by Andrew Wells*


The Fifth Amend­ment states that “[n]o per­son . . . shall be com­pelled in any crim­i­nal case to be a wit­ness against [them­selves].”1 While the Fifth Amend­ment only explic­it­ly ref­er­ences crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tions, the Supreme Court has held that the priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion can be prop­er­ly invoked “in any pro­ceed­ing, civ­il or crim­i­nal, admin­is­tra­tive or judi­cial, inves­ti­ga­to­ry or adju­di­ca­to­ry” so long as an indi­vid­ual is com­pelled to pro­vide tes­ti­mo­ny that they rea­son­ably believe could be used in a crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion.2 Out­side of a civ­il or crim­i­nal pro­ceed­ing, the Supreme Court has held that indi­vid­u­als may prop­er­ly invoke Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege when a com­pelled dis­clo­sure cre­ates a “sub­stan­tial and ‘real,’ and not mere­ly tri­fling or imag­i­nary, haz­ard[] of incrim­i­na­tion.”3

Thir­ty-six states have legal­ized med­ical mar­i­jua­na, and forty-nine states have offi­cial­ly acknowl­edged the med­ical ben­e­fits of mar­i­jua­na.4 At the fed­er­al lev­el, how­ev­er, mar­i­jua­na is still list­ed as a Sched­ule I drug in the Con­trolled Sub­stances Act.5 The incon­gruity between fed­er­al and state laws in their treat­ment of mar­i­jua­na is known as the “mar­i­jua­na pol­i­cy gap”6 and is the focus of this Con­tri­bu­tion. In a state that has legal­ized med­ical mar­i­jua­na, state reg­u­la­to­ry agen­cies may have legit­i­mate rea­sons for requir­ing the dis­clo­sure of med­ical mar­i­jua­na use by license hold­ers. For exam­ple, agen­cies may feel com­pelled to restrict con­duct pro­hib­it­ed under fed­er­al law. How­ev­er, a com­pelled dis­clo­sure in that sit­u­a­tion would also be self-incrim­i­nat­ing because it requires license hold­ers to admit to a vio­la­tion of the Con­trolled Sub­stances Act. As such, com­pelled dis­clo­sure of med­ical mar­i­jua­na use by a state reg­u­la­to­ry agency may be pro­tect­ed by the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion, even if such dis­clo­sure does not cre­ate state-lev­el crim­i­nal liability.

Ulti­mate­ly, this Con­tri­bu­tion argues that an indi­vid­ual may prop­er­ly invoke Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege in response to any com­pelled dis­clo­sure of med­ical mar­i­jua­na use by a state reg­u­la­to­ry agency, regard­less of whether that dis­clo­sure occurs with­in a dis­ci­pli­nary pro­ceed­ing con­text or not.

* * * * *

The Supreme Court has assert­ed that the priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion “must be accord­ed lib­er­al con­struc­tion,” even if such broad allowance “adds to the bur­den of dili­gence and effi­cien­cy rest­ing on enforce­ment author­i­ties, [because] any oth­er con­clu­sion would seri­ous­ly com­pro­mise an impor­tant con­sti­tu­tion­al lib­er­ty.”7 This lib­er­al con­struc­tion is influ­enced by the Court’s under­stand­ing that the priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion is the bedrock of an individual’s rights in the face of com­pelled tes­ti­mo­ny.8 The  Court has not­ed that society’s “unwill­ing­ness to sub­ject those sus­pect­ed of a crime to the cru­el trilem­ma of self-accu­sa­tion, per­jury, or con­tempt” is a reflec­tion of “our most fun­da­men­tal val­ues and noble aspi­ra­tions.”9

The Supreme Court expand­ed upon this lib­er­al con­struc­tion of the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege when it held that the priv­i­lege pro­tects com­pelled state­ments beyond just the crim­i­nal cas­es envi­sioned by the text of the amend­ment.10 In doing so, the Court has rec­og­nized a range of gov­ern­ment actions out­side the crim­i­nal inter­ro­ga­tion process as being suf­fi­cient­ly com­pul­sive to allow for Fifth Amend­ment pro­tec­tion, includ­ing the poten­tial fir­ing of a pub­lic employ­ee.11 Direct­ly on point to the con­sid­er­a­tion of licensees using med­ical mar­i­jua­na, the Court held in Lefkowitz v. Tur­ley that archi­tects who held licens­es to con­tract with New York State had the right to invoke Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege when forced to answer self-incrim­i­nat­ing ques­tions on the pain of hav­ing their licens­es revoked.12 Gar­ri­ty v. New Jer­sey and Lefkowitz estab­lish that license hold­ers who are forced by the state to answer ques­tions under threat of los­ing their jobs are faced with gov­ern­ment com­pul­sion suf­fi­cient to invoke the Fifth Amend­ment if those answers would amount to self-incrimination.

The oper­a­tive ques­tion, then, is what thresh­old risk of pros­e­cu­tion aris­ing from a com­pelled state­ment is suf­fi­cient to war­rant Fifth Amend­ment pro­tec­tion, and whether the risk of fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion aris­ing from dis­clo­sure of state-sanc­tioned med­ical mar­i­jua­na use meets that thresh­old. The Supreme Court has estab­lished that, “in any pro­ceed­ing, civ­il or crim­i­nal” where an indi­vid­ual is respond­ing direct­ly to ques­tions, the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion pro­tects “any dis­clo­sure[] which [an indi­vid­ual] rea­son­ably believes could be used in a crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion.”13 Deter­mi­na­tions of whether an indi­vid­ual in a crim­i­nal or civ­il pro­ceed­ing held a rea­son­able belief that their com­pelled respons­es to incrim­i­nat­ing ques­tions could lead to crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion is a fact‑intensive and context‑specific inquiry,14 focus­ing on the “the impli­ca­tions of the ques­tion, in the set­ting in which it is asked.”15 Out­side the con­text of a pro­ceed­ing in which an indi­vid­ual was respond­ing direct­ly to incrim­i­nat­ing ques­tions, the Court has artic­u­lat­ed that com­pelled dis­clo­sures are still pro­tect­ed by the Fifth Amend­ment when an indi­vid­ual is con­front­ed by a “real and sub­stan­tial . . . haz­ard[] of incrim­i­na­tion.”16 The under­ly­ing facts of Mar­che­t­ti v. Unit­ed States illus­trate this point: Mar­che­t­ti invoked Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege in refus­ing to fill out an IRS form iden­ti­fy­ing prof­its from his illic­it gam­bling activ­i­ty in Con­necti­cut. The Court held that, even though Mar­che­t­ti had been pros­e­cut­ed for his gam­bling activ­i­ty in the past (and so could not invoke Fifth Amend­ment pro­tec­tion for that activ­i­ty), fil­ing gam­bling rev­enues with the IRS would sub­ject him to height­ened scruti­ny from state and fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors for all of his future activ­i­ty. This risk of height­ened pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al scruti­ny, the Court rea­soned, amount­ed to a “real and sub­stan­tial” haz­ard of incrim­i­na­tion.17 Because Mar­che­t­ti v. Unit­ed States’ “real and sub­stan­tial haz­ard of incrim­i­na­tion” stan­dard applies to all invo­ca­tion of Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege, not just those occur­ring in a pro­ceed­ing, Hoff­man’s con­text-spe­cif­ic, “impli­ca­tion and set­tings” approach is not always applic­a­ble. Instead, courts deter­min­ing whether an indi­vid­ual faced a risk of crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion suf­fi­cient to invoke Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege have con­sid­ered whether pros­e­cu­tion was pos­si­ble.18

The prop­er­ly under­stood stan­dard for invo­ca­tion of Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege, while expan­sive, does have explic­it lim­i­ta­tions. The Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege does not extend to an individual’s com­pelled tes­ti­mo­ny for which there is an “absolute bar to sub­se­quent pros­e­cu­tion.”19 In cir­cum­stances where the pros­e­cu­tion of an indi­vid­ual on the basis of their com­pelled dis­clo­sure is explic­it­ly barred by pro­ce­dur­al grounds, such as the statute of lim­i­ta­tions or dou­ble jeop­ardy, then invo­ca­tion of the priv­i­lege is improp­er.20 Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege is also lim­it­ed to dis­clo­sures that have the pos­si­bil­i­ty to “fur­ther incrim­i­nate” an indi­vid­ual. Invo­ca­tion of the priv­i­lege is thus not able pro­tect a com­pelled dis­clo­sure if the indi­vid­ual had pre­vi­ous­ly vol­un­teered the same incrim­i­nat­ing infor­ma­tion.21 Final­ly, Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege does not pro­tect an indi­vid­ual from being com­pelled to pro­vide tes­ti­mo­ny if the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment has extend­ed immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion on the basis of that individual’s com­pelled tes­ti­mo­ny.22 Such immu­ni­ty can be extend­ed by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment in two ways. First, Con­gress may pass a prospec­tive immu­ni­ty statute that pro­hibits fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion for dis­clo­sures made in reg­u­la­to­ry pro­ceed­ings, such as the Com­pul­so­ry Tes­ti­mo­ny Act of 1893, which immu­nized state­ments made before the Inter­state Com­merce Com­mis­sion.23 Sec­ond, Unit­ed States Attor­neys may peti­tion dis­trict courts on a case-by-case basis to grant immu­ni­ty to wit­ness­es in order to com­pel their tes­ti­mo­ny pur­suant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003.24

* * * * *

Because there is not an absolute bar on fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion for pos­ses­sion of marijuana­­­­­­—and no dis­tinc­tion in the Con­trolled Sub­stances Act between pos­ses­sion for med­ical or recre­ation­al purposes—individuals must be allowed to invoke Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege. This is because, as not­ed in the deci­sions above, fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion for such pos­ses­sion is pos­si­ble.25

Mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion is a fed­er­al crime,26 and the fed­er­al statute of lim­i­ta­tions for mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion runs for five years.27 Based on advances in the under­stand­ing of the med­ical uses for cannabis, med­ical mar­i­jua­na use has been legal­ized in at least some capac­i­ty in the major­i­ty of states.28 Accord­ing to the Mar­i­jua­na Pol­i­cy Project, over 4.5 mil­lion peo­ple had active pre­scrip­tions for med­ical mar­i­jua­na in 2020. How­ev­er, the Supreme Court held in Gon­za­les v. Raich that state laws legal­iz­ing med­ical mar­i­jua­na do not pre­empt the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment from pur­su­ing fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tions for mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion under the CSA.29 Thus, an indi­vid­ual com­pelled to dis­close their use of med­ical mar­i­jua­na today would be direct­ly impli­cat­ing them­selves in a fed­er­al crime, regard­less of the legal­iza­tion of mar­i­jua­na at the state lev­el, for which they could face pros­e­cu­tion for up to five years.

While Gon­za­les affirms that the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment unques­tion­ably has the pow­er to pros­e­cute indi­vid­u­als for mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion in med­ical mar­i­jua­na states,30 offi­cials in Con­gress and the Depart­ment of Jus­tice (“DOJ”) have recent­ly demon­strat­ed that they are not par­tic­u­lar­ly inter­est­ed in exer­cis­ing this pow­er. On a year­ly basis since fis­cal year 2014, Con­gress has passed an appro­pri­a­tions rid­er to the fed­er­al bud­get, which pro­hibits trea­sury funds from being spent pur­su­ing fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tions for mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion against med­ical mar­i­jua­na users in com­pli­ance with all applic­a­ble state laws.31  This appro­pri­a­tions rid­er pro­hibits the DOJ from spend­ing mon­ey to pros­e­cute mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion cas­es in med­ical mar­i­jua­na states as long as it is includ­ed in the fed­er­al bud­get.32

