by Ains­ley McMa­hon*

Under the Indi­vid­u­als with Dis­abil­i­ties Edu­ca­tion Improve­ment Act (“IDEA”), stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties are enti­tled to a “free appro­pri­ate pub­lic edu­ca­tion” pro­vid­ed by the state. Some states, such as Geor­gia, have imposed dis­crim­i­na­to­ry pro­grams that remove stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties from schools alto­geth­er. For extreme pro­grams such as these, advo­cates are pur­su­ing ADA antidis­crim­i­na­tion claims to achieve a high­er stan­dard of edu­ca­tion for these stu­dents, par­tic­u­lar­ly where IDEA pro­tec­tions prove insuf­fi­cient. Recent cas­es in Geor­gia indi­cate that these ADA claims may be a viable option for pro­tect­ing dis­abil­i­ty rights and ensur­ing dis­abil­i­ty jus­tice in pub­lic schools. 

Title II of the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act of 1990 (“ADA”) pro­tects per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties and pro­hibits dis­abil­i­ty-based dis­crim­i­na­tion, includ­ing exclu­sion from par­tic­i­pa­tion in or denial of “the ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic enti­ty.”1 The Supreme Court in Olm­stead inter­pret­ed the ADA to include an inte­gra­tion man­date: a require­ment that States pro­vide com­mu­ni­ty-based ser­vices for per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties where appro­pri­ate.2

In schools, stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties are often sub­ject­ed to harsh rules and pun­ish­ments, includ­ing removal from class­rooms. These removals can be dis­crim­i­na­to­ry and often reflect an over-polic­ing of Black dis­abled stu­dents in par­tic­u­lar.3 The Indi­vid­u­als with Dis­abil­i­ties Edu­ca­tion Improve­ment Act (“IDEA”), which was enact­ed to pro­tect stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties specif­i­cal­ly, fails, in some cas­es, to pro­tect stu­dents sub­ject to dis­crim­i­na­to­ry removals.

Where removal from schools and class­rooms is harm­ful to the stu­dent and dis­crim­i­na­to­ry in nature, and IDEA pro­tec­tions fall short, a poten­tial avenue for legal relief is an Olm­stead rein­te­gra­tion claim under Title II of the ADA. Two recent cas­es in Geor­gia, Unit­ed States v. Geor­gia and Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, both of which have sur­vived motions to dis­miss, show that this nov­el legal the­o­ry has poten­tial mer­it for affect­ed stu­dents.4

The need to resort to claims under Title II of the ADA aris­es from short­com­ings in the pro­tec­tions afford­ed to stu­dents under the IDEA. A de min­imis stan­dard imposed by the IDEA leaves gaps in pro­tec­tions for stu­dents. The IDEA enti­tles stu­dents to an appro­pri­ate edu­ca­tion in the most inte­grat­ed set­ting pos­si­ble; how­ev­er, even this low stan­dard is often not met.

The IDEA man­dates a “free appro­pri­ate pub­lic edu­ca­tion” for stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties,5 which the Supreme Court in Board of Edu­ca­tion v. Row­ley defined as “per­son­al­ized instruc­tion with suf­fi­cient sup­port ser­vices to per­mit the child to ben­e­fit edu­ca­tion­al­ly from that instruc­tion.”6 The Court went on to explain that “to ben­e­fit [stu­dents] edu­ca­tion­al­ly” did not require a school to “max­i­mize the poten­tial of [stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties] ‘com­men­su­rate with the oppor­tu­ni­ty pro­vid­ed to oth­er chil­dren.’”7 Rather, the IDEA requires States to pro­vide a “basic floor of oppor­tu­ni­ty” which enti­tles a child to “mean­ing­ful” access to edu­ca­tion.8

Fur­ther­more, stu­dents are enti­tled under the IDEA to an indi­vid­u­al­ized edu­ca­tion pro­gram (“IEP”) that is sub­ject to a “least restric­tive envi­ron­ment” require­ment.9 This pro­vi­sion requires schools to edu­cate stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties in class­rooms with non-dis­abled stu­dents “to the ‘max­i­mum extent appro­pri­ate’” unless an edu­ca­tion “can­not be achieved sat­is­fac­to­ri­ly” in such envi­ron­ments.10

Despite these statu­to­ry pro­tec­tions, a sig­nif­i­cant num­ber of stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties, and dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly stu­dents of col­or with dis­abil­i­ties, are removed from class­rooms.11 These stu­dents are removed for dis­ci­pli­nary rea­sons, for exam­ple, sus­pen­sions or expul­sions, and for place­ment in more restric­tive settings.

Dis­ci­pli­nary removals impact stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties in two ways. First, stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties are dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly sub­ject to removals like sus­pen­sions. A 2016 U.S. Depart­ment of Edu­ca­tion study showed that, while only six per­cent of the total pub­lic school pop­u­la­tion faced sus­pen­sions in the sam­ple year, twelve per­cent of stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties were sus­pend­ed and twen­ty-five per­cent of Black male stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties were sus­pend­ed.12 Sec­ond, under-iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties could mean that stu­dents are sus­pend­ed or expelled for behav­ior that may be the result of an uniden­ti­fied dis­abil­i­ty.13 At min­i­mum, these stu­dents should be pro­tect­ed by the IDEA’s ten-day max­i­mum on tem­po­rary sus­pen­sions.14 How­ev­er, they are enti­tled to and deserve to receive sup­port and accom­mo­da­tion, rather than removal.15

Addi­tion­al­ly, some stu­dents are removed from class­rooms to be placed in more restric­tive set­tings, such as the Geor­gia Net­work for Edu­ca­tion­al and Ther­a­peu­tic Sup­port Pro­gram (“GNETS”).16 GNETS is a statewide pro­gram admin­is­tered by the Geor­gia Depart­ment of Edu­ca­tion (“Geor­gia DOE”) that is meant to “address[] the needs of stu­dents with intense and severe emo­tion­al and behav­ioral dis­or­ders who are not best served by learn­ing in tra­di­tion­al class­room envi­ron­ments.”17 The func­tion­al effect of this pro­gram, how­ev­er, is to place stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties into dis­crim­i­na­to­ry pro­grams that do not pro­vide either the ther­a­peu­tic ben­e­fits promised or a min­i­mum ben­e­fit of edu­ca­tion.18

In either of these sit­u­a­tions, a stu­dent removed from their class­room may not be receiv­ing an edu­ca­tion in the least restric­tive envi­ron­ment or the most inte­gra­tive set­ting avail­able to them, as required by the IDEA. Although the IDEA should pro­tect such stu­dents, many attempts at legal reme­dies under the Act are “thwart­ed by courts’ heavy-hand­ed use of the IDEA’s exhaus­tion clause.”19 Under the exhaus­tion require­ment, plain­tiffs must first “exhaust … admin­is­tra­tive pro­ce­dures when they seek relief avail­able under the IDEA.”20 The exhaus­tion require­ment is a par­tic­u­lar­ly high bar­ri­er to relief where the school that wrote the IEP and removed the stu­dent is the very body run­ning the pro­gram at issue.

Where IDEA process­es do not ade­quate­ly address the improp­er removal of stu­dents from schools, stu­dents and their advo­cates may be able to pur­sue antidis­crim­i­na­tion and Olm­stead inte­gra­tion claims under Title II of the ADA. This is a nov­el legal approach, seen in two cas­es in which the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment and dis­abil­i­ty rights advo­cates sued Geor­gia for its dis­crim­i­na­to­ry and harm­ful GNETS pro­gram.21 Both cas­es have sur­vived the motion to dis­miss phase in the North­ern Dis­trict of Geor­gia, show­ing that antidis­crim­i­na­tion claims under the ADA are a viable option in the edu­ca­tion­al context.

