Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Tag: Constitutional Law

Fitting Administrative Law Judges into Appointments Clause Jurisprudence (and Determining the Proper Forum to Do So)

by Jordan Gary*

Are Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) inferior officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, rendering the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) procedure for appointing ALJs unconstitutional? Procedurally, how could a respondent in an SEC administrative action make such a challenge? Jordan Gary (’17) explores this question, as presented in the 2016 Kaufman Moot Court Competition at Fordham Law School. Supreme Court doctrine places a demanding burden on plaintiffs seeking to circumvent SEC administrative processes. Additionally, the SEC is neither bound by, nor required to defer to, initial ALJ determinations in reaching its ultimate determination within a proceeding. As a result, this Contribution argues that, as a matter of both law and policy, Article III district courts should not have subject-matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims challenging SEC administrative procedure, and that SEC ALJs do not constitute inferior officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.

Long Hair, Don’t Care: An Analysis of Gender-Specific School Athletic Regulations & The Equal Protection Clause

by Matthew Olsen*

Does a high school men’s baseball team regulation governing player hairstyles violate players’ Due Process or Equal Protection rights? Matt Olsen (’17) examines this question, based on his experience at the 2016 Tulane Mardi Gras Sports Law Invitational Competition. His Contribution discusses the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Hayden v. Greensburg School Community Corporation, the sole circuit court case to address the constitutionality of extracurricular athletic grooming regulations in the context of an Equal Protection claim. Although the adoption of the holding by other courts remains to be seen, the Contribution concludes that the ruling could serve as a powerful means to strike down personal appearance regulations based on gender stereotypes.

Hacking from the Inside-Out: Can the CFAA Impose Liability on Employees who Misuse Employer Data?

by Susanna Griffith*

Can an employee who has accessed computer database information in violation of use restrictions and direct instructions from his employer be convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for accessing data “without authorization” or “exceed[ing] authorized access”? Susanna Griffith (’17) reflects on this question, based on her experience at the 2016 Spong Moot Court Tournament, hosted by William & Mary Law School. Her Contribution discusses the legal landscape and circuit split regarding the applicability of the statute to employees who have violated use restrictions and directives from employers. The Contribution argues that the narrow, code-based view is preferable as the clearly constitutional reading that also comports with standards of excellence in the field of cyber-security.

Reexamining the “Germaneness” Test for Limited Purpose Public Figures

by David Clements*

What standard should be applied to limited purpose public figures – individuals that are public figures only due to their involvement in a particular public controversy – who bring defamation claims, when the alleged defamatory remarks are unrelated to the plaintiff’s purpose for being a public figure? David Clements (’17) examines this question, presented at the Spring 2016 Marden Moot Court Competition, held at New York University School of Law. The “germaneness test” employed by several Circuit Courts of Appeal determines the extent of First Amendment protections a defendant in a defamation suit receives: a challenged statement germane to the controversy for which a defamation claimant is a public figure receive more protection than a statement unrelated to that controversy. This Contribution urges the Supreme Court to revisit this germaneness test, as applied to limited purpose public figures, for three reasons: first, allowing limited purpose public figures to recover damages for negligent defamation would cause a chilling effect on the press; second, engaging in a intensive investigation into whether certain comments are “germane” to a particular plaintiff’s purpose as a public constitutes a presumptively unconstitutional content-based analysis of speech; third, the distinction between limited purpose and general purpose public figures is no longer applicable due to technological advancement and the heightened access to self-help channels that even limited purpose public figures now possess.

The Dean Wormer Test: Good Faith as a Keystone of Student Speech First Amendment Jurisprudence

by Alec Webley*

Does a school district violate the First Amendment when they ban stickers reading “Screw Hate, Don’t Discriminate,” and if so, how? Alec Webley (’16) examines this question, presented at the 2015 Seigenthaler First Amendment Moot Court Competition at Vanderbilt University. Supreme Court doctrine recognizes that a school or educator may suppress student speech – speech that, in other contexts, would receive First Amendment protections – that is “lewd,” and therefore inconsistent with a school’s educational mission. This Contribution critiques this lewdness test as impermissibly vague, content-based, and overbroad, and proposes an alternative method through which schools could productively address and sanction “lewd” speech.

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