards for secured cred­i­tors who could be neg­a­tive­ly impact­ed by a debtor’s reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan.”4 One such safe­guard is sec­tion 1129(a)(10), which requires that at least one impaired class of claims has accept­ed the plan.5  This require­ment impor­tant­ly gives impaired cred­i­tors a seat at the nego­ti­a­tion table, but it should not be inter­pret­ed so as to give them a cud­gel with which to hold the bank­rupt­cy process hostage.

Sec­tion 1129(a)(10)’s safe­guard should apply on a “per plan,” rather than “per debtor,” basis. The “per plan” approach, which has been adopt­ed by the only cir­cuit court to address this ques­tion as well as sev­er­al fed­er­al bank­rupt­cy courts, requires accep­tance of the plan by one impaired class of claims under the plan.6  On the oth­er hand, the “per debtor” approach, which has been adopt­ed by the Delaware Bank­rupt­cy Court,7 requires one accept­ing impaired class of claims for each debtor.8 Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion will argue that courts should adopt the “per plan” read­ing of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) because it more close­ly aligns with the text of the statute, fits com­fort­ably with the rest of the sec­tion, and bet­ter advances the pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11 reorganization.

A. The Plain Lan­guage of Sec­tion 1129(a)(10) Indi­cates a “Per Plan” Interpretation

The start­ing point for statu­to­ry inter­pre­ta­tion must always be the text itself, and here the plain text of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) clear­ly sup­ports the “per plan” approach. It is well-estab­lished that “the mean­ing of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan­guage in which the act is framed, and if that is plain … the sole func­tion of the courts is to enforce it accord­ing to its terms.”9  The text of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) reads: “If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accept­ed the plan, deter­mined with­out includ­ing any accep­tance of the plan by any insid­er.”10 The text does not dis­tin­guish between the cred­i­tors of var­i­ous debtors or between sin­gle-debtor and joint, mul­ti­ple-debtor plans—indeed, it makes no ref­er­ence to debtors at all. And yet, the “per debtor” approach reads into the statute the addi­tion­al require­ment of approval by an impaired class of claims of each debtor. Imput­ing this addi­tion­al require­ment and negat­ing the plain statu­to­ry lan­guage strains prin­ci­ples of statu­to­ry inter­pre­ta­tion and under­mines the pur­pos­es of bankruptcy.

The lan­guage of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is clear and unam­bigu­ous: once “at least one” impaired class has accept­ed the plan, sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is sat­is­fied as to the entire plan.11 If Con­gress had intend­ed this sec­tion to apply on a “per debtor” basis, it could have eas­i­ly evinced this intent in the statu­to­ry lan­guage. The total absence of lan­guage refer­ring to the debtor or debtors, dis­tin­guish­ing between sin­gle-debtor and mul­ti-debtor plans, or oth­er­wise indi­cat­ing any sit­u­a­tion in which the phrase “at least one” should be mul­ti­plied indi­cates that Con­gress did not intend for these con­sid­er­a­tions to be a part of the sec­tion 1129(a)(10) inquiry. As the Supreme Court has repeat­ed­ly stat­ed, we must “pre­sume that a leg­is­la­ture says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”12 The text of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) unam­bigu­ous­ly requires a “per plan” approach.

Courts apply­ing the “per debtor” approach have argued that the rule of inter­pre­ta­tion that “the sin­gu­lar includes the plur­al” changes the plain mean­ing of sec­tion 1129(a)(10), but this argu­ment is unavail­ing.13 The first clause of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) uses the indef­i­nite arti­cle “a” to refer to the impaired class or class­es of claims which trig­ger the con­di­tion. In con­trast, the sec­ond clause uses the def­i­nite num­ber “one” to refer to the impaired class of claims that must con­sent to the plan to ful­fill the con­di­tion. Because “one” can­not be made plur­al with­out self-con­tra­dic­tion, the rule that “the sin­gu­lar includes the plur­al” does not change the plain mean­ing of the sec­tion and does not sup­port a “per debtor” inter­pre­ta­tion. Regard­less of whether “plan” is read in the sin­gu­lar or plur­al, the sec­tion requires “one class” of approv­ing impaired claims. Because the text of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) calls for approval by “one class” of impaired claims, only one class’s approval is required.

B. The Con­text of the Bank­rupt­cy Code and Canons of Statu­to­ry Inter­pre­ta­tion Con­firm a “Per Plan” Interpretation

Even if there were ambi­gu­i­ty in the lan­guage of sec­tion 1129(a)(10), the con­text of the bank­rupt­cy code also sup­ports a “per plan” approach to this sec­tion.14 Apply­ing a “per plan” inter­pre­ta­tion is the only way to give full effect to all terms in sec­tion 1129, avoid sur­plusage, and achieve a con­sis­tent read­ing of the sec­tion as a whole.

Read­ing a “per debtor” approach into sec­tion 1129(a)(10) would dimin­ish the sig­nif­i­cance of the exemp­tion from sec­tion 1129(a)(8) that is giv­en in cram­down cas­es.15 Under sec­tion 1129(b), the court may cram­down a reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan over objec­tions, so long as all require­ments of sec­tion 1129(a) oth­er than 1129(a)(8) are met. Sec­tion 1129(a)(8) pro­vides that “each class” of claims or inter­ests must either accept or be unim­paired under the plan for the plan to be approved—in oth­er words, each impaired class must approve. If a “per debtor” read­ing is giv­en to sec­tion 1129(a)(10), then the 1129(a)(8) require­ment is par­tial­ly revived in the mul­ti-debtor con­text. The “per debtor” read­ing re-intro­duces a class-by-class approach to approval and gives hold-outs dis­pro­por­tion­ate pow­er, thus sig­nif­i­cant­ly reduc­ing the util­i­ty of cram­down approval and sec­tion 1129(b).

If Con­gress had intend­ed “per debtor” con­sid­er­a­tion, they would have includ­ed that in writ­ing, as they did in oth­er sec­tions. While some sub­sec­tions like 1129(a)(7) and (8) specif­i­cal­ly refer to “each impaired class of claims” and “each class of claims,” sub­sec­tion (a)(10) does not give the var­i­ous class­es this indi­vid­u­al­ized treat­ment.16 Rather, 1129(a)(10) lumps togeth­er all class­es impaired under the plan and demands accep­tance by at least one. Con­gress knew how to invite indi­vid­u­al­ized scruti­ny, but it declined to do so as to sec­tion 1129(a)(10).

The court in In re Tri­bune Co. mis­in­ter­pret­ed con­text to con­clude that sec­tion 1129(a)(10) must apply on a “per debtor” basis because cer­tain oth­er sub­sec­tions of 1129(a) apply on a “per debtor” basis.17  This argu­ment fails for three inde­pen­dent rea­sons. First, it is not at all clear that the sec­tions fre­quent­ly cit­ed for this propo­si­tion actu­al­ly do apply on a “per debtor” basis. Sec­ond, even if the cit­ed sec­tions do apply on a “per debtor” basis, that does not cre­ate a con­flict or con­tra­dic­tion with­in the statute when sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is inter­pret­ed “per plan.” Final­ly, even if the cit­ed sec­tions apply on a “per debtor” basis and cre­ate a gen­er­al rule that the sub­sec­tions of sec­tion 1129(a) should be read with a “per debtor” ele­ment, the more spe­cif­ic “per plan” rule announced by 1129(a)(10) should be under­stood to be an excep­tion to that gen­er­al rule.

As to the first point, the Tri­bune court con­tend­ed that sec­tions 1129(a)(1) and (a)(3) apply on a “per debtor” basis, and that nei­ther sec­tion could be sat­is­fied if one or more, but few­er than all, debtors com­plied with its require­ments.18 This mis­states the inquiry. Sec­tion (a)(3) requires that the plan be pro­posed in good faith—if one or mul­ti­ple of the debtors demon­strates bad faith, that bad faith is imput­ed to the plan. So too with (a)(1)—if one or more of the debtors takes action incon­sis­tent with the bank­rupt­cy code, that is imput­ed to the plan, mak­ing the plan out of com­pli­ance with applic­a­ble law. In either case, the debtors are only rel­e­vant inso­far as their actions affect the plan. Fur­ther, nei­ther cit­ed sec­tion con­tains any lan­guage explic­it­ly indi­cat­ing that it requires indi­vid­u­al­ized appli­ca­tion to each debtor.

Even assum­ing that sec­tions 1129(a)(1) and (a)(3) apply on a “per debtor” basis, there is no rea­son that (a)(10) must func­tion the same way. Though it is an impor­tant prin­ci­ple of statu­to­ry inter­pre­ta­tion that statutes be read to be con­sis­tent with them­selves, this prin­ci­ple reach­es its break­ing point when it is used to con­tra­dict the statu­to­ry text itself. More­over, there is no rea­son “that all sub­sec­tions must uni­form­ly apply on a ‘per debtor’ basis, espe­cial­ly when the Bank­rupt­cy Code phras­es each sub­sec­tion dif­fer­ent­ly.”19  Because the var­i­ous sub­sec­tions of sec­tion 1129(a) are phrased dif­fer­ent­ly, they should be inter­pret­ed dif­fer­ent­ly. To sup­ply a “per debtor” ele­ment to sec­tion 1129(a)(10) would require both adding words that are not present in the statute and ignor­ing the words that are present. Fur­ther, there is noth­ing con­tra­dic­to­ry about inter­pret­ing sec­tion 1129(a) such that some sub­sec­tions apply “per debtor” and oth­ers apply “per plan”; such an inter­pre­ta­tion would lead to no impos­si­bil­i­ties or absurdities.

The court in Tri­bune assert­ed not only that sec­tions 1129(a)(1) and (a)(3) apply on a “per debtor” basis, but that these and oth­er sub­sec­tions of 1129(a) estab­lish a gen­er­al rule that all of the section’s require­ments ought to apply “per debtor.”20 Even if this inter­pre­ta­tion is cor­rect, it does not fol­low that this gen­er­al “per debtor” rule must be imput­ed to sec­tion 1129(a)(10). On the con­trary, if there is a gen­er­al rule, then 1129(a)(10)’s spe­cif­ic and dif­fer­ent rule must be under­stood as an excep­tion to the gen­er­al rule.21

C. The Pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11 Reor­ga­ni­za­tion Are Bet­ter Advanced by a “Per Plan” Inter­pre­ta­tion than by a “Per Debtor” Interpretation

A “per debtor” approach to sec­tion 1129(a)(10) would con­tra­vene the pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11 reor­ga­ni­za­tion and cre­ate a per­verse incen­tive for cred­i­tors hold­ing impaired claims in mul­ti-debtor bank­rupt­cies to hold out and obstruct the reor­ga­ni­za­tion process. The pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11 are to revive the debtor’s busi­ness in a time­ly man­ner and to max­i­mize the val­ue and pro­duc­tiv­i­ty of the bank­rupt­cy estate.22  The “per debtor” approach not only pro­longs the reor­ga­ni­za­tion process and thus siphons val­ue from the bank­rupt­cy estate and retards the process of restart­ing the debtor’s busi­ness, but also encour­ages cre­ation of plans that serve par­tic­u­lar inter­ests at the expense of these over­all pol­i­cy goals.

A ”per debtor” approach can cre­ate hold out prob­lems, espe­cial­ly in cir­cum­stances where cer­tain debtor enti­ties have only one or a small num­ber of cred­i­tors.23 If a “per debtor” read­ing is giv­en to sec­tion 1129(a)(10), such a cred­i­tor could hold out for a reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan that is ben­e­fi­cial to them, regard­less of whether the plan would ben­e­fi­cial­ly restruc­ture the debtors’ busi­ness­es, pre­serve jobs, pro­tect oth­er cred­i­tors and investors, or max­i­mize the val­ue of the bank­rupt­cy estate. Under the “per debtor” approach, such cred­i­tors are incen­tivized to use their lever­age as a blud­geon and drag out the bank­rupt­cy process, cost­ing debtors, oth­er cred­i­tors, and courts sig­nif­i­cant­ly more time and mon­ey. Hold outs like this could force debtors into liq­ui­da­tion, an out­come which is typ­i­cal­ly worse for all par­ties involved than reor­ga­ni­za­tion. This is not a pure­ly hypo­thet­i­cal problem—the prob­lem of a class of one has occurred before and is like­ly to occur again.24  Addi­tion­al­ly, there could be a class of zero prob­lem. If one or mul­ti­ple of the debtors in a joint­ly admin­is­tered, mul­ti-debtor bank­rupt­cy had no vot­ing impaired class­es of claims, it is not clear that 1129(a)(10) could ever be sat­is­fied under a “per debtor” approach.25

There is some dis­agree­ment as to the pur­pose of sec­tion 1129(a)(10). Some courts view sec­tion 1129(a)(10) as a mere tech­ni­cal require­ment which does not cre­ate sub­stan­tive rights for cred­i­tors.26  Under this view, the “per debtor” read­ing is not only incon­sis­tent with the statute, it under­mines its very pur­pose. A “per debtor” approach gives hold­out cred­i­tors the right to uni­lat­er­al­ly reject any reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan they do not like; it not only cre­ates a sub­stan­tive right, but a very pow­er­ful one. Oth­er courts argue that the pur­pose of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is to ensure there are “some indi­cia of sup­port” for a Chap­ter 11 plan.27 “Some indi­cia” is not a high bar. Under either view, the pur­pose of sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is not well served by man­u­fac­tur­ing an addi­tion­al require­ment of height­ened sup­port. Even under the view that sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is more than a tech­ni­cal require­ment, there is no rea­son that a “per debtor” approach is need­ed in order to ensure that the plan has “some indi­cia” of cred­i­tor support.

The Bank­rupt­cy Code is intend­ed to encour­age con­sen­su­al res­o­lu­tion of claims through the plan nego­ti­a­tion process.28 Chap­ter 11 in par­tic­u­lar is designed to encour­age the time­ly and effi­cient reor­ga­ni­za­tion of dis­tressed busi­ness­es so as to pre­serve jobs and eco­nom­ic val­ue.29  None of these pur­pos­es are advanced by apply­ing an arti­fi­cial­ly height­ened “per debtor” standard.

Not only is a “per plan” approach clear­ly indi­cat­ed by the statu­to­ry text and con­text, but also it is urged by com­mon sense and the pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11. For all those rea­sons, the “per plan” approach should be pre­ferred to the “per debtor” approach.

1. Elaine Ander­sen is a J.D. Can­di­date (2021) at New York Uni­ver­si­ty School of Law. This piece is a com­men­tary on the 2020 Prob­lem at the Duber­stein Bank­rupt­cy Moot Court Com­pe­ti­tion held in Queens, New York. The views expressed in this arti­cle do not nec­es­sar­i­ly rep­re­sent the views of the author on this point of law. Rather, this arti­cle is a dis­til­la­tion of one side of an argu­ment assigned to the team the author rep­re­sent­ed at the Duber­stein Bank­rupt­cy Moot Court Competition.

2. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).

3. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).

4. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lak­eridge, LLC (In re Vill. at Lak­eridge, LLC), 814 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016).

5. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).

6. See JPMCC 2007-­C1 Grass­lawn Lodg­ing, LLC v. Tran­swest Resort Props. (In re Tran­swest Resort Props.), 881 F.3d 724, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2018) (assess­ing and reject­ing “per debtor” approach and apply­ing “per plan” approach); In re Enron Corp., No. 01–16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549, at *234–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004) (same); In re SGPA, Inc., No. 1–01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291, at *12–22 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2001) (same); see also In re Sta­tion Casi­nos, Inc., Nos. BK-09–52477, BK 09–52470, BK 09–52487, 10–50381, 2010 WL 11492265, at *23 (Bankr. D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2010) (cit­ing SGPA and Enron and apply­ing “per plan” approach); JPMor­gan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Char­ter Comm­c’ns Oper­at­ing, LLC (In re Char­ter Comm­c’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 264–66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).

7. See In re Tri­bune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 182–83 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (apply­ing “per debtor” approach); see also In re Wood­bridge Grp. of Cos., 592 B.R. 761, 778–79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (cit­ing Tri­bune and apply­ing “per debtor” approach to case involv­ing sub­stan­tive­ly con­sol­i­dat­ed par­ties); In re JER/Jameson Mezz Bor­row­er II, LLC, 461 B.R. 293, 301–02 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (cit­ing and apply­ing Tri­bune).

8. One fed­er­al bank­rupt­cy court has con­sid­ered with­out decid­ing the issue. In re ADPT DFW Hold­ings, LLC, 574 B.R. 87, 104–07 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017) (apply­ing “per plan” approach to sub­stan­tive­ly con­sol­i­dat­ed debtors, mak­ing no deci­sion as to which approach would be appro­pri­ate for joint­ly admin­is­tered, mul­ti-debtor plans).

9. Caminet­ti v. Unit­ed States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Unit­ed States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (announc­ing same prin­ci­ple in Chap­ter 11 bank­rupt­cy context).

10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).

11. See Tran­swest, 881 F.3d at 729.

12. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Ger­main, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

13. 11 U.S.C. § 102(7) (sin­gu­lar includes the plur­al rule of inter­pre­ta­tion); see Tri­bune, 464 B.R. at 182 (apply­ing rule to sec­tion 1129(a)(10) so as to make “plan” plural).

14. See gen­er­al­ly FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobac­co Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[T]he words of a statute must be read in their con­text and with a view to their place in the over­all statu­to­ry scheme.” (cita­tion omit­ted)), super­seded by statute on oth­er grounds.

15. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (“[I]f all of the applic­a­ble require­ments of sub­sec­tion (a) of this sec­tion oth­er than para­graph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the pro­po­nent of the plan, shall con­firm the plan notwith­stand­ing the require­ments of such para­graph if the plan does not dis­crim­i­nate unfair­ly, and is fair and equi­table, with respect to each class of claims or inter­ests that is impaired under, and has not accept­ed, the plan.”).

16. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (8).

17. 464 B.R. at 182–83.

18. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1), (3); Tri­bune, 464 B.R. at 183.

19. Tran­swest, 881 F.3d at 730.

20. 464 B.R. at 183.

21. See Rad­LAX Get­away Hotel, LLC v. Amal­ga­mat­ed Bank, 566 US 639, 645 (2012) (apply­ing rule of statu­to­ry con­struc­tion that “the spe­cif­ic pro­vi­sion is con­strued as an excep­tion to the gen­er­al one” in Chap­ter 11 bank­rupt­cy context).

22. See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991) (stat­ing that Chap­ter 11 reor­ga­ni­za­tion serves both the pur­pos­es of “per­mit­ting busi­ness debtors to reor­ga­nize and restruc­ture their debts in order to revive the debtors’ busi­ness­es and there­by pre­serve jobs and pro­tect investors” and of “max­i­miz­ing the val­ue of the bank­rupt­cy estate”); H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 5 (1978), as reprint­ed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (“The pur­pose of a busi­ness reor­ga­ni­za­tion case, unlike a liq­ui­da­tion case, is to restruc­ture a business’s finances so that it may con­tin­ue to oper­ate, pro­vide its employ­ees with jobs, pay its cred­i­tors, and pro­duce a return for its stockholders.”).

23. See Young v. Hig­bee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 211 (1945) (stat­ing that a stake­hold­er should not be per­mit­ted to “obstruct a fair and fea­si­ble reor­ga­ni­za­tion in the hope that some­one would pay them more”).

24. See In re JER/Jameson Mezz Bor­row­er II, LLC, 461 B.R. 293, 302 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“Because Colony is Mezz II’s only cred­i­tor, con­fir­ma­tion of a plan to which they do not con­sent is not pos­si­ble [under a ‘per debtor’ approach].”).

25. See In re Sta­tion Casi­nos, Inc., Nos. BK-09–52477, BK 09–52470, BK 09–52487, 10–50381, 2010 WL 11492265, at *23 (Bankr. D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2010) (approv­ing reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan under “per plan” approach in case where “sev­er­al of the Debtors had no Vot­ing Classes”).

26. See In re Rhead, 179 B.R. 169, 177 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (“Sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is a tech­ni­cal require­ment for con­fir­ma­tion. It is an oblig­a­tion for the pro­po­nent to ful­fill; it is not a sub­stan­tive right of object­ing creditors.”).

27. In re Com­bus­tion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2004); P. Mur­phy, Cred­i­tors’ Rights in Bank­rupt­cy, § 16.11, at 16–20 (1980) (“The only con­ceiv­able pur­pose of Sec­tion 1129(a)(10) is to require some indi­cia of cred­i­tor sup­port [for the reor­ga­ni­za­tion plan].”).

28. See, e.g., Wind­sor on the Riv­er Assocs. v. Bal­cor Real Estate Fin. (In re Wind­sor on the Riv­er Assocs.), 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Chap­ter 11 is designed to pro­mote con­sen­su­al reor­ga­ni­za­tion plans.”); In re AVBI, Inc., 143 B.R. 738, 739–40 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (“Chap­ter 11 is designed to fos­ter con­sen­su­al plans of reorganization.”).

29. See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991) (explain­ing the pur­pos­es of Chap­ter 11).