Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Tag: Criminal Law and Procedure Page 3 of 4

Innocent Until My Attorney Says So: The Sixth Amendment and Admissions of Guilt in Capital Cases

by Rona Li*

In a capital case, can a defense attorney, against his client’s express objections, concede his client’s guilt to the jury? In this Contribution, Rona Li (’19) discusses the trial strategy of a defense attorney conceding guilt to avoid a death sentence and the conflict with his client’s Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that when a defense attorney admits his client’s guilt to the jury over his client’s unequivocal objection, he violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to make fundamental decisions about his case, and further, that his actions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Cars in Castles: The Fourth Amendment’s Automobile Exception and the Curtilage of the Home

by Kristin Mulvey*

When an automobile is parked in a driveway in the curtilage of the home, does the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment still apply? In this Contribution, Kristin Mulvey (’19) argues that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment should not apply when the vehicle is in the curtilage of the home. Further, this Contribution demonstrates that the underlying justifications for the automobile exception do not support a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a driveway.

Arrests and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Towards a Unitary Reasonableness Standard

by Conor Gaffney*

How should police officers take into account the different needs of a person with disabilities during an arrest? In this Contribution, Conor Gaffney (’18) examines the role of the Americans with Disabilities Act in governing arrests and investigations by police of persons with disabilities. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement modifies what searches and seizures of individuals with disabilities are considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Dead on Deferral?: Whether to Prosecute Companies That Fail to Comply with DPAs

by Brittney Nagle*

What actions should prosecutors and regulators take following a financial institution’s failure to meet the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement? In this Contribution, Brittney Nagle (’18) analyzes the options and remedies that U.S. prosecutors and regulators can pursue to promote accountability in the financial sector. This Contribution ultimately argues that they should pursue a combination of criminal charges against the institutions and actions to disgorge top executives of bonuses and other discretionary income.

Don’t Depart From Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule And Warrants Based On Tainted Evidence

by Savannah Ashby*

Should the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule apply when an officer acts in good faith in the execution of a warrant based on tainted evidence? In this Contribution, Savannah Ashby (’18) discusses the differing ways in which Courts of Appeals have applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in situations where the warrant is based on tainted evidence. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence obtained in execution of a warrant based on tainted evidence as it more consistent with the goal of the exclusionary rule: deterring officers from committing Fourth Amendment violations.

The Element in the Room: Requiring Probable Cause of Every Element of a Crime

by Kimberly La Fronz*

When conducting a warrantless search or seizure, must a police officer have probable cause for all elements of the crime, including mens rea? In this Contribution, Kimberly La Fronz (’18) discusses what the circuits include in their totality of the circumstances analysis to determine probable cause. This Contribution argues that in order to effect a warrantless arrest a police officer must have probable cause with respect to every element of the crime in order to effect a warrantless arrest and must not ignore exonerating evidence in their totality of the circumstances analysis.

The Importance of Privacy in Shared Spaces

by Rachel Lerner*

Does the Fourth Amendment protect a tenant’s privacy in a shared storage unit? Can law enforcement search the whole space if her cotenant consents? In this Contribution, Rachel Lerner (’18) analyzes whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the space and whether it is reasonable for police to search the space upon a third-party’s consent. The Contribution argues that the Fourth Amendment protects a shared storage unit either as curtilage under Dunn or under the Katz test, and law enforcement cannot reasonably search a well-demarcated section of the unit if another cotenant consents.

 Search, Seizure, and the Smartphone: Rethinking Privacy Protections in the Digital Age

by Christopher J. Rydberg*

In the digital age, how should privacy concerns constrain police investigations? In this Contribution, Christopher J. Rydberg considers this problem with respect to forcing suspects to unlock smartphones and specificity requirements with respect to smartphone search warrants. Ultimately, the Contribution argues that smartphones are different in kind because of the massive scope of data they contain, and thus historical doctrines of police process will have to change to accommodate the smartphone era.

The New Panopticon: Location Tracking and the Fourth Amendment

by Hogan Paschal*

Does warrantless, prolonged location tracking violate the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches? Hogan Paschal (’17) examines this question, based on her experience at the 2016 Spong Moot Court Tournament, hosted by William & Mary Law School on February 12-13th, 2016. The location tracking tools employed by Government investigators have become more sophisticated and widespread, often eroding the practical constraints that government resources previously imposed on search power. This Contribution posits a more holistic reading of the Fourth Amendment, that simultaneously acknowledges its historical context and modern investigative challenges. Ultimately, it argues that courts should restore Fourth Amendment safeguards by requiring a warrant as a precursor to the government’s use of prolonged location tracking.

Hacking from the Inside-Out: Can the CFAA Impose Liability on Employees who Misuse Employer Data?

by Susanna Griffith*

Can an employee who has accessed computer database information in violation of use restrictions and direct instructions from his employer be convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for accessing data “without authorization” or “exceed[ing] authorized access”? Susanna Griffith (’17) reflects on this question, based on her experience at the 2016 Spong Moot Court Tournament, hosted by William & Mary Law School. Her Contribution discusses the legal landscape and circuit split regarding the applicability of the statute to employees who have violated use restrictions and directives from employers. The Contribution argues that the narrow, code-based view is preferable as the clearly constitutional reading that also comports with standards of excellence in the field of cyber-security.

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