Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Author: Annemarie Ardy

Testifying by Fingerprint: Why the Government Can’t Force You to Unlock Your Phone

Download PDF

by Annemarie Ardy*

Cell phones have become ubiquitous in modern life; they are often carried everywhere and used to facilitate nearly every activity. Yet their incredible convenience is a double-edged sword: when searched by law enforcement, the wealth of information contained on a cell phone can paint a more intimate and fine-grained portrait of a person’s life than 24/7 surveillance. Passcodes and biometric scanners—mechanisms that permit a user to unlock a device through its recognition of the user’s face or fingerprint—stand in the government’s way, but only so long as courts do not permit the government to compel people to unlock their phones. Although the compulsion of a passcode clearly violates the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, courts have split on the question of whether compulsion of biometric scanning receives similar protections. This Contribution argues that courts should treat the use of biometric scanners as categorically testimonial and therefore protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause. Biometric scanners convey information that is classically testimonial, and to hold otherwise would pose unacceptable risks to personal privacy.

The Johnson Amendment After Catholic Charities: The Return of Larson v. Valente Strict Scrutiny

Download PDF

by Christopher Cokinos*

The Supreme Court’s decision in Larson v. Valente established that laws creating explicit preferences among religious denominations must be analyzed under strict scrutiny for Establishment Clause violations. For more than four decades after Larson was handed down, the Court left many questions open as to what an explicit denominational preference was and whether Larson strict scrutiny was even a viable test. However, following Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin Labor and Industrial Review Commission, where the Supreme Court used the Larson strict scrutiny analysis as the core of its decision, the vitality of Larson is clear. With this newfound life, both the government and religious organizations are hoping to strike down the Johnson Amendment: a ban on direct political participation by 501(c)(3) organizations, including churches. This Contribution argues that such a challenge to the Johnson Amendment does not fit within the Larson doctrine, since, although Larson is rather unclear in its applicability and whether strict scrutiny is the operative test, the Johnson Amendment is not a denominational preference as contemplated by the relatively thin Larson body of case law.

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén