by Mia Bravo*

The Supreme Court has not yet adopted a legal standard to regulate what happens when the government seizes personal property and retains it for an extended period without a legally valid justification. Circuit courts are split on the correct doctrinal bucket to place this unsettling pattern of behavior. While some courts think a Due Process or Takings analysis is suitable, neither standard fits with current Supreme Court precedent, produces appropriate incentives for individual officers, or sufficiently compensates aggrieved parties. On the other hand, a Fourth Amendment standard offers the most effective and doctrinally sound path forward. The Fourth Amendment reasonability framework is firmly grounded in constitutional text, history, and precedent and provides a workable means to stop constitutional harms inflicted by the government’s prolonged, unjustified retention of personal property.

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 Accordingly, law enforcement must always act reasonably when detaining someone, searching their home, or taking their belongings into government custody. The Fourth Amendment and its associated protections are governed by a reasonableness standard,2 which is always a fact-bound and case-specific inquiry.3 Courts evaluate reasonability by weighing how much a seizure intrudes on someone’s liberty or privacy interests against the legitimate interests of the government in seizing the property.4 If a seizure is unreasonable, either for intruding too much on private liberties or for lacking a basis in a strong government interest, then the seizure is necessarily unconstitutional.5

When seizing personal property after a lawful arrest, the government needs a valid reason to retain custody of that property.6 The government may not hold onto the seized items purely for the sake of keeping them or because officers are “hopeful” that they might be relevant to a future investigation.7 When there are no criminal proceedings arising from the relevant arrest, the scope and duration of the personal property seizure must be tied to and justified by the circumstances that made its initiation proper.8 The government must return seized property once the reason for initially taking it expires.9 In City of West Covina v. Perkins, the Supreme Court said “no one contests” that the government has an ultimate obligation to return property seized by law enforcement and provide fair procedures to ensure its return.10 Exceptions to this general rule include when the property itself is contraband or evidence in a continued investigation.11

A constitutional issue arises when someone’s belongings are taken by law enforcement and kept in government custody for a prolonged period with no valid justification. Circumstances like these might amount to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if the initial seizure of the property was reasonable. Prolonged, unjustified retention most often occurs when someone is arrested and released without charges. They might be free to go, but their property could waste away in police department custody for extended periods of time—even if no criminal investigation is actively being pursued against the property’s rightful owner.12 Extremely prolonged deprivations of cell phones, cars, and even winter coats are routine and often have no relevance to the conduct that spurred the initial arrest.13 Prolonged property retention also occurs when law enforcement seizes items from victims or witnesses of crimes who merely report unlawful conduct, only for their property to sit in government custody for lengthy periods without explanation.14

In many cases when vehicles are seized, the aggrieved party must pay extensive storage and impound fees to get their car back. For example, in Lee v. City of Chicago, police impounded a car with gunshot damage after the vehicle’s owner reported the shooting.15 The police department kept the car for several weeks after notifying Lee that his vehicle was no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, and he was required to pay all towing and storage fees for the car’s extended and unjustified stay in police custody.16 Despite retaining counsel to get the fees reduced, the city still declined to pay for significant cosmetic damage Lee’s vehicle sustained while impounded.17 The Chicago Police Department had no valid reasoning to deprive Lee of his vehicle, but even worse, faced no penalty for this constitutional violation.

What is an aggrieved party to do in such a scenario? It might seem obvious that this pattern of property seizure is wrongful and does not serve the public interest, but courts are split on the correct basis for an individual to bring a constitutional claim to vindicate their property rights. Several circuit courts analyze prolonged unjustified personal property retention under a due process framework18 or even as a Fifth Amendment taking.19 However, neither option sufficiently compensates victims for the harm suffered nor produces proper incentives for law enforcement officers. Comparatively, the Fourth Amendment is best suited to address these claims of prolonged, unjustified retention of personal property. There is a long-standing historical basis for this interpretation going back to the Founding, and several circuit courts have continued to embrace this reasoning.20

The Supreme Court has consistently found that a Fourth Amendment seizure extends past the point of initial interference with a possessory interest, and the seizure must be reasonable for the entire duration of the seizure to remain constitutional. This issue first came before the Court in United States v. Place, where officers seized Place’s luggage and held it for 90 minutes before establishing probable cause.21 The majority held that the seizure’s duration was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, given the length of the luggage’s detention as well as the lack of a “diligently pursue[d] investigation.”22 The Court found that a 90-minute detention of Place’s luggage was “sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable,” and the constitutional violation was “exacerbated” by the agents’ failure to inform Place of where they were taking his belongings, how long he could expect to be dispossessed of them, and how he could secure their return.23 Place emphasizes the importance of the “brevity” of the interference with an individual’s possessory interests for the purposes of determining the reasonableness—and in turn, the constitutionality—of a government seizure.24

The Court confirmed this interpretation of Place in United States v. Jacobsen, stating that Place “holds[] a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘unreasonable seizures.’”25 The Court specifically emphasized how a seizure’s duration, as a singular factor, can transform an initially reasonable seizure into an impermissibly unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, one.26 Jacobsen confirmed that, when evaluating the constitutionality of property seizure by law enforcement, courts must consider how long the property is in the government’s custody. One month later, in Segura v. United States, a majority of the Justices again supported the proposition that “a seizure reasonable at its inception . . . may become unreasonable as a result of its duration.”27 The Supreme Court has thus spoken repeatedly and authoritatively that Fourth Amendment seizures are necessarily characterized by their duration and prolonged, unjustified retention can render an initially reasonable seizure unreasonable.28

Circuit courts have followed Place, Jacobsen, and Segura to find that the Fourth Amendment directly applies to prolonged seizures of property. In Brewster v. Beck, the Ninth Circuit held that the extended retention of property was a constitutional violation.29 There, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) stopped a vehicle, learned the driver’s license was suspended, and impounded the driver’s car.30 The plaintiff, who had loaned the vehicle to the driver, proved at a hearing that she was the lawfully registered owner and had a valid license, and brought suit against the LAPD when they still refused to return the vehicle, citing a state law requiring minimum 30-day impoundment.31 The Ninth Circuit held that LAPD’s 30-day seizure not only implicated the Fourth Amendment, but also violated its guarantee against unreasonable seizures.32 The court reasoned that when “a seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment,” the constitutionality of the government’s seizure remains “only to the extent that the government’s justification holds force33 Once that original, constitutional justification fails, “the government must cease the seizure or secure a new justification,” at risk of violating the Constitution.34

Beyond Supreme Court precedent, which establishes that a constitutional seizure must be reasonably limited in duration, the animating reasoning behind the Fourth Amendment’s drafting and ratification is instructive to its best interpretation. The Supreme Court has noted that the Fourth Amendment “must be read in light of ‘the history that gave rise to the words’—a history of ‘abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the key causes of the Revolution.’”35 Frequently, the Court treats pre-Founding historical sources as persuasive interpretive tools, especially when there is evidence that the Framers understood the Bill of Rights as codifying a pre-existing right rooted in common law or philosophy.36 Therefore, this history should be considered when evaluating the doctrinal basis to evaluate prolonged seizures of personal property.

The D.C. Circuit examined the history of the Fourth Amendment immediately following the American Revolution in Asinor v. District of Columbia, finding early judicial analysis was grounded in common law trespass and was “understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”37 Thus, “to determine whether a particular action violates the Fourth Amendment,” courts should consider “whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”38 The court evaluated the works of William Blackstone, the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation, to find a recognized actionable common law property tort of “unjust detainer of another’s goods, though the original taking was lawful.”39 The court emphasized that common law property interests were impaired continuously when the original owner could not regain their property in a timely manner, and that at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, the injury was not only in the initial taking but also the continued deprivation.40 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that when “the government seizes property incident to a lawful arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires that any continued possession of the property must be reasonable,” directly calling on constitutional interpretation when the Bill of Rights was passed.41

Additional historical evidence illustrates that the Framers ratified the Fourth Amendment to prevent arbitrary use of government power and indefinite interference with property interests. At the Boston Town Meeting of 1772, held to compile grievances against British soldiers to advance the revolutionary effort, colonists complained of officers who “ransack men’s houses, destroy their securities, [and] carry off their property.”42 The colonists also cited property damage, mishandling of goods, and indefinite interference with property interests during a seizure as major concerns.43 Attendees condemned the ability of soldiers to enter anywhere they pleased and leave “boxes, chests [and] trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches.”44 The Founding Fathers did not want to create a country where “any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner . . . . Every thing the most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power.”45 Both the common law and historical evidence from the Founding era therefore indicate that for a seizure to be reasonable, it must be both reasonable at its inception and throughout its duration.

Recognizing the history of the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent, several circuit courts have held that the Fourth Amendment reasonability requirement directly applies to prolonged seizures of property for the duration that the seized property is in government custody. In Alexander v. City of Syracuse, officers seized a house for over 20 hours before obtaining a warrant.46 The district court explained, “most importantly, the length of the delay and lack of diligence in securing a warrant” could allow a jury to find that “the prolonged seizure of the house” was unreasonable.47 In Mom’s, Inc. v. Willman, the Internal Revenue Service and Virginia Department of Alcohol Beverage Control both executed search warrants against a restaurant chain in separate fraud investigations.48 During the search, the authorities seized a watch and never returned it to the claimant, even though no charges were brought.49 While the claim, brought by the watch owner against the IRS, was rejected on qualified immunity grounds, the Fourth Circuit still held that a Fourth Amendment seizure extends past the point of initial dispossession and thus is governed by a continuous reasonability standard.50 In Honda Lease Trust v. Malanga’s Automotive, a municipality hired a towing company to tow a vehicle for a traffic law violation but didn’t notify the title owner that the car was in the tow company’s possession for almost a year and still charged towing and storage fees.51 The Third Circuit held that property seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be reasonable both initially and continuously because a valid justification for initial seizure “can run out.”52

The Fourth Amendment’s text, Supreme Court precedent, and historical interpretation counsel towards analyzing prolonged retention of personal property without justification under a Fourth Amendment reasonability framework. Analyzing extended government property retention under a Fifth Amendment takings or Due Process framework does not provide sufficient remedy for aggrieved parties or produce individual incentives for law enforcement officers to ensure this pattern of conduct does not continue to occur. The Supreme Court should thus select Fourth Amendment reasonability considerations as the governing body of law for this type of harm.

Procedural due process claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment when someone alleges the government deprived them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.53 This doctrinal framework ensures individuals have notice and an opportunity for a hearing before being permanently deprived of their property.54 A procedural due process framework is a poor fit for prolonged retention cases because the Supreme Court has already set the bar for appropriate post-seizure procedure on the floor without solving the core problem with lengthy property retention.

In City of West Covina v. Perkins, the Supreme Court held that telling the property owner their seized property is in government custody is sufficient notice comporting with due process.55 But, for virtually all prolonged retention cases, knowledge of who is holding the property is not the issue, rendering due process notice requirements effectively meaningless. The true problem is the immense difficulty and cost that aggrieved parties must suffer to regain rightful possession of their seized items, often hounding the police department for days, weeks or even years to give back property in their care with no valid justification.56

Even if the Supreme Court throws City of West Covina to the wayside and imposes affirmative procedural duties for police departments when they have custody of seized property, the outcome would likely not be better than the status quo. A police department might still be incentivized to follow the path of least resistance and institute policies with deliberately muddied procedures for property retrieval so that the department doesn’t need to overhaul its practices. A procedure with ambiguous timelines and substantial law enforcement discretion could formally satisfy “due process,” while not meaningfully improving current outcomes where police departments retain custody of property at will.

Substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is also poor fit for analyzing prolonged retention cases because judges increasingly disfavor the doctrine as nebulous and disconnected from constitutional text. Substantive due process comes from the Fourteenth Amendment57 and stands for the idea that, while the Constitution protects certain enumerated rights, the due process protections included within also protect unenumerated rights integral to personal liberty.58 It is the foundation for the right to marriage,59 the right to bodily integrity,60 and was formerly the constitutional home of the right to an abortion.61

The Supreme Court now disfavors extending substantive due process to new domains, all but foreclosing its adaptation for use in prolonged retention cases. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Court expressed extreme skepticism in “break[ing] new ground” under substantive due process because the doctrine has transformed into a sneaky inroad for judicial policy preferences.62 The majority of the current Court prefers constitutional claims with explicit textual grounding.63 Unlike the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Fourth Amendment explicitly addresses the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable seizures, providing a direct textual anchor for prolonged retention claims.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is also ill-suited to govern prolonged retention claims because it does not establish freedom from government seizure; it merely requires the government to justly compensate those whose property it takes.64 As such, a Takings Clause framework severely under protects individual property rights by preventing courts from analyzing other elements of the seizure for their constitutionality.

The Takings Clause requires the government to provide someone with just compensation when taking their private property for the benefit of the public.65 As such, the Takings Clause typically only applies to seizures of real property, i.e., land, which result in public use.66 However, courts have never found “public use” to include law enforcement investigatory purposes.67 Some scholars have argued for an expanded public use analysis which could extend to law enforcement.68 Even so, courts defer to legislative judgments and community need when evaluating the public purpose requirement, making the requirement little more than a formality.69 Thus, where the original seizure was lawful, the only relevant constitutional question under the Takings Clause is whether the original possessor was justly compensated.70 Under a Takings Clause approach, the court cannot evaluate the duration of the seizure, the justification for the seizure, or even the malintent of law enforcement.71

A Takings Clause approach to prolonged, unjustified retention also risks undercompensating aggrieved parties. Under the Takings Clause, just compensation is limited to the market value of the seized property for the duration it was in government custody.72 Compensatory damages do not make aggrieved parties whole for the lost subjective value of their belongings. For those who are dispossessed of items with significant sentimental value, like a pet or valuable memories stored on an electronic device, “just” compensation proves unable to appropriately address the harm from unreasonable seizure. For example, the market value of a phone held for a year is much less than the subjective value of the inconvenience of not being reachable by loved ones and does not account for the costs of obtaining a temporary phone in the meantime.73

These three approaches—procedural due process, substantive due process, and the Takings Clause—all share one key fault: they create a collective action problem at the institutional level. By only considering institutional actors and policies, and not evaluating misconduct by individual officers, there is not sufficient incentive for police departments to meaningfully alter their behavior and appropriately vindicate property rights. The Takings Clause leaves police departments footing the just compensation bill, thus making monetary relief for plaintiffs contingent on whether police departments can afford to improperly retain property without justification. Due process claims incentivize police departments to establish process ex ante, but doctrinal emphasis on the mere availability of process does not ensure individuals are able to vindicate their property rights when the policy is violated or hopelessly ambiguous.74 Additionally, claims against individual officers are essentially unworkable under due process and takings frameworks because the remedies are institutional and do not consider individual officer behavior except in cases of egregious misconduct.75

The Fourth Amendment is the natural constitutional home to combat police departments’ prolonged, unjustified property retention problem. Using its robust reasonableness standard to evaluate a seizure throughout its entire duration has Constitutional textual grounding, longstanding lower and Supreme Court precedent, and pre-Revolution historical tradition. All of these factors point the Supreme Court towards using the Fourth Amendment when evaluating scenarios where aggrieved parties currently lack a means of redress and will hopefully stop this troubling pattern of law enforcement behavior altogether.

* Mia Bravo is a J.D. Candidate (2026) at New York University School of Law. This Contribution is a commentary on the problem presented at the 2025 New York City Bar Association National Moot Court Competition. One of the questions presented asked if the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement should apply to the continued retention of personal property once seized by law enforcement after a lawful arrest. This contribution distills one side of the argument, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the author’s views.

1. U.S. Const. amend. IV, cl. 1.

2. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (“Ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

3. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (disapproving a per se unreasonableness standard and instead balancing interests of individual and government).

4. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mays, 993 F. 3d 607, 617–18 (8th Cir. 2021) (weighing defendant’s privacy interests against government’s interest in using seized laptop as evidence).

5. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“It must always be remembered that what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”).

6. See Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F. 2d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 1982) (demanding return of seized documents after finding “no legitimate purpose” for the government to retain them).

7. Id.

8. See Brewster v. Beck, 859 F. 3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that the government’s justification holds force. Thereafter, the government must cease the seizure or secure a new justification.”).

9. See, e.g., Sovereign News Co., 690 F. 2d at 577 (explaining that property should be returned to defendants upon termination of criminal proceedings).

10. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999).

11. See Sovereign News Co., 690 F. 2d at 577.

12. See Asinor v. District of Columbia, 111 F. 4th 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (challenging D.C. police retention of cell phones and reporting equipment kept for months or years after being seized incident to arrests at protests with no charges pursued against the claimants).

13. See Brief for Public Defender Service for DC, as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs *3–*12, Asinor v. DC, 111 F. 4th 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (Nos. 22-7129–7130) [hereinafter Brief for Public Defender Service for DC].

14. Id.

15. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F. 3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2003).

16. Id. at 459.

17. Id.

18. See, e.g., Case v. Eslinger, 555 F. 3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009); Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. 3d 177, 187 (2d Cir. 2004); Snider v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 313 F. App’x 85, 93 (10th Cir. 2008).

19. See, e.g., Denault v. Ahren, 857 F. 3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2017).

20. See Asinor, 111 F. 4th at 1254 (discussing Founding-era conceptions of Fourth Amendment rights).

21. United States v. Place, 462 US 696, 699 (1983).

22. Id. at 709.

23. Id. at 710.

24. Id. at 709.

25. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).

26. Id. at 124 n. 25 (explaining that in Place, the seizure became unreasonable “because its length unduly intruded upon constitutionally protected interests”).

27. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (plurality opinion); id. at 823, (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Even a seizure reasonable at its inception can become unreasonable because of its duration.”).

28. See Place, 462 US at 696; Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124; Segura, 468 U.S. at 796.

29. Brewster v. Beck, 859 F. 3d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 2017).

30. Id. at 1195.

31. Id.

32. Id. at 1196 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n. 25; Place, 462 U.S. at 707–10).

33. Brewster, 859 F. 3d at 1197.

34. Id.

35. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (citation omitted).

36. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“It has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”) (emphasis in original).

37. Asinor v. District of Columbia, 111 F. 4th 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

38. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)).

39. Id. at 1254.

40. Id.

41. Id. at 1252.

42. See The Rights of the Colonists, a List of Violations of Rights and a Letter of Correspondence, October 28, 1772, reprinted in The Writings of Samuel Adams 350, 361 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1906).

43. Id.

44. Id.

45. Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 532, 588 (Washington, Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (recording an argument by Patrick Henry, during Virginia’s ratification debates).

46. Alexander v. City of Syracuse, 132 F. 4th 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2025).

47. Id. at 151–56.

48. Mom’s, Inc. v. Willman, 109 Fed. App’x 629, 633 (4th Cir. 2004).

49. Id.

50. Id. at 637.

51. Honda Lease Trust v. Malanga’s Automotive, 152 F.4th 477, 489 (3d Cir. 2025).

52. Id.

53. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, cl. 3.

54. See Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F. 3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The presumption is that an individual is entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the state’s permanent deprivation of his property interest.”).

55. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999) (“Once the property owner is informed that his property has been seized, he can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him.”).

56. See Brief for Public Defender Service for DC, Asinor v. DC, supra note 13, at *1 (“[E]ven when the government has no basis to keep the property, the process of ensuring that MPD and the U.S. Attorney’s Office complete the required paperwork and communicate with one another is extremely burdensome and complicated. In effect, there is virtually no way for an individual to have their property returned without the assistance of an attorney.”).

57. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, cl. 3.

58. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015) (“[I]t requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.”).

59. Id.

60. See Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding forced sterilization unconstitutional since “procreation [is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”).

61. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).

62. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 240 (2022) (referencing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) as an example of “freewheeling judicial policymaking”).

63. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (opting for Fourth Amendment analysis over substantive due process because it is an “explicit textual source of constitutional protection”).

64. M. Jackson Jones, Examining Why the Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Property Interests Once the Initial Search and Seizure Have Been Completed, 45 S.U.L. Rev. 96, 129 (2017).

65. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4.

66. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–86 (2005) (listing acceptable public uses as eminent domain, ownership transfers to a private common-carrier for public access, and community economic development).

67. Id.

68. Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 77, 101 (2019) (arguing that gaining access to ISP-data servers should be governed by a Takings Analysis and asserting law enforcement and national security purposes could be deemed an appropriate public use).

69. Id. at 114 (“[U]nderstanding a taking of data for law enforcement purposes as analogous to a public use fit[s] with other purposes that qualify as public uses.”).

70. See Lee v. Chicago, 330 F. 3d 456, 475 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, J. concurring) (asserting duration and justification post-seizure were not factors in a Takings Clause analysis and the legal question merely turned on just compensation).

71. Id. at 476.

72. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (holding that proper compensation for temporary takings is the value of the seized property for the duration of the seizure) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).

73. Asinor, 111 F. 4th at 1255 (“It is one thing not to have access to a cell phone while spending a night in jail. It is quite another not to have access to it for the following year. Some plaintiffs allege that they had to replace their phones, a significant financial harm. And some allege that they lost access to important information like passwords, photographs, and contact information for friends and family.”).

74. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999) (holding that notification of property seizure was enough to satisfy procedural due process).

75. See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Central School District, 363 F. 3d 177, 187 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It is well established that mere negligence is insufficient as a matter of law to state a due process violation.”).