The ADA applies to pub­lic schools and the ser­vices pro­vid­ed there­in.22 Under Title II of the ADA, “no qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty shall, by rea­son of such dis­abil­i­ty, be exclud­ed from par­tic­i­pa­tion in or be denied the ben­e­fits of the ser­vices, pro­grams, or activ­i­ties of a pub­lic enti­ty, or be sub­ject­ed to dis­crim­i­na­tion by any such enti­ty.”23 A “qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty” is an indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty who “meets the essen­tial eli­gi­bil­i­ty require­ments for the receipt of ser­vices or the par­tic­i­pa­tion in pro­grams or activ­i­ties pro­vid­ed by a pub­lic enti­ty.”24 This require­ment is often paired with the Sec­tion 504 of the Reha­bil­i­ta­tion Act (“Sec­tion 504”) require­ment that “[n]o oth­er­wise qual­i­fied indi­vid­ual with a dis­abil­i­ty in the Unit­ed States … shall, sole­ly by rea­son of her or his dis­abil­i­ty, be exclud­ed from the par­tic­i­pa­tion in, be denied the ben­e­fits of, or be sub­ject­ed to dis­crim­i­na­tion under any pro­gram or activ­i­ty,” includ­ing pub­lic and pri­vate schools, that receive fed­er­al assis­tance.25 Tak­en togeth­er, these statutes mean that stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties can­not be exclud­ed from or denied the ben­e­fits of an edu­ca­tion by rea­son of their disability.

In Olm­stead, the Supreme Court affirmed the scope of these statutes to also pro­hib­it “unjus­ti­fied iso­la­tion” as a form of dis­abil­i­ty-based dis­crim­i­na­tion.26 Dis­crim­i­na­to­ry or over­broad exclu­sions from schools and class­rooms should be con­sid­ered such an unjus­ti­fied iso­la­tion.27 While there are lim­its and con­di­tions on removals, removed stu­dents are often denied the basic ben­e­fits of ser­vices. In cas­es of sus­pen­sion and expul­sion, stu­dents often receive insuf­fi­cient edu­ca­tion, with some schools unable to pro­vide any alter­na­tive ser­vices or instruc­tion at all.28 In cas­es of place­ment in more restric­tive set­tings, the edu­ca­tion pro­vid­ed is sim­i­lar­ly insuf­fi­cient to ben­e­fit the stu­dents.29

Fac­ing the basic insuf­fi­cien­cies of these alter­na­tive edu­ca­tion­al set­tings, stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties and their coun­sel may con­sid­er bring­ing Olm­stead rein­te­gra­tion claims. Under Olm­stead, per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties must be pro­vid­ed com­mu­ni­ty-based sup­port (i.e., inte­gra­tion) when three con­di­tions are met:

[T]he State’s treat­ment pro­fes­sion­als have deter­mined that com­mu­ni­ty place­ment is appro­pri­ate, the trans­fer from insti­tu­tion­al care to a less restric­tive set­ting is not opposed by the affect­ed indi­vid­ual, and the place­ment can be rea­son­ably accom­mo­dat­ed, tak­ing into account the resources avail­able to the State and the needs of oth­ers with men­tal dis­abil­i­ties.30

In defense of a removal or replace­ment, a school may argue that the removal is jus­ti­fied under the first prong by the fact of a student’s dis­abil­i­ty or by the pre­vi­ous deter­mi­na­tions made by school offi­cials, as Geor­gia argued in Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy.31 While Olm­stead did require that state treat­ment pro­fes­sion­als deter­mine that com­mu­ni­ty place­ment is appro­pri­ate, Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy reject­ed this require­ment, agree­ing with oth­er courts that “it would be illog­i­cal to make plain­tiffs suing a state rely on an opin­ion from that state’s pro­fes­sion­als.”32 The dis­trict court went on to explain that the exis­tence of an IEP can­not pre­clude an Olm­stead claim because “the State ‘can­not deny the right [to an inte­grat­ed set­ting] sim­ply by refus­ing to acknowl­edge that the indi­vid­ual could receive appro­pri­ate care in the com­mu­ni­ty.’”33 The court found that this type of cir­cu­lar rea­son­ing can­not sup­port the removal of stu­dents, espe­cial­ly in dis­crim­i­na­to­ry pro­grams like GNETS.34

