Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Author: Andrew Debbins

Everywhere at Once: The Tinker Framework and Off-Campus, Online Speech

by Avery Med­juck*

May a school restrict a stu­den­t’s online speech with­out vio­lat­ing the First Amend­ment? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Avery Med­juck (’18) explains how the omnipres­ence of dig­i­tal com­mu­ni­ca­tion chal­lenges the Tin­ker frame­work for deter­min­ing when a school admin­is­tra­tor can law­ful­ly restrict speech. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that only a test that con­sid­ers the intent of the stu­dent speak­er can ade­quate­ly bal­ance stu­dents’ free speech rights against admin­is­tra­tors’ need to pro­tect the school environment.

Caveat Utilitor: A Tort Regime for Outer Space

by Jason A. Driscoll*

Is dam­age to a lunar min­ing facil­i­ty action­able under the Out­er Space Treaty when the facil­i­ty is built on the sur­face of the Moon and made entire­ly from lunar rock? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Jason A. Driscoll (’18) ana­lyzes a wrin­kle in the law of out­er space, con­tem­plat­ing whether the cur­rent out­er space tort regime pro­tects dam­age to prop­er­ty craft­ed entire­ly from mate­ri­als mined in out­er space. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the cur­rent regime does not pro­tect and can­not account for the unprece­dent­ed, though pos­si­ble, prac­tice of man­u­fac­tur­ing objects in out­er space using extrater­res­tri­al materials.

Rights on ICE: A Determination Delayed is Due Process Denied

by Sharon Tur­ret*

How long may Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment detain a nonci­t­i­zen before he or she must go before a judge? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Sharon Tur­ret (’18) ana­lyzes the Due Process Clause issues with a “rea­son­able­ness” test for length of deten­tion and the need for a bright-line rule. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Due Process Clause requires a bright-line rule that the length of deten­tion be pre­sumed unrea­son­able after six months. That very bright-line rule is now before the Supreme Court in Jen­nings v. Rodriguez.

Truly Threatening: Intent Requirements for First Amendment Protection

by Ben Lazarus*

How should the law deter­mine whether a true threat was made with intent suf­fi­cient to not mer­it First Amend­ment pro­tec­tion? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Ben Lazarus (’18) ana­lyzes the dif­fer­ent approach­es cir­cuit courts have tak­en to answer this ques­tion. This Con­tri­bu­tion argues that an objec­tive test for what con­sti­tutes a threat is most in line with the Supreme Court’s prece­dents and rea­son­ing when con­fronting threat­en­ing speech.

The Importance of Privacy in Shared Spaces

by Rachel Lern­er*

Does the Fourth Amend­ment pro­tect a ten­an­t’s pri­va­cy in a shared stor­age unit? Can law enforce­ment search the whole space if her cotenant con­sents? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Rachel Lern­er (’18) ana­lyzes whether a ten­ant has a rea­son­able expec­ta­tion of pri­va­cy in the space and whether it is rea­son­able for police to search the space upon a third-par­ty’s con­sent. The Con­tri­bu­tion argues that the Fourth Amend­ment pro­tects a shared stor­age unit either as cur­tilage under Dunn or under the Katz test, and law enforce­ment can­not rea­son­ably search a well-demar­cat­ed sec­tion of the unit if anoth­er cotenant consents.

The Prudence of Finality: Equitable Mootness and Involuntary Creditors

by Cyrus B. Korn­feld*

Incentivizing Chapter 11: Why A Non-Debtor Discharge Is Within the Authority of the Bankruptcy Courts and in the Best Interest of Creditors

by Chelsea Ire­land*

The Doctrinal Significance of Message Attribution in Compelled Speech Cases

by Jesse Klinger*

If a bak­er has a reli­gious objec­tion to same-sex mar­riage, would a law that doesn’t allow him to refuse to sell to a same-sex cou­ple for their wed­ding vio­late his First Amend­ment rights? In this Con­tri­bu­tion, Jesse Klinger tack­les the prob­lem of whether pub­lic accom­mo­da­tions laws — laws that pro­hib­it dis­crim­i­na­tion in the pro­vi­sion of goods and ser­vices — imper­mis­si­bly com­pel a per­son to speak. The Con­tri­bu­tion exam­ines the Supreme Court’s com­pelled speech prece­dents and argues that mes­sage attri­bu­tion is the key issue. In par­tic­u­lar, because pub­lic accom­mo­da­tions laws are con­tent-neu­tral, a speak­er’s First Amend­ment rights are vio­lat­ed only if one would attribute a par­tic­u­lar mes­sage to the provider of the goods or ser­vices in question.

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén