by Réka Illei* 

In 2008 with District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court began its overhaul of Second Amendment jurisprudence and left lower courts in a state of limbo on how to evaluate permissible state restrictions on firearm possession. In 2022, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Court affirmed the right to carry a firearm for self-defense outside of the home. At the same time, the Court left open the notion of “sensitive places,” such as schools and government buildings, in which firearm restrictions may be more permissible under the Second Amendment. In the years since, states have attempted to regulate firearm possession in parks under the Bruen historical analogue framework. Still, Bruen provides little to lower courts regarding how to properly identify if a location is a sensitive place for the purposes of relaxing Second Amendment protections. Meanwhile, First Amendment jurisprudence has established a forum analysis for the similar purpose of evaluating rights-restricting speech regulations, which is familiar to and faithfully applied by courts across the country. This Contribution argues that courts should appropriate the First Amendment forum framework for the Second Amendment analysis of sensitive places and historical analogues as established by Bruen.

 

In the last eighteen years, a series of Supreme Court cases have upended the application of the Second Amendment to state laws.1 In rapid succession, the Court changed the landscape of permissible firearm restrictions, leaving lower courts to develop the framework through which these regulations were evaluated. This initial framework was later disregarded by the Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and replaced with a much more convoluted approach relying on historical analogues. As lower courts have grappled with applying the new test, similarities to the First Amendment forum analysis have emerged. By drawing from established First Amendment doctrine, courts will be better equipped to distinguish appropriate historical analogues for location-specific restrictions on firearms when evaluating modern-day firearm regulations.

The Supreme Court began its overhaul of Second Amendment jurisprudence in 2008 with District of Columbia v. Heller.2 For the first time, the Court recognized a constitutional right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense.3 Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, the Court clarified that the Second Amendment is applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 This decision came after lower courts declined to apply Heller to state regulations, finding that the Supreme Court had “explicitly refrained from ‘opin[ing] on the subject of incorporation . . . of the Second Amendment’” to states.5 The Heller-McDonald decisions led lower courts to develop a two-part test for evaluating the constitutionality of firearm restrictions. Under this test, courts first considered whether the regulation “fell within the scope of the Second Amendment based on its text and history” and if it did, whether “the challenged law burdened the core of the Second Amendment, defined by Heller as self-defense in the home.”6 A law that was found to burden the core purpose of the Second Amendment was reviewed under strict scrutiny7, the most stringent standard of judicial review which asks whether the restriction is “narrowly tailored . . . to serve the stated government interest.”8 Laws that burden conduct outside of the Second Amendment’s core were to be reviewed under a lower standard of review known as intermediate scrutiny,9 which asks whether the regulation is “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.”10 For years, all circuits faithfully applied this two part means-ends test.11 Then, when given the chance to affirm this established lower court practice, the Supreme Court instead chose to create confusion.

In 2022, the Court once again overhauled established lower court practice. In Bruen, the Court extended Heller and McDonald and interpreted the Second Amendment to include the right to carry firearms for self-defense outside of the home.12 In doing so, the Court explicitly declined to adopt the “‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny” employed by circuit courts.13 Finding the two-step framework to be “one-step too many,” the Court articulated a new standard by which firearm regulations would be evaluated.14 Courts now must consider if the conduct targeted by the regulation is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment.15 If covered, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.”16 To nevertheless sanction the regulation, the “government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”17 In Bruen, the Court found that New York State’s licensure requirement for carrying a firearm targeted conduct which falls under the text of the Second Amendment’s protections.18 Despite some history of carriage restrictions at the nation’s founding, the Court did not find a historical tradition of such regulation.19 Two years later, in United States v. Rahimi, the Court elaborated upon Bruen’s “historical tradition” requirement.20 The Court emphasized that the “law [is not] trapped in amber,”21 supporting the Court’s prior position in Bruen that historical traditions can be supported by analogues and not solely by twins.22

As demonstrated by the rapid change in Second Amendment jurisprudence from Heller to Rahimi, the doctrine has had little time to solidify itself into workable standards by lower courts’ precedents. Nonetheless, the one carveout that has survived through all the changes is the notion of sensitive places, or locations in which firearm regulation are more permissible (and in line with historical tradition) than others.23 After first being mentioned in Heller,24 the Bruen Court affirmatively acknowledged that certain locations such as schools and government buildings are sufficiently “sensitive” as to permit restrictions on firearm possession.25 Still, with few clear lines as to what is or is not a sensitive place, and what locations are or are not more accepting of firearm regulations, states have been left to draft regulations without clear directions and lower courts have struggled in developing the doctrine independently.

