by Soleil Ball Van Zee *

The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization opened the door to states individually regulating, controlling, and criminalizing abortion and abortion-related care. In the emerging state legislative patchwork, conflicts between state laws demonstrate the increasing need for federal abortion legislation to ensure uniformity and halt interstate constitutional litigation before it begins. This Contribution proposes a framework for federal abortion legislation that can protect long-standing principles of federalism in this new age.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization left the decision about whether to criminalize or protect access to abortion care solely in the hands of the states.1 In response to this mandate, states are implementing diverging legislation regulating abortion that extends beyond their own state lines. Without decisive federal action, individual states, either by prosecuting individuals for facilitating abortion across state lines or by refusing to extradite individuals who have broken the law in another state by seeking an abortion, are at risk of throwing the careful balance of federalism into disarray.

However, by holding that the right to abortion is not found anywhere in the Constitution,2 the Dobbs Court prevented Congress from protecting the right through its legislative powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, either by identifying an individual right to abortion or by linking the right to another already recognized under the Amendment.3 Therefore, to create legislation that enshrines the right to abortion and survives scrutiny from the Dobbs Court, Congress should look instead to its past regulation of interstate commerce. A statute that specifically targets the interstate economic impact of abortion access and related care may be able to withstand the Court’s scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.

Ultimately, any benefit of federal legislative proposals to protect abortion access must be weighed against the possibility of legislative proposals to ban abortion using precisely the same justifications. Ongoing political gridlock and the lack of a supermajority for any political party has made the passage of federal legislation that legalizes or bans abortions unlikely. Moreover, even if federal abortion legislation becomes legally feasible, the political realities of implementation and backlash in this area may still discourage any movement on federal legislation.

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Prior to the Court’s 1973 recognition of a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,4 states had the ability to determine the metes and bounds of abortion on a state-by-state basis. Nine states did not repeal their legislative abortion bans following the Roe decision.5 Therefore, from 1973 to June 2022, these laws were not enforced, as they were unconstitutional during that time period. After Dobbs, these laws can theoretically be enforced again, although the enforceability of pre-Roe abortion bans is currently being litigated.6 For example, the Wisconsin Attorney General filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment against the legislature finding that the 1948 law banning abortion is unenforceable.7

Many states have instead chosen to pass new legislation restricting or banning abortion following Dobbs. After the Dobbs decision was leaked, a total of 13 states passed laws that would ban abortion once Dobbs was issued or shortly after.8 These statutes were designed to ban or severely limit abortion access across the enacting state after Dobbs became law. Some of these laws had bans that immediately went into effect,9 and others included a 30-day delay after a judicial decision returning the regulation of abortion to the states before the state law would become effective.10 However, the efficacy of trigger laws remains uncertain as state court judges have issued stays on trigger laws in Michigan11 and Minnesota.12

States interested in banning abortion are not solely interested in restricting abortion access within their own boundaries. Legislators have attempted to target those who seek to aid people in obtaining abortion care, which can reach across state lines and impact out-of-state providers and patients. In Montana, Planned Parenthood stopped providing medication abortions to patients who came from other states out of “fear [providers will] be targeted by out-of-state prosecutors for offering services to residents from states with bans.”13 Many of these laws follow the unique legal framework of Texas Senate Bill 8 (“SB 8”), passed in Texas in 2021, that deputizes private citizens to sue anyone who “aids or abets” the provision of an abortion after six weeks of pregnancy.14 Under the law, private plaintiffs are incentivized to bring civil actions with an award of $10,000 or more for successful suits.15

Idaho has recently passed a similar law that bans abortions six weeks into pregnancy.16 This bill follows SB 8’s structure by allowing relatives of the aborted fetus to sue abortion providers for performing abortions after six weeks of pregnancy.17 It does not however, criminalize the patients who obtained the abortions.18 Rather, licensed health-care professionals who perform abortions are criminally liable for a felony and eligible for sentences up to five-years imprisonment.19 In August 2022, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of criminal penalties on medical providers that provide abortion care in emergency situations.20 The DOJ’s suit alleged that the law contradicts the principles of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires medical-care facilities that receive federal funding through Medicare to provide “stabilizing treatment” to patients.21

One of the most restrictive abortion laws in the nation, House Bill 4327, was signed into law by Oklahoma’s governor on May 26, 2022.22 This bill bans abortion beginning at fertilization, with exceptions for pregnancy that was the result of rape, sexual assault, or incest that has been reported to law enforcement, or to save the life of the pregnant woman.23 The law also does not apply to the “use, prescription, administration, procuring, or selling” of morning-after pills such as Plan B or any other type of contraception.24 Like SB 8, it permits private individuals to sue abortion providers and anyone who “performs or induces” or “aids or abets the performance” of an abortion.25 The bill also permits individuals to be sued if they “intend[] to engage” in performing an abortion, even without actually doing so.26

These state laws demonstrate how states have sought to enforce abortion restrictions beyond their own state lines. Since the Court has mandated that states dictate what abortion procedures to permit or restrict, state legislatures may continue to become even more creative in their attempts to completely restrict abortion access, even extraterritorially. Texas has already done so through SB 8, which allows civil liability to be imposed for “paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise.”27 Under this section, non-profits who pay for the cost of an individual to travel outside of Texas to receive an abortion could be liable.

On the other side of the abortion legislation conflict, 21 states and the District of Columbia have either protected the right to abortion or expanded access to abortion since the Dobbs decision.28 For example, Washington state passed a law prohibiting adverse action against those who seek an abortion or those who help them, seemingly directly responding to Texas’s SB 8 framework.29

States are not only responding to Dobbs by protecting the right to an abortion but are also preparing for the collateral consequences of the Court’s decision. States like Maryland have passed laws that appropriate money to train medical professionals, such as nurse practitioners; nurse midwives; and physician assistants, to perform abortions.30 In Oregon, the legislature appropriated $15 million to help the state expand its abortion workforce.31 Connecticut also recently passed a law that would expand the number of medical professionals who can provide abortions and would shield resident abortion providers from liability under other states’ abortion laws.32

Other states have proactively passed statutes to protect in-state providers from the reach of out-of-state regulations. For example, the Massachusetts House recently approved provider protection legislation which would make it more difficult to collect a fine imposed by another state and to file a subpoena from outside Massachusetts, as well as shield provider licenses and insurance rates from the impact of out-of-state judgments.33 Under the law, if passed, Massachusetts courts would be barred from ordering anyone in the state to testify or produce documents for lawsuits involving abortion care, and judges would not be able to issue a summons in a case concerning these health-care services unless the alleged offense would violate Massachusetts law. Out-of-state residents who sue a Massachusetts provider would have to persuade an out-of-state judge that they have jurisdiction over an abortion performed in Massachusetts. And if the out-of-state resident wins, they would then have to come to Massachusetts to make that same argument in a Massachusetts state court. Similar efforts are underway in California,34 Connecticut,35 and Michigan.36 These laws have been enacted despite states being required under 18 U.S.C. § 3182 to extradite anyone who has committed “treason, felony, or other crime” to the state in which the fugitive committed the crime. For years, the Extradition Clause was seen as necessary to “preserve harmony between States, and order and law within their respective borders . . . .”37

As states look to new and creative responses to the gaping hole in abortion policy created by Dobbs, each state will become increasingly interested in presenting legislative solutions that extend outside of their traditional territorial boundaries. These efforts will inevitably infringe on the federal government’s traditional area of regulation: interstate commerce. Whether state legislation extends or restricts abortion access, these laws will affect the movement of people and resources across state lines. As more state legislation clashes with other state laws and interferes with the territory of federal regulatory power, the need for a cohesive federal framework regarding abortion will be essential.

