by Mariana Lopez*

Magistrate judges perform a crucial role in the federal judiciary system by reducing the administrative burden on Article III judges. Courts, however, remain divided on the scope of magistrates’ duties, and importantly, whether they have  final decision-making authority to accept felony guilty pleas under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Vesting this duty in a magistrate judge violates the Federal Magistrates Act, which allows district judges to delegate “additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”1 The weightiness of this task, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution should prohibit magistrate judges from accepting guilty pleas, regardless of a criminal defendant’s consent, and require magistrates to submit a report and recommendation to an Article III judge who may then accept the plea. As the consequences of a felony verdict weigh heavily on defendants and our judicial system, this task should remain in the hands of a constitutionally endorsed Article III Judge.

 

The Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”) authorizes district judges to delegate to magistrate judges “additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”2 Courts have split on the scope of these “additional duties,” creating inconsistencies in federal courts and uncertainty for criminal defendants. However, the laws of the United States and the Constitution dictate that this critical procedural step should remain in the hands of Article III judges.

First, acceptance of a felony guilty plea surpasses the importance of responsibilities falling beneath the “additional duties” clause of the FMA. As acceptance of a felony guilty plea holds analogous weight to the verdict of a felony trial, the power must remain with an Article III judge, regardless of a defendant’s consent to the magistrate’s plea proceedings. Second, authorizing magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas ignores the procedural dictates of a “law[] of the United States”: Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 59 outlines that magistrate judges may act as final decision-makers on nondispositive matters and may only submit report and recommendations to district courts for dispositive matters. As acceptance of a guilty plea is a dispositive matter, a magistrate judge may only submit a report and recommendation regarding the guilty plea, not a final decision of acceptance. Finally, a magistrate judge’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea violates the structural protections of Article III of the Constitution.

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Acceptance of a felony guilty plea does not constitute an enumerated duty nor an “additional duty” of a magistrate judge under the Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”). The FMA permits magistrate judges to oversee “minor offenses,”3 such as entering a sentence for a petty offense, hearing certain pretrial matters, and presiding over misdemeanor trials.4 Any additional duties should “bear some relation to the specified duties that the statute assigned to magistrates.”5 The foundation of this comparison lies in the “responsibility and importance” of the task.6

In Gomez v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “the carefully defined grant of authority [for magistrate judges] to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial.”7 Lower courts have recognized that this logic extends to the acceptance of a felony guilty plea—if a magistrate judge cannot conduct a felony trial, they should not act as a final decision-maker for felony guilty pleas. In United States v. Harden8 the Seventh Circuit compared the finality of this task to that of a felony trial. The court noted that acceptance of a guilty plea is even “more final” than acceptance of a guilty verdict, as guilty pleas often involve waivers of a defendant’s rights to habeas corpus and appeals processes.9 The process of entering and accepting a felony guilty plea requires an in-depth colloquy for defendants to understand its weight, and it results in defendants waiving multiple constitutional rights.10

Peretz v. United States does not alter the conclusion that the finality of felony guilty pleas precludes magistrate judges from accepting them. In Peretz v. United States, the Supreme Court granted authority to magistrate judges to conduct voir dire with the consent of the parties.11 The Peretz Court reasoned that given district courts’ “bloated dockets,” magistrate judges must perform “indispensable” tasks.12 These tasks included conducting voir dire because this duty is comparable in both “responsibility and importance” to conducting civil and misdemeanor trials.13 The Court found that the FMA “evinces a congressional belief that magistrates are well qualified to handle matters of similar importance to jury selection but condition[ed] their authority to accept such responsibilities on the consent of the parties.”14 Proponents of adding acceptance of felony guilty pleas to magistrate judges’ dockets argue this logic should extend to felony guilty pleas. However, even with a defendant’s consent, accepting felony guilty pleas is far too important to be categorized as an “additional duty.” The unenumerated, “additional duty” of voir dire is a preliminary step in a trial, followed by numerous steps prior to a verdict,15 while acceptance of a felony guilty plea is akin to a verdict in a criminal trial.

While some courts have characterized a plea colloquy as less complex than voir dire,16 the proper inquiry focuses on the consequence, not the complexity, of a given proceeding. Information an adjudicator gains from plea colloquies is “weighted with importance” because of the effects of accepting a felony guilty plea.17 The Supreme Court has focused on “responsibility and importance” when assigning additional duties to magistrate judges, not complexity.18 In accordance with Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the adjudicator must determine whether the defendant understands what they are pleading to, the minimum penalty the defendant could receive if they plead guilty, and whether the defendant is voluntarily pleading guilty, among other determinations.19 The culmination of these answers and the adjudicator’s interpretation of them will determine the case’s outcome—or more precisely, whether they accept the felony guilty plea.20 While the composition of a jury does not necessarily seal the fate of a defendant, a criminal conviction, through a trial or guilty plea, does. A felony conviction can lead to serious and lasting collateral consequences, such as restrictions on public housing assistance and other public benefits, voting disenfranchisement, and limited expungement and sealing provisions.21 The outcome of a felony trial, in both finality and seriousness, is more comparable to the acceptance of a felony guilty plea than conducting voir dire. The importance attributed to acceptance of a felony guilty plea compels a reading of the FMA “additional duties” clause that excludes this duty, regardless of a defendant’s consent to the delegation.