When a court finds that a per­son with a dis­abil­i­ty was improp­er­ly exclud­ed and dis­crim­i­nat­ed against, they are enti­tled to com­mu­ni­ty-based sup­port and inte­gra­tion pur­suant to Olm­stead. Olm­stead’s rein­te­gra­tion man­date reflects two impor­tant judg­ments: that improp­er “place­ment of per­sons … per­pet­u­ates unwar­rant­ed assump­tions that per­sons so iso­lat­ed are inca­pable or unwor­thy of par­tic­i­pat­ing in com­mu­ni­ty life,” and that exclu­sion dimin­ish­es the qual­i­ty of life for these indi­vid­u­als.35 Olm­stead there­fore stands for the propo­si­tion that peo­ple with dis­abil­i­ties are enti­tled to sup­port and ser­vices with­in their com­mu­ni­ties.36 For school-age chil­dren, that com­mu­ni­ty must be defined to include their peers, dis­abled and nondis­abled alike, as well as the com­mu­ni­ty envi­ron­ment that a school provides.

In Unit­ed States v. Geor­gia, the Depart­ment of Jus­tice endorsed this con­cept, alleg­ing in its com­plaint that chil­dren in the pro­gram would be bet­ter served by gen­er­al edu­ca­tion class­rooms or oth­er more inte­grat­ed set­tings.37 In both Geor­gia and Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, the ADA dis­crim­i­na­tion claims sur­vived motions to dis­miss, indi­cat­ing that removal into such defi­cient edu­ca­tion­al set­tings can be shown to be discriminatory.

When schools remove stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties from classrooms—both by dis­ci­pli­nary action and pur­port­ed accom­mo­da­tion means—they must do so in a way that does not dis­crim­i­nate against the child and places them in the least restric­tive set­ting pos­si­ble pur­suant to ADA and IDEA require­ments. When those require­ments are not met and removals are dis­crim­i­na­to­ry, stu­dents and advo­cates can bring ADA Title II antidis­crim­i­na­tion and Olm­stead rein­te­gra­tion claims to secure place­ment back into gen­er­al edu­ca­tion class­rooms or more inte­grat­ed set­tings. Because these improp­er removals dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly affect stu­dents of col­or, this is not only an issue of dis­abil­i­ty rights but also of dis­abil­i­ty justice.

* Ains­ley McMa­hon is a J.D. Can­di­date (2023) at New York Uni­ver­si­ty School of Law. This Con­tri­bu­tion arose from a paper for the course Exam­in­ing Dis­abil­i­ty Rights & Dis­abil­i­ty Jus­tice taught by Pro­fes­sor Natal­ie M. Chin exam­in­ing a new legal the­o­ry devel­op­ing in the North­ern Dis­trict of Geor­gia, which applies Title II antidis­crim­i­na­tion law in the edu­ca­tion­al context.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

2. Olm­stead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).

3. See Kate Mitchell, “We Can’t Tol­er­ate that Behav­ior in this School!”: The Con­se­quences of Exclud­ing Chil­dren with Behav­ioral Health Con­di­tions and the Lim­its of the Law, 41 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 407, 410 (2017) (“Of [] 2.8 mil­lion stu­dents [sus­pend­ed from pub­lic schools in the 2013–14 school year], 700,000 (approx­i­mate­ly twen­ty-five per­cent) were stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties served by IDEA, and 1.1 mil­lion (approx­i­mate­ly thir­ty-nine per­cent) were black.”).

4. Unit­ed States v. Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Ga. Advoc. Off. v. Geor­gia, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2020).

5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2016).

6. Board of Educ. of Hen­drick Hud­son Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Row­ley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).

7. Id. at 189–90.

8. Id. at 201, 192 (quot­ing H.R. Rep. No. 94–332, at 14 (1975)); see also Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 753–54 (2017) (explain­ing that the “free appro­pri­ate pub­lic edu­ca­tion” pro­vi­sion requires mean­ing­ful access to edu­ca­tion based on a student’s needs, but that the IDEA does not enti­tle stu­dents to accom­mo­da­tions beyond those that meet the “free appro­pri­ate pub­lic edu­ca­tion” stan­dard, even if the same accom­mo­da­tions would be required under oth­er fed­er­al dis­abil­i­ty law (cit­ing Row­ley, 458 U.S. at 192)).

9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4)–(5) (2016); see also Mitchell, supra note 3, at 430 (“[Free appro­pri­ate pub­lic edu­ca­tion] and [least restric­tive envi­ron­ment] togeth­er require that stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties receive an indi­vid­u­al­ized edu­ca­tion in an inte­grat­ed set­ting when­ev­er pos­si­ble. The indi­vid­u­al­ized pro­gram and set­ting are artic­u­lat­ed in writ­ing in an IEP.”).

10. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 429–31 (quot­ing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2015)).

11. Id. at 410–11 (“[A] sig­nif­i­cant and dis­pro­por­tion­ate num­ber of stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties and stu­dents of col­or with dis­abil­i­ties are exclud­ed from school due to dis­ci­pli­nary removal, despite the fact that IDEA and Sec­tion 504 pro­vide stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties enhanced pro­ce­dur­al pro­tec­tions in school dis­ci­pli­nary actions.”).

12. Id. (cit­ing U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2013–2014 Civ­il Rights Data Col­lec­tion, A First Look: Key Data High­lights on Equi­ty and Oppor­tu­ni­ty in our Nation’s Pub­lic Schools 3 (2016)).

13. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 416 (“[O]nly 5.9% of the spe­cial edu­ca­tion pop­u­la­tion between the ages of six and twen­ty-one, and less than 1% of the total stu­dent pop­u­la­tion, were iden­ti­fied as eli­gi­ble for spe­cial edu­ca­tion ser­vices under the ED cat­e­go­ry.… These fig­ures sug­gest that … chil­dren with behav­ioral health con­di­tions are like­ly under-iden­ti­fied as eli­gi­ble for spe­cial edu­ca­tion ser­vices for behav­ior-relat­ed challenges.”).

14. Id. at 431 (“With amend­ments to IDEA in 1997, [the ten-day tem­po­rary sus­pen­sion] rule was cod­i­fied to pre­vent uni­lat­er­al long-term dis­ci­pli­nary removals of stu­dents with disabilities.”).

15. See id. at 409–10 (sum­ma­riz­ing the guar­an­tees and pro­tec­tions for stu­dents with dis­abil­i­ties in the IDEA and reg­u­la­tions pro­mul­gat­ed under Sec­tion 504 of the Reha­bil­i­ta­tion Act).

16. See Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1317 (describ­ing plaintiff’s alle­ga­tion that “Geor­gia dis­crim­i­nates against thou­sands of pub­lic school stu­dents with behav­ior-relat­ed dis­abil­i­ties” by plac­ing them in “a sep­a­rate and unequal edu­ca­tion­al pro­gram known as [GNETS]”); see also Alan Judd, Geor­gia ‘Psy­choe­d­u­ca­tion’ Stu­dents Seg­re­gat­ed by Dis­abil­i­ty, Race, Atlanta J.-Const. (Apr. 28, 2016), (describ­ing the racial­ly dis­parate impact of GNETS’s “psy­choe­d­u­ca­tion­al programs”).

17. Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 (explain­ing GNETS’s pur­pose and Geor­gia DOE eli­gi­bil­i­ty criteria).

18. See Judd, supra note 16 (report­ing on the edu­ca­tion­al short­com­ings and “disappear[ance]” of ther­a­peu­tic ser­vices in the GNETS programs).

19. Claire S. Raj, Rights to Nowhere: The IDEA’s Inad­e­qua­cy in High-Pover­ty Schools, 53 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 409, 418; see also Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1325 (describ­ing the doc­tri­nal struc­ture which makes exhaus­tion of IDEA pro­ce­dures a nec­es­sary ele­ment in many cases).

20. Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 (cit­ing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).

21. See Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1326; Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1328.

22. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 159 (“Impor­tant as the IDEA is for chil­dren with dis­abil­i­ties, it is not the only fed­er­al statute pro­tect­ing their inter­ests. Of par­tic­u­lar rel­e­vance to this case are two antidis­crim­i­na­tion laws—Title II of the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Reha­bil­i­ta­tion Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794—which cov­er both adults and chil­dren with dis­abil­i­ties, in both pub­lic schools and oth­er set­tings.”). In both Geor­gia and Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, courts denied Georgia’s motions to dis­miss the ADA claims on the grounds that the state did not “admin­is­ter” the GNETS pro­grams in par­tic­u­lar and there­fore could do not be sub­ject to the Title II claim. See Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1322; Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1323.

23. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

24. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

25. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b).

26. Olm­stead, 527 U.S. at 597 (“Unjus­ti­fied iso­la­tion, we hold, is prop­er­ly regard­ed as dis­crim­i­na­tion based on disability.”).

27. See Jamelia Mor­gan, The Para­dox of Inclu­sion: Apply­ing Olmstead’s Inte­gra­tion Man­date in Pris­ons, 27 Geo. J. Pover­ty L. & Pol’y 305, 306 (2020) (“In Olm­stead v. L.C., the Supreme Court ruled that unjus­ti­fied insti­tu­tion­al­iza­tion con­sti­tutes dis­crim­i­na­tion under Title II of the ADA. Rely­ing on statu­to­ry text as a basis for con­clud­ing that Congress’s intent was to incor­po­rate a ‘com­pre­hen­sive view of the con­cept of dis­crim­i­na­tion advanced in the ADA,’ the Court empha­sized that ‘Con­gress explic­it­ly iden­ti­fied unjus­ti­fied “seg­re­ga­tion” of per­sons with dis­abil­i­ties as a “for[m] of dis­crim­i­na­tion.”’ Through its hold­ing the Supreme Court endorsed and affirmed Congress’s com­mit­ment to end­ing the shame­ful lega­cy of insti­tu­tion­al­iza­tion of peo­ple with dis­abil­i­ties through the Amer­i­cans with Dis­abil­i­ties Act.” (alter­ation in orig­i­nal) (inter­nal cita­tions omitted)).

28. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 466–67.

29. See Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1316–17 (explain­ing that in 2016, only 10% of the 5,256 GNETS stu­dents grad­u­at­ed, and only two thirds of those received a “spe­cial edu­ca­tion diplo­ma,” which sig­ni­fies com­ple­tion of IEP goals); Judd, supra note 16 (report­ing that the GNETS pro­gram pro­vides “an almost total lack of aca­d­e­m­ic instruc­tion,” with at least one stu­dent spend­ing the major­i­ty of his time “watch­ing movies and play­ing com­put­er games.”).

30. Mor­gan, supra note 27, at 306 (quot­ing Olm­stead, 527 U.S. at 587).

31. See Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1323.

32. Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1323; see also Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1323–24 (list­ing var­i­ous fed­er­al court cas­es reject­ing the require­ment for a state deter­mi­na­tion for more inte­grat­ed ser­vices); Day v. Dis­trict of Colum­bia, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Although the Court in Olm­stead not­ed that a State ‘gen­er­al­ly may rely on the rea­son­able assess­ments of its own pro­fes­sion­als,’ it did not hold that such a deter­mi­na­tion was required to state a claim.” (inter­nal cita­tion omitted)).

33. Geor­gia Advo­ca­cy, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 (alter­na­tion in orig­i­nal) (quot­ing Long v. Ben­son, No. 4:08-cv-26, 2008 WL 4571904, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2008)).

34. Id. at 1323–24.

35. Id. at 1322 (quot­ing Olm­stead, 527 U.S. at 600).

36. See Mor­gan, supra note 27, at 305–06.

37. Geor­gia, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 (“[T]he Com­plaint does indeed allege that pub­lic school chil­dren with dis­abil­i­ties in GNETS could appro­pri­ate­ly be served in gen­er­al edu­ca­tion class­rooms and oth­er more inte­grat­ed settings.”).