While the Second Amendment analysis remains muddled, First Amendment jurisprudence has established a clear test dictating forum analysis for courts. Distinguishing between public and non-public forums allows courts to determine the permissible level of government restrictions on speech, including the level of scrutiny courts must apply to any challenged regulation impacting speech.26 Speech in public forums is afforded the highest level of protection, with any state restriction being subject to heightened scrutiny.27 Strict scrutiny in the First Amendment context requires a regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.28 Speech restrictions in non-public forums, on the other hand, need only pass rational basis review, a much lower standard, more permissive of government regulations.29 The type of forum can therefore be determinative as to the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts speech, as a restriction deemed permissible in a non-public forum may easily be rendered unconstitutional in a public forum.30 As a result of the dispositive nature of a forum, courts have established a standardized, fact-specific analytical framework by which they evaluate location-specific speech restrictions.

This Contribution argues that the First Amendment public forum doctrine already tested by courts provides a clear framework for lower courts to evaluate historical analogues of firearm restrictions in sensitive places.31 The Supreme Court is posed to decide the constitutionality of restrictions on firearms in several sensitive places this term, including in public parks, in Wolford v. Lopez.32 Applying the forum framework to the sensitive places analysis would allow the Supreme Court and lower courts to more uniformly interpret historical analogues, identify modern sensitive places, and protect the conduct intended by the Framers when ratifying the Second Amendment.

Lower courts need a structured analysis for Second Amendment sensitive place cases. In Bruen, the Court noted that “federal courts [are] tasked with making . . . difficult empirical judgments regarding firearm regulations.”33 In response, the Court emphasized the presumption against regulation to simplify the analysis. However, in practice, this leaves courts no better off, as they still must make subjective judgments regarding the similarity between modern-day regulations and their historical analogues. Without a standard framework with which to evaluate modern-day sensitive places, courts will continue to struggle to draw a clear line as to the permissibility of firearm restrictions in certain locations. The Ninth Circuit in Wolford said as much when the court acknowledged that the “lack of an apparent logical connection among the sensitive places is hard to explain in ordinary terms.”34 The Wolford court further expressed concern over the “seemingly arbitrary nature of Second Amendment rulings.”35 By appropriating the First Amendment forum analysis, courts considering Second Amendment sensitive place firearm regulations can counter this apparent lack of logic and arbitrariness in courts’ decision-making by relying instead on a consistent, established framework.

Using public parks as a test case demonstrates how forum analysis can differentiate historical analogues and identify appropriate modern sensitive places. First Amendment forum analysis is a fact-specific inquiry, considering an area’s use, purpose, and characteristics.36 Rather than focusing solely on the name of a location (park, square, commons, greens), forum analysis takes a holistic view, one which allows courts to accurately evaluate the analogue put forth by the government. While public parks are often seen as quintessential public fora, their names are not dispositive, just as the name of a sensitive place should not be the end of a court’s Second Amendment analysis.37

The framework of this First Amendment forum analysis can already be found within the opinions of lower courts that have addressed prohibitions on firearms in parks. In Antonyuk v. James, for instance, the Second Circuit specifically used the language of “public forum” when evaluating the relevance of several historical analogues put forth by the state, focusing specifically on historical public forums.38 The Fourth Circuit in Kipke v. Moore also referred to forum analysis principles when considering firearm restrictions in mass transit.39 The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Class considered the use, location, and ownership of a parking lot to determine its classification as a sensitive place, much like the considerations in a typical forum analysis.40 And in Wolford, the Ninth Circuit considered the use and physical characteristics of modern parks to evaluate their similarity to forums at the Founding-era.41 Without even realizing it, circuit courts have integrated forum analysis into their evaluations of location-based firearm restrictions. Formally adopting the forum framework into Second Amendment jurisprudence would simply standardize the practice and ensure uniform application across the country.

The test established in Bruen requires an analogous historical restriction for a firearm regulation to be deemed by courts as part of this nation’s history and thereby a constitutionally permissible regulation. In determining if a historical restriction is sufficiently similar, courts inevitably consider the current and historical use of the relevant location, the current and historical purpose of the restriction itself, and the current and historical physical characteristics of a location. By standardizing these prongs and establishing a clear test, lower courts can more consistently review state restrictions on firearm possession while still faithfully upholding the protections of both the First and Second Amendment.