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Read together, the Federal Magistrates Act and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate that felony guilty plea acceptance must remain in the hands of Article III judges. Adopted in 2005, Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure clarifies the authority of magistrate judges over dispositive and nondispositive matters.22 According to Cambridge Dictionary, “dispositive” means “deciding a matter finally, or relating to the process of doing this.”23 Rule 59 states that “a district judge may refer to a magistrate judge for recommendation . . . [on] any matter that may dispose of a charge or defense.”24 If within 14 days the defendant objects to the report and recommendation from the magistrate judge, the district judge must review the materials de novo.25 Importantly, the district judge maintains the ultimate decision-making power regarding a dispositive matter, as the magistrate judge may only submit a report and recommendation.26 When a district judge refers to a magistrate judge on a nondispositive matter, the judge considers the defendant’s timely objections to the magistrate judge’s decision and can modify an order if it is “contrary to law or clearly erroneous.”27 Without a timely objection, the magistrate judge retains the authority to make nondispositive decisions without an Article III judge’s interference.

Acceptance of a felony guilty plea constitutes a dispositive matter, and thus must remain in the hands of Article III judges. When establishing Rule 59, Congress declined to categorize felony guilty pleas as dispositive or nondispositive, leaving the decision up to the courts.28 As several circuits have indicated, acceptance of a felony guilty plea is a dispositive matter. In United States v. Harden, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the acceptance of a guilty plea was dispositive.29 The court held that a guilty plea “results in a final and consequential shift in the defendant’s status.”30 Additionally, in United States v. Garcia, the Tenth Circuit accepted, in dicta, that a felony guilty plea is a dispositive matter for which a report and recommendation is required.31 The court published this despite contradictory circuit precedent pre-dating Rule 59 that authorized magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas.32

Additionally, while some circuits’ precedents did not consider the procedural distinction between dispositive and nondispositive matters because they were decided before Congress enacted Rule 59,33 many circuits have implicitly endorsed the idea that magistrate judges must submit reports and recommendations to district judges prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea.34 While most of these decisions do not expressly state whether magistrate judges are permitted to accept felony guilty pleas, the circuits nevertheless use the procedural steps for dispositive matters under Rule 59(b). Thus, most circuits have implicitly endorsed classifying the acceptance of a felony guilty plea as dispositive, indicating that magistrate judges may not have final decision-making authority for this task.

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Even if a magistrate judge’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea appropriately fits within the scope of an “additional duty” under the Federal Magistrates Act and aligns with Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, delegation of this duty to magistrate judges raises Article III issues. Denying delegation of this duty to magistrate judges avoids potential constitutional complications, regardless of criminal defendants’ consent.35

Granting magistrates the ability to accept felony guilty pleas, with or without a criminal defendant’s consent, improperly vests them with Article III powers. Article III of the Constitution states that “the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”36 Congress has, however, used legislation to vest some duties ordinarily reserved for Article III courts in non-Article III courts.37 Congress created magistrate judges utilizing its Article I, Section 8 power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”38 The Supreme Court has defined the limits of Congress’s ability to transfer power to non-Article III courts.39 First, the Supreme Court has recognized the personal right to impartial and independent federal adjudication.40 Like other personal constitutional rights, this can be waived.41 Second, the Court has recognized the structural protections of Article III, which ensure the judicial branch maintains its judicial power, such as authority over a dispositive matter.42 Specifically, “Article III, § 1, safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts ‘to transfer jurisdiction [from constitutional to legislative courts] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts.”43 Magistrate judges are Article I courts. Granting them certain powers reserved for Article III judges would violate the structural protections of separation of powers. Given these structural protections, “[n]otions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive”44 regarding whether a magistrate can accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea.

Consent cannot fully cure either constitutional issue. On one hand, the structural protections of Article III cannot be waived by consent, as Article III does not grant individual rights.45 Such a waiver would be an improper exercise of judicial power.46 While consent can cure certain issues running afoul of the Constitution, it cannot by itself grant jurisdiction to an Article I magistrate judge.47 As previously noted, the Supreme Court has been particularly concerned with granting power to magistrate judges to preside over a felony trial.48 Historically, Article III judges have presided over felony trials. Because a magistrate’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea is a dispositive matter, leading to the same result as a full felony trial, this is a utilization of power historically reserved for Article III judges. This use of judicial power violates Article III of the Constitution, regardless of defendants’ consent.