How­ev­er, the fed­er­al government’s cur­rent lack of inter­est in pros­e­cut­ing mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion in med­ical mar­i­jua­na states does not elim­i­nate the “pos­si­bil­i­ty of pros­e­cu­tion” and there­fore can­not jus­ti­fy the denial of the priv­i­lege if it is invoked.33 The appro­pri­a­tions rid­er “does not pro­vide immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for fed­er­al mar­i­jua­na offens­es,” because “Con­gress could restore fund­ing tomor­row . . . and the gov­ern­ment could then pros­e­cute indi­vid­u­als who com­mit­ted offens­es while the gov­ern­ment lacked fund­ing.”34

The offi­cial pol­i­cy stance of the DOJ regard­ing fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion of mar­i­jua­na offens­es in med­ical mar­i­jua­na states also sug­gests that the cur­rent dearth of fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion is an uneasy peace. In 2018, Attor­ney Gen­er­al Jeff Ses­sions cir­cu­lat­ed a mem­o­ran­dum to all Unit­ed States Attor­neys reaf­firm­ing the DOJ’s abil­i­ty to pros­e­cute all mar­i­jua­na crimes pur­suant to “inves­tiga­tive and pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al dis­cre­tion in accor­dance with all applic­a­ble laws.”35 Accord­ing to the Ses­sions memo, which cur­rent­ly dic­tates DOJ pol­i­cy, pros­e­cu­tions of mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion in mar­i­jua­na-legal states could resume as soon as the appro­pri­a­tions rid­er is rescind­ed.36 Fur­ther, even if a future Attor­ney Gen­er­al cir­cu­lates new guid­ance dis­cour­ag­ing Unit­ed States Attor­neys from fed­er­al­ly pros­e­cut­ing mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion in med­ical mar­i­jua­na states, that guid­ance alone would be insuf­fi­cient pro­tec­tion from poten­tial future pros­e­cu­tion to war­rant the denial of priv­i­lege where state reg­u­la­to­ry agen­cies com­pel incrim­i­nat­ing tes­ti­mo­ny con­cern­ing med­ical mar­i­jua­na use.37 Sim­ply, dis­cour­age­ment is a far cry from a pro­hi­bi­tion and so as long as there is a poten­tial for future pros­e­cu­tion, the priv­i­lege must be afford­ed to com­pelled individuals.

* * * * *

Although it is unlike­ly that state-com­pli­ant med­ical mar­i­jua­na users would face fed­er­al crim­i­nal charges giv­en cur­rent fed­er­al poli­cies, an indi­vid­ual may still prop­er­ly invoke the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege in response to a com­pelled dis­clo­sure of med­ical mar­i­jua­na use by a state agency because such dis­clo­sure expos­es them to the pos­si­bil­i­ty of fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion.38 This is true because “[n]either the prac­ti­cal unlike­li­hood of fur­ther pros­e­cu­tion, nor the [prosecutor’s] denial of an inten­tion to charge” are suf­fi­cient for find­ing those indi­vid­u­als’ impli­ca­tions of priv­i­lege improp­er.39 This expan­sive con­cep­tion of Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege as it applies to com­pelled dis­clo­sures of fed­er­al­ly crim­i­nal­ized med­ical mar­i­jua­na pos­ses­sion is con­sis­tent with set­tled Supreme Court prece­dent.40 Fur­ther, low­er courts have demon­strat­ed that exec­u­tive offi­cials and agen­cies that need to com­pel poten­tial­ly incrim­i­nat­ing tes­ti­mo­ny may do so with­out infring­ing on the Fifth Amend­ment by demon­strat­ing that there is an “absolute bar to future pros­e­cu­tion” on the basis of the com­pelled dis­clo­sure.41 Unless and until state reg­u­la­to­ry agen­cies can demon­strate that such a com­plete bar­ri­er exists, indi­vid­u­als who are com­pelled by those agen­cies to dis­close state-com­pli­ant med­ical mar­i­jua­na use may prop­er­ly invoke Fifth Amend­ment privilege.


* Andrew Wells is a J.D. Can­di­date (2022) at New York Uni­ver­si­ty School of Law. This piece arose from the prob­lem pre­sent­ed at the 2021 Frank A. Schreck Gam­ing Law Com­pe­ti­tion at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Neva­da, Las Vegas. The issue in the prob­lem con­sid­ered whether an indi­vid­ual may prop­er­ly invoke the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion in response to ques­tions about their med­ical mar­i­jua­na use in the con­text of a state reg­u­la­to­ry pro­ceed­ing in a state that has legal­ized med­ical mar­i­jua­na. The views expressed in this arti­cle do not nec­es­sar­i­ly rep­re­sent the views of the author on this point of law. Rather, this arti­cle is a dis­til­la­tion of one side of the argu­ments made by the team at the Schreck Gam­ing Law Competition.

1. U.S. Con­st. amend. V.

2. Kasti­gar v. Unit­ed States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (cita­tions omitted).

3. Mar­che­t­ti v. Unit­ed States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (quot­ing Rogers v. Unit­ed States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) and Brown v. Walk­er, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896)).

4. Med­ical Mar­i­jua­na by the Num­bers, Mar­i­jua­na Pol’y Project, https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/medical-marijuana-numbers/ (last vis­it­ed Mar. 27, 2022).

5. 21 U.S.C. § 812.

6. See gen­er­al­ly Joan­na R. Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10482, State Mar­i­jua­na “Legal­iza­tion” and Fed­er­al Drug Law: A Brief Overview for Con­gress (2020).

7. Hoff­man v. Unit­ed States, 341 U.S. 479, 489–90 (1951).

8. See, e.g., Unit­ed States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (declar­ing the priv­i­lege “a bul­wark against iniq­ui­tous mea­sures of prosecution”).

9. Mur­phy v. Water­front Com’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) abro­gat­ed on oth­er grounds by Unit­ed States v. Bal­sys, 524 U.S. 666, 667 (1998).

10. See Kasti­gar v. Unit­ed States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (stat­ing that the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege “can be assert­ed in any pro­ceed­ing, civ­il or crim­i­nal, admin­is­tra­tive or judi­cial, inves­ti­ga­to­ry or adju­di­ca­to­ry”); Mar­che­t­ti v. Unit­ed States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (“The cen­tral stan­dard for the priv­i­lege’s appli­ca­tion has been whether the claimant is con­front­ed by sub­stan­tial and ‘real,’ and not mere­ly tri­fling or imag­i­nary, haz­ards of incrim­i­na­tion.” (inter­nal quo­ta­tion marks omit­ted) (cita­tions omitted).

11. See Gar­ri­ty v. New Jer­sey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (hold­ing that the Fifth Amend­ment pro­tect­ed police offi­cers from being forced to pro­vide incrim­i­nat­ing tes­ti­mo­ny under threat of removal from office, and that this pro­tec­tion “extends to all,” includ­ing “mem­bers of our body public”).

12. 414 U.S. 70, 82–83 (1973) (hold­ing that the “threat of sub­stan­tial eco­nom­ic sanc­tion” is suf­fi­cient­ly com­pul­sive to war­rant Fifth Amend­ment protection).

13. Kasti­gar, 406 U.S. at 444–5.

14. See Con­verti­no v. Unit­ed States Dept. of Just., 795 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2015) (stat­ing that invo­ca­tion of the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege in response to a com­pelled dis­clo­sure is improp­er only “if it is ‘per­fect­ly clear, from a care­ful con­sid­er­a­tion of all the cir­cum­stances in the case, that [an indi­vid­ual] is mis­tak­en, and that the answer(s) can­not pos­si­bly have such ten­den­cy’ to incrim­i­nate.” (quot­ing Hoff­man v. Unit­ed States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951))).

15. Hoff­man, 341 U.S. at 486-87.

16. Mar­che­t­ti v. Unit­ed States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).

17. Id.

18. See In re Mas­ter Key Lit­ig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he right to assert one’s priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion does not depend upon the like­li­hood, but upon the pos­si­bil­i­ty of pros­e­cu­tion.” (cita­tions omit­ted)); In re Fold­ing Car­ton Antitrust Lit­ig., 609 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1979) (revers­ing the find­ing of the tri­al court that a witness’s invo­ca­tion of priv­i­lege was improp­er, stat­ing “we can­not agree that a wit­ness’ con­sti­tu­tion­al priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion depends upon a judge’s pre­dic­tion of the like­li­hood of prosecution”).

19. Cf. Fold­ing Car­ton, 609 F.2d at 872.

20. See id. (assert­ing that pro­ce­dur­al bars on pros­e­cu­tion are appro­pri­ate lim­i­ta­tions for the scope of an assert­ed privilege).

21. E.g., Rogers v. Unit­ed States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); Brown v. Walk­er, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).

22. Kasti­gar v. Unit­ed States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).

23. Id. at 451.

24. Id. at 462.

25. See In re Mas­ter Key Lit­ig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974) ((“[T]he right to assert one’s priv­i­lege against self-incrim­i­na­tion does not depend upon the like­li­hood, but upon the pos­si­bil­i­ty of pros­e­cu­tion.” (cita­tions omitted)).

26. See gen­er­al­ly Con­trolled Sub­stances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

27. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).

28. See Med­ical Mar­i­jua­na by the Num­bers, supra note 4.

29. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).

30. Id. at 17.

31. See gen­er­al­ly Con­sol­i­dat­ed Appro­pri­a­tions Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116–93, 133 Stat. 2317, 2431 (2019); Joan­na R. Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10482, State Mar­i­jua­na “Legal­iza­tion” and Fed­er­al Drug Law: A Brief Overview for Con­gress 3 (2020).

32. Unit­ed States v. McIn­tosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014).

33. In re Mas­ter Key Lit­ig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974).

34. McIn­tosh, 833 F.3d at 1179 n. 5.

35. Office of the Att’y Gen., Mem­o­ran­dum for All Unit­ed States Attor­neys (Jan. 4, 2018), avail­able at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download (last vis­it­ed Mar. 27, 2022).

36. Id. (“[T]his memo is intend­ed sole­ly as a guide to the exer­cise of inves­tiga­tive and pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al dis­cre­tion in accor­dance with all applic­a­ble laws, reg­u­la­tions, and appropriations.”).

37. See Unit­ed States v. Miran­ti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (“We find no jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for lim­it­ing the his­toric pro­tec­tions of the Fifth Amend­ment by cre­at­ing an excep­tion to the gen­er­al rule which would nul­li­fy the priv­i­lege when­ev­er it appears that the gov­ern­ment would not under­take to prosecute.”).

38. In re Mas­ter Key Lit­ig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974).

39. Unit­ed States v. John­son, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973).

40. See Hoff­man v. Unit­ed States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 489–90 (1951) (stat­ing that the Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege “must be accord­ed lib­er­al con­struc­tion,” even if such broad allowance of the priv­i­lege “adds to the bur­den of dili­gence and effi­cien­cy rest­ing on enforce­ment author­i­ties, [because] any oth­er con­clu­sion would seri­ous­ly com­pro­mise an impor­tant con­sti­tu­tion­al liberty”).

41. See In re Fold­ing Car­ton Antitrust Lit­ig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 1979) (rec­og­niz­ing that lim­i­ta­tions on Fifth Amend­ment priv­i­lege invo­ca­tions are appro­pri­ate where there is an “absolute bar to sub­se­quent prosecution”).