Consider the use of a location first. Under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, a public forum is one which has been “historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities,”42 or alternatively “[has] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”43 Much like the focus on historical analogues in the Second Amendment sensitive places analysis, First Amendment forum analysis is grounded in the historical use of the physical location, preventing modern restrictions from infringing on established, pre-existing rights.44 The use of a park, for example, can be instrumental in determining if historical regulations are sufficiently analogous to present-day restrictions, or if such comparisons are misplaced.

The Second Circuit in Antonyuk considered whether the use of Boston Common, a historical analogue put forth by opponents to New York’s firearm restriction45 was an appropriate comparison to New York parks. Plaintiffs, gun owners, contended that the lack of firearm restrictions at Boston Common during the Founding undermined the constitutionality of modern-day prohibitions by the New York legislature on firearms in its state parks.46 Antonyuk dealt with Second Amendment challenges to New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (“CCIA”).47 The CCIA identifies twenty sensitive places in which it is a crime to carry a firearm.48 One of the sensitive places challenged by petitioners and considered by the Second Circuit was public parks.49 In evaluating the plaintiffs’ comparison to Boston Common as a Founding-era public park, the Second Circuit found that Boston Common had, at the time of the Founding, been used as “grazing areas open to all,” and not as a “public square” or a public forum.50 The Antonyuk court went on to say that “commons, greens, and public parks” can only be treated as “‘relevantly similar’ [to modern-day parks] if one’s metric is green spaces in cities,” a metric that takes in only the superficial description of a place and ignores its historic use as a “public forum[] and place[] of social recreation.”51 By engaging in more than mere surface level analysis, the court did not find the comparison to be sufficiently similar.52

Unmoved by the Boston Common analogy, the Second Circuit found that New York had demonstrated a historical tradition of firearm restrictions within urban parks sufficient to uphold CCIA’s constitutionality.53 The Ninth Circuit found similarly in Wolford, stating that an “assertion that the public green spaces that existed in 1791 were akin to a modern park” was likely to be unsuccessful.54 The Wolford court also differentiated modern parks from the Boston Common, in part due to the differences in use, with the Boston Common historically being “used primarily for grazing animals and for holding military exercises.”55 Meanwhile, modern day parks are places of recreation and social gathering, much like public fora, and are incompatible with military exercise.56 This distinction applies in the First Amendment context as well, where the use of a municipal park, which has been associated with expression, differs greatly from that of an undeveloped green space with has no such expressive association. Finding this distinction in the First Amendment, it follows the same holds in the Second Amendment context as well because the mere constitutional amendment at issue in a given case before a court should not change the court’s consideration of the use of a space by the public. As the Second Circuit aptly put it, a historical firearm regulation in an open field “tells us little about the history of firearm regulation in the public square,” and therefore should not be relied upon when evaluating historical analogues under Bruen.57

After considering the modern-day use of a location and its similarity to the use of a historical example, courts should turn to the purpose of the challenged restriction on firearms and its relationship to the purpose of the space in which the restriction applies. In the First Amendment context, this analysis presents as an evaluation of the expressive nature of a forum and a consideration of whether restrictions on speech would impede such purpose.58 Under the First Amendment, governments may establish time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment-protected activity.59 Such balancing does not exist under the Second Amendment60 and permitting restrictions on firearms when doing so aligns with the modern purpose of the space does not rely on balancing of interests. In Antonyuk, the state put forth several historical restrictions on firearms in public forums ranging from British statutes pre-1776, to statutes from the Founding and Reconstruction eras,61 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.62 The court found that these prohibitions shared a purpose of “protect[ing] people from the danger and disturbance that may accompany firearms.”63 This historical purpose of prohibitions in public fora is not only analogous but identical to the purpose of several park bans on carrying guns: to protect the public from the danger posed by firearms.64 Meanwhile, areas that did not have firearm restrictions, like the popular example of Founding-era Boston Common, are distinguishable based on the purpose of the space. Boston Common historically operated in part as an area for militia exercises.65 Firearm restrictions would have been inherently incompatible with its original militia purposes. Modern parks, on the other hand, have the purpose of engagement in “social, political, and recreational activities,”66 and thus are comparable with other fora that share in such a purpose.67 This may include public fora like fairs (recreation) and markets (social).68 Such places do in fact have a history of firearm restrictions and provide the historical tradition of such regulation required by Bruen.69 The consideration of the purpose of a location allows courts to accurately identify appropriate historical analogues by relying on historical reasoning for firearm restrictions (or the lack thereof) rather than depending solely on the name of a location when determining the constitutionality of firearm restrictions.

Lastly, courts assessing firearm regulations should look to the physical characteristics of the place in which the restriction applies.70 Similar to considering the use of a park, its physical characteristics would allow courts to draw nuanced lines between permissible prohibitions and unconstitutional restrictions rather than relying on an all-or-nothing approach. In the First Amendment context, courts frequently consider the physical characteristics of a forum when determining if it is compatible with expressive use and speech.71 For example, wilderness areas have been found to be incompatible with free expression and assembly and therefore not akin to historic examples of public fora due to their physical nature and use.72 Similar distinctions can be made when considering historical analogues. Returning to the Founding-era Boston Common, the physical characteristics of such a “grazing area” cannot be said to be the same as a municipal park within a city, which is designed to facilitate recreation and socialization. In this way, the physical characteristics of parks can help courts differentiate which historical prohibitions to firearm possession should be given weight under the Bruen historical analogue framework. The Second Circuit in Antonyuk considered the physical characteristics of modern-day parks to be more akin to Founding-era fairs and markets than grazing areas, and as a result, found support for a historical tradition of firearm regulation that affirmed the constitutionality of New York State’s firearm restriction in parks under Bruen.73 Similarly, the Wolford court noted that once “green spaces began to take the shape of a modern park,” firearms restrictions emerged.74 The comparable physical characteristics of modern parks to those developed in the 19th century75 help courts identify the correct historical analogues to base their analysis on.

While the Founding-era Boston Common may not be a physical match for modern day municipal parks, its characteristics and use may allow it to be an applicable comparison for “wilderness parks, forests, and reserves,” a location where firearm restrictions may not align with historical traditions.76 The First Amendment forum framework allows courts to consider the specific attributes of different sensitive places, understanding that the name of a location is not dispositive.77 In doing so, Second Amendment rights may actually be more protected as broad bans on firearms in all green spaces in a state would not pass muster under the fact-specific nature of this inquiry. The Antonyuk court demonstrated such discernment when it held that regulation of firearms in urban parks fell within the historical tradition of “regulating firearms in quintessentially crowded areas and public forums” and did not extend that tradition to rural parks,78 since modern rural parks are much more reminiscent of “wilderness areas” than traditional public fora.79 The fact-specific nature of forum analysis allows courts to make nuanced decisions, preventing judicial overreach in either direction.

While the First and Second Amendment do not operate in tandem with each other, interaction between the two is not unheard of. The Court in both Heller and Bruen pointed to the First Amendment as a comparable right and legal analysis.80 Further, government restrictions on firearms in public fora, such as parks, act as offensive protection of free speech. In a public forum, the government must allow for the free exchange of ideas and refrain from infringing on free speech rights.81 The presence of firearms in such fora can unintentionally chill expressive speech.82

The clarity provided by the forum framework and its familiarity to courts supports its use in Second Amendment jurisprudence. Unlike the vague test first put forth by the Court in Bruen and later clarified (or muddied) by Rahimi, the First Amendment forum test is straightforward. Its several factors allow the test to be flexible to different types of locations, not just parks, while still providing courts with the needed specificity to draw lines and prevent watering down Second Amendment protections. Rather than overriding Bruen or Rahimi, the forum framework supplements the Court’s determination of “sensitive places” by providing lower courts with tangible steps to defining such a place and identifying relevant historical analogues. In Bruen, the Supreme Court acknowledge the difficult task faced by courts in determining the constitutionality of firearm restrictions but did little to standardize the analysis, instead deciding to reinvent the wheel. By applying the First Amendment’s forum analysis structure to firearm regulations in sensitive places, courts could more effectively uphold the founders’ Second Amendment vision without overriding states’ right to protect public safety.

* Réka Illei is a J.D. Candidate (2026) at New York University School of Law. This Contribution is commentary on the applicability of First Amendment jurisprudence to Second Amendment cases.

1. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); N. Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 18 (2022); United States v Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024).

2. 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008).

3. Id. at 594–95.

4. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750, 778.

5. Id. at 750 (quoting NRA, Inc. v. Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008)).

6. Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941, 963 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (2025).

7. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18.

8. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

9. Id.

10. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015).

11. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 963.

12. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8–10.

13. Id. at 17.

14. Id. at 19.

15. Id. at 18. (“If the government can prove that the regulated conduct falls beyond the Amendment’s original scope, ‘then the analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected.’”) (citation omitted).

16. Id. at 24.

17. Id. at 17.

18. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32.

19. Id. at 38–39.

20. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691–92 (explaining that prior precedent should not be read to require a perfect historical match when evaluating whether a modern firearm regulation falls within the historical tradition of firearm regulations).

21. Id. at 691.

22. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30.

23. Id.

24. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.

25. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30.

26. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (scrutiny); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (types of forums).

27. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (finding that “speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”).

28. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.

29. See id. at 54 (applying rational basis review).

30. See id. at 49.

31. The Second Amendment is independent from the First Amendment, and this Contribution should not be read to imply that Second Amendment cases should be evaluated under First Amendment precedent.

32. Wolford v. Lopez, 116 F.4th 959, 1003 (9th Cir 2024), cert. granted in part, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025) (addressing several firearm restrictions in both Hawaii and California, not just restrictions in parks and other sensitive places).

33. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26 (referring to difficulty courts face when attempting to apply intermediate scrutiny).

34. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 1003.

35. Id.

36. See, e.g., United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 675 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A court must consider the forum’s physical traits as well as its past uses and purposes.”); Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he inquiry must be an objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property.”) (hereinafter “ISKCON”).

37. See Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 514–15 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

38. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1018–25.

39. Kipke v. Moore, 165 F.4th 194, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2026) (considering the forum status of a mass transit system).

40. United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

41. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982–85.

42. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).

43. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).

44. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (comparing the Second Amendment to the First and Fourth Amendment).

45. Plaintiffs opposing firearm restrictions often use Boston Common as the analogous Founding-era park. However, there is significant disagreement as to its similarity to a modern-day park and if the Founding-era is the correct time period for state regulations on firearms. See Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1024 (discussing Boston Common); see also Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982 (same).

46. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1024.

47. Id. at 955.

48. Id. at 957.

49. Id. at 1015.

50. Id.

51. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1025.

52. Id.

53. Id. at 1025–26.

54. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982.

55. Id.

56. Id.

57. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1024.

58. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (“[T]he government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes.”); see also First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We also consider whether speech activities are compatible with the purpose of the [place].”).

59. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989).

60. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22 (emphasizing that Heller and McDonald “rejected the application of any ‘judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry”’” within the Second Amendment) (citation omitted).

61. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1018–19 (acknowledging the several state laws enacted during the Founding-era and the Reconstruction-era which regulated firearms in public forums).

62. The Supreme Court has not affirmatively decided whether the relevant time period for historical analogues for firearm restrictions is the Founding-era (passage of the Second Amendment) or the Reconstruction-era (passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 82 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court avoids another ‘ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868’ or when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.”).

63. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1017 (quoting the district court).

64. Id. at 1019 (“agree[ing] with the State that [the sensitive places ban] is within the Nation’s history of regulating firearms in quintessentially crowded areas and public forums” based on the analogue presented).

65. See Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1024; see also Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982.

66. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982.

67. Contra Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1025 (“[O]ur 18th century forebears would have considered commons and greens to be public grazing areas and not places of social recreation.”).

68. See id. at 1019.

69. Id.

70. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 698–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring); but cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (“The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis.”).

71. See e.g., ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[P]hysical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and uses.”); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, 308 F.3d at 1128 (expressive activity must be “historically . . . compatible with, if not virtually inherent in [the space]” to make it a traditional public forum.).

72. See Boardley, 615 F.3d at 515 (“Presumably, many national parks include areas—even large areas, such as a vast wilderness preserve—which never have been dedicated to free expression and public assembly, would be clearly incompatible with such use, and would therefore be classified as nonpublic forums.”); see also A Quaker Action Grp. v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 724–25 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“It may be that certain parks can reasonably be reserved for specific park uses; First Amendment activity might be inappropriate for a wilderness area such as Yellowstone Park.”).

73. See Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1019.

74. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 982.

75. See id.

76. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1019 (acknowledging there may not be “historical support for the regulation of firearms in wilderness parks, forests, and reserves”).

77. See Boardley, 615 F.3d at 514–15.

78. Antonyuk, 120 F. 4th at 1019.

79. Id. at 1025.

80. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24 (“Take, for instance, the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. . .In that context, ‘[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.’”) (citation omitted); see also Heller, 554 U.S at 582, 595 (comparing the Second Amendment to the First Amendment).

81. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.

82. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1018 (“[T]he [firearm] regulation aims to protect the spaces where individuals often gather to express ‘their constitutional rights to protest or assemble.’”) (citation omitted).