Alternatively, even if Article III protections are considered as individual, waivable rights, curable by consent, additional constitutional problems arise regarding district court control over the Article I adjudicator.49 If district judges delegate acceptance of a felony guilty plea to magistrate judges, they would fail to maintain sufficient control over the acceptance process. The Peretz Court found that because the process of voir dire, conducted by a magistrate judge, took place under the district court’s total control and jurisdiction there was no concern of improperly taking power away from the Article III courts.50 In the case of accepting felony guilty pleas, district courts do not retain enough control over the magistrate judges’ actions where this delegation of final decision-making authority is permitted. Most importantly, this delegation restricts district judges’ powers of review.

De novo review acts as a crucial marker of a district judge’s control over magistrates.51 When district judges delegate acceptance of a felony guilty plea to magistrate judges, they relinquish this control, as de novo review is not necessarily available for the acceptance of a felony guilty plea. Rule 59 reserves the possibility of de novo review only for reports and recommendations on dispositive matters, not final dispositions on nondispositive matters. If guilty plea acceptance is deemed a nondispositive matter, de novo review will not be available and the standard of review will be clear error.52 Thus, if a defendant objects to a magistrate’s entry of their guilty plea, a district judge could only modify or set aside the plea if it is contrary to law or clearly erroneous. However, if guilty plea acceptance constitutes a dispositive matter, as previously argued, Article III judges must reserve final decision-making power for themselves, and magistrates’ reports and recommendations can be subject to de novo review. Thus, a magistrate judge’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea, as opposed to a report and recommendation on the matter, is too far removed from Article III judge oversight.

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While magistrate judges remove heavy administrative burdens from Article III judges, their jurisdiction must be limited to conform with federal statutes, rules, and the Constitution. As acceptance of a felony guilty plea is a final disposition, weighted with importance, power to accept a defendant’s plea must be left in the hands of Article III judges, regardless of a defendant’s consent to the delegation.

* Mariana Lopez is a J.D. Candidate (2024) at New York University School of Law. This Contribution is a commentary on the problem at the 2023 William B. Spong, Jr. Moot Court Tournament, hosted by William & Mary Law School. The issue presented dealt with whether the laws of the United States and the Constitution prohibit magistrate judges from accepting felony guilty pleas under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure even with a defendant’s consent. This Contribution distills one side of the argument, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the author’s views.

1. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(3).

2. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(3).

3. United States v. Garcia, 936 F.3d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 2019).

4. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4), (b)(1)(A), (a)(3).

5. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).

6. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991).

7. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872.

8. 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014).

9. Id. at 888.

10. Id. at 888–89.

11. 501 U.S. at 933.

12. Id. at 928 (citing Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).

13. Id. at 933.

14. Id. at 935.

15. Harden, 758 F.3d at 889.

16. See e.g., United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008).

17. Harden, 758 F.3d at 889.

18. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933.

19. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).

20. Harden, 758 F.3d at 889.

21. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 491, 494, 505 (2010).

22. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).

23. Dispositive, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/dispositive (last visited Mar. 1, 2024).

24. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1) (emphasis added).

25. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).

26. Id.

27. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a).

28. United States v. Garcia, 936 F.3d 1128, 1137 (10th Cir. 2019).

29. 758 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2014).

30. Id.

31. 936 F.3d at 1140.

32. See id. at 1140 (“Were we not bound by Ciapponi, we are persuaded that the acceptance of a felony guilty plea is in fact a dispositive matter.”).

33. See, e.g., United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).

34. See, e.g., United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that magistrate judges can conduct plea colloquies and submit a report and recommendation of their findings to the district judge); United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 631–34 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).

35. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (denying a magistrate judge the ability to conduct voir dire without the defendant’s consent to avoid constitutional issues).

36. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

37. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636 (delegating some authority to magistrate judges).

38. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9

39. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986).

40. Id. at 848–49.

41. Id.; Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 683 (2015).

42. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.

43. United States v. Garcia, 936 F.3d 1128, 1140–41 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850).

44. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.

45. Garcia, 936 F.3d at 1141.

46. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (“[N]otions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because [at least some Article III] limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”); Garcia, 936 F.3d at 1141 (“[Consent] cannot cure constitutional command . . . .”).

47. Compare Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“There is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants consent.”) with Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) (finding that a magistrate judge could not oversee voir dire in a felony trial when litigants did not consent); but see Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (“[T]he parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III.”).

48. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872 (“[T]he carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial.”).

49. See, e.g., United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that consent can cure constitutional problems associated with accepting a guilty plea, if the district court maintains control over the magistrate judge); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).

50. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937.

51. Id. at 939.

52. Garcia, 936 F. 3d at 1136 (“For nondispositive matters, the parties may object within 14 days, and the district court must consider objections by reviewing the magistrate judge’s order for clear error.”).