State conflicts are likely to emerge in two primary arenas.38 The first will occur with the increased demand for abortion procedures performed across state lines, taking the form of interstate telehealth and mail abortion pills.39 The second, and most concerning, will manifest when an individual physically travels between two states, where one permits abortion and the other does not.40

However, state law traditionally only extends as far as its borders. These territorial limits raise questions about a state’s ability to penalize out-of-state conduct. Bigelow v. Virginia is one of only a few cases that even tangentially address if states can penalize out-of-state conduct.41 In Bigelow, the Supreme Court found that a Virginia statute prohibiting publications from encouraging individuals to obtain an abortion in another state infringed on the publisher’s First Amendment rights.42 In doing so, the Court expounded upon extraterritorial application of state law, stating that: “A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State.”43 However, Bigelow’s precedent is outdated, and scholars question its precedential effects post-Dobbs.44 Due to the more prominent political concerns, states will likely not be dissuaded by Bigelow. Instead, many states seeking to expand abortion restrictions would likely relish the opportunity to approach the current Supreme Court about extraterritorial abortion restrictions. Additionally, questions of where a crime occurred will be especially difficult to answer in the era of electronic healthcare administration, which may allow for a loosening of once firm extraterritorial limits.

Traditionally, the federal government’s most important role was to establish nation-wide policy when conflicts between state approaches would threaten to unravel the fabric of federalism.45 The Court, in overruling Roe and Casey, undid the national uniformity created by a constitutional right to abortion and placed it into the hands of individual states, hungry to impose their increasingly polarized views as broadly as they can. Federal legislation at this point would prevent the variety of difficult questions that will arise as states continue to creatively pass legislation that seeks to impose the strongly-held beliefs of its legislators upon people who reside in other states.

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Congress’s regulatory power is limited to areas that significantly impact the ability of the federal government to act as a cohesive whole. Over the past 80 years, the sources of the federal government’s regulatory authority in the Constitution have shifted. The Court continued this trend in Dobbs by severely limiting another channel of Congressional regulatory authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, federal legislation regarding abortion will most likely find constitutional authority strong enough to withstand a challenge only if it is connected to the interstate economic impacts of abortion and reproductive-health regulation and is therefore justifiable under the Commerce Clause.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs,46 the right to an abortion and – more broadly – the right to privacy were found in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade explained:

This right of privacy, . . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.47

Subsequent cases held that the right to privacy enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment extended beyond reproductive autonomy to living arrangements,48 sexual activity,49 and decisions to terminate medical treatment that could prolong life.50 Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Dobbs raised the possibility that the broader understanding of a right to privacy expressed in precedent besides Roe may also be vulnerable due to the Justice’s previously expressed belief that “‘substantive due process’ is an oxymoron that ‘lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.’”51

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the rights of “life, liberty, or property,” “due process,” and “equal protection” through “appropriate legislation.”52 The broad holding of Dobbs is that a right to abortion exists nowhere in the Constitution, and thus Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the appropriate justification for Congress to use its legislative authority. Given the Supreme Court’s current articulation of rights encapsulated by the Fourteenth Amendment, any attempt by Congress to justify federal abortion legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment would be futile.53

The Commerce Clause therefore provides the next best authority for Congress to legislate regarding the right to an abortion. Abortion, reproductive healthcare, and traveling to abortion-care facilities have direct and indirect economic impacts on individual state economies, as well as the national economy as a whole.54 United States v. Lopez lays out the modern test for determining whether federal legislation falls within Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”55 Lopez sorts interstate activity that can be regulated by Congress in three categories: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities, or people and things, in interstate commerce; and (3) any activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.56

The last category of the Lopez framework provides the most flexible opening through which Congress can regulate. As a result, the Court devised an additional four-factor balancing test to determine if an activity “substantially affect[s]” interstate commerce.57 The Court asks: (1) whether the activity regulated has any relation to “economic enterprise” or “activity,” (2) whether the statute “contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce,” (3) whether there are “legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce,” and (4) whether the regulation has a “concrete tie to interstate commerce.”58

While individuals aiding or abetting those receiving abortion care, or individuals seeking abortions themselves, would fall into the second category of the Lopez framework, the most likely category that would justify expansive federal legislation is the third, and broadest, category. This outcome is bolstered by studies that have examined the financial impacts of the increased travel required for abortion care and predicted that states like California, which served 7,000 patients from other states pre-Dobbs, will now serve up to 20,000 patients post-Dobbs.59 During oral argument before the Court, counsel for Jackson Women’s Health Organization Julie Rikelman made the argument that raising unwanted children would economically hinder the “ability of women to participate fully in society.”60 Although the Court dismissed the broader economic arguments, the more quantifiable, microeconomic impacts of the Dobbs decision itself may allow federal legislation to survive a Commerce Clause analysis.

When fashioning a statute to regulate abortion under the third Lopez category, Congress could satisfy both the second and third elements of the balancing test through committee findings, reports, data about economic impacts of abortion restrictions on interstate commerce, and an express jurisdictional statement. The statute at issue in Lopez, which regulated firearm possession, was later amended by Congress to limit the law’s reach to firearms that have moved in or that would otherwise affect interstate or foreign commerce.61 Although the Supreme Court has not considered the amended statute, the Fourth Circuit has held that an express jurisdictional statement limiting application of the statute to things or individuals that have engaged in interstate activity is constitutional, following Lopez’s Commerce Clause analysis.62

The primary challenge for any federal legislation will be convincing the Supreme Court that the preservation of the right to an abortion is economic in nature. The link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce seems a bit more self-explanatory, especially after Dobbs, as individuals are moving interstate to receive abortion care more than ever before. Consequently, the need for federal legislation preserving a national right to abortion is essential to maintain the principles of federalism among the states and to address the impact of disparate state abortion legislation on interstate commerce. Ultimately, the challenges facing this kind of federal abortion legislation are more political than legal. To succeed, particularly in front of the Dobbs Court, a narrowly worded statute would need to cite ample quantitative evidence about the economic impacts of disjointed state abortion rules to pass constitutional scrutiny.

* Soleil Ball Van Zee is a J.D. Candidate (2023) at New York University School of Law. This piece was inspired by different steps individual state legislatures made after the draft decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization was leaked to the press in May 2022. This Contribution does not necessarily reflect the views of the author.

1. See generally 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2283–84 (2022).

2. See id. at 2266 (overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which “found that the Constitution implicitly conferred a right to obtain an abortion,” in part because that decision’s reasoning lacked “grounding in the constitutional text”).

3. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 163, 169–70 (1998).

4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), and abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), (holding that “[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).

5. Ala. Code § 26-23H-4 (2022); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3603, 13-3605 (2022) (formerly §§ 13-211, 13-213 (1956)); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-61-102 (2022); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.14, 750.323 (2022); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-3 (2022); S.B. 1555, 58th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2022), (Oklahoma amended its 2021 pre-Roe ban through a 2022 trigger law); McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Texas pre-Roe statutes that criminalized abortion “have, at least, been repealed by implication”); W. Va. Code § 61-2-8 (2022), invalidated by Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 644 (4th Cir. 1975); Wis. Stat. § 940.04 (2022).

6. These debates are primarily occurring in states with divided legislatures. See, e.g., Complaint, Kaul v. Kapenga, No. 2022-CV-001594 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 28, 2022); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Isaacson v. State of Arizona, No. CV2022-013091 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2022).

7. See Kaul, No. 2022-CV-001594 at 8.

8. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-61-301-304; Idaho Code § 18-601 (2022); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.772 (2022); 2022 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 545 (S.B. 342) (West); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-45 (2022); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.010 (2022); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.3-01(1) (2022); S.B. 1555, 58th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2022); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-56 (2022); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-213 (2022); Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 170A.001-7 (2022); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7a-201 (West 2022); H.B. 92, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2022).

9. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-45 (2022).

10. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-601 (2022); Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 170A.001-7 (2022).

11. Opinion and Order, Planned Parenthood of Mich. et. al. v. Att’y Gen. of Michigan, No. 22-00044-MM (Mich. Ct. Cl. Sept. 7, 2022).

12. See Kaul, No. 2022-CV-001594.

13. Kelsey Butler, Planned Parenthood of Montana Will Stop Giving Abortion Pill to Some Out-of-State Women After Roe Ruling, Fortune (Jul. 1, 2022, 11:06 AM), https://fortune.com/2022/07/01/planned-parenthood-montana-abortion-pill-out-of-state-women/.

14. Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 171.204–12 (2022).

15. Id. at § 171.018.

16. Idaho Code §§ 18-8804, 18-8807 (2022).

17. Id.

18. See id.

19. Id. at § 18-622(2).

20. Memorandum Decision and Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (Idaho Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 2022) (granting preliminary injunction).

21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).

22. H.B. 4327, 58th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021).

23. Id. at § 2.

24. Id. at § 1.1.

25. Id. at § 5.

26. Id.

27. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.208 (2022).

28. After Roe Fell: Abortion Laws by State, Ctr. for Reprod. Rts. (Nov. 16, 2022), https://reproductiverights.org/maps/abortion-laws-by-state/.

29. Rachel La Corte, Washington State Prohibits Texas-Style Abortion Lawsuits, Associated Press (Mar. 17, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/abortion-health-lawsuits-legislature-washington-b63da7e85e9f95402cce5f3ac8ebe86f (discussing Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.120).

30. E.g., 2021 Md. Laws §§ 13-4401–07.

31. H.B. 5202, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2022); News Release, Office of the House Speaker of the Oregon Legislature, Oregon Reproductive Health Equity Fund will counter attacks on abortion access (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/rayfield/Documents/Oregon%20Reproductive%20Health%20Equity%20Fund%20will%20counter%20attacks%20on%20abortion%20access_.pdf (describing HB 5202’s $15 million appropriation as intended to “mitigate harm from a looming Supreme Court decision that could completely undermine the nationwide right to abortion under Roe v. Wade”).

32. H.B. 5261, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2022).

33. H.B. 4701, 192nd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2022).

34. Assemb. B. 1666, 2021–2022 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2022) (declaring that any law of another state that authorizes a person to bring a civil action against a person or entity that receives, performs, aids or abets an abortion is contrary to the public policy of California).

35. H.B. 5414, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2022) (prohibiting judges, justices of the peace, or notaries from issuing a subpoena “according to the law or usages of any other state . . . when such subpoena relates to reproductive health care services that are permitted under the laws of this state”).

36. Mich. Exec. Order No. 2022-4 (Jul. 13, 2022), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/news/state-orders-and-directives/2022/07/13/executive-order-2022-4-unavailability-of-interstate-extradition (stating that the Office of the Governor will decline to “assist with or effectuate the extradition of persons to or from Michigan when the charged criminal conduct . . . [is related to] reproductive health-care services, including abortion”).

37. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 103 (1861). But see Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 Yale L.J. 97, 106 (1956) (arguing that governors often refuse to extradite individuals across state lines despite the fugitive having been charged with a crime through the use of non-constitutional reasoning and discretion).

38. See David S. Cohen, Greer Donley & Rachel Rebouché, The New Abortion Battleground, 122 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022).

39. Id. at 38–39.

40. Id.

41. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

42. Id. at 824–25 (holding that a State may not “bar a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State”).

43. Id. at 824.

44. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 38, at 20–21.

45. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (describing Congress’s purview under the Commerce Clause); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1903) (describing Congress’s role as it relates to the Commerce Clause); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (outlining the principles underlying the Commerce Clause).

46. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2266 (2022).

47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228, and abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

48. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (explaining that the protection of family life from governmental intrusion is located in the Fourteenth Amendment).

49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

50. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).

51. Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2300 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 607–08 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)).

52. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.

53. Congress is also unable to expand its legislative authority under the Fourteenth Amendment “by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, [as] no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’ It would be ‘on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.’” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).

54. See generally Anna Bernstein & Kelly M. Jones, The Economic Effects of Abortion Access: A Review of the Evidence (2019), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/B379_Abortion-Access_rfinal.pdf.

55. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).

56. Id. at 558–59.

57. Id. at 559.

58. Id. at 561, 562, 567.

59. Elizabeth Nash & Jonathan Bearak, Impact of Texas’ Abortion Ban, Guttmacher Institute (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/08/impact-texas-abortion-ban-14-fold-increase-driving-distance-get-abortion.

60. See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Devastating Economic Impacts of an Abortion Ban, New Yorker (May 11, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-devastating-economic-impacts-of-an-abortion-ban.

61. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(2)(B) (referring to the jurisdictional reach of the Hate Crimes Act).

62. See United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2019).