N.Y.U. Proceedings – Page 14 – Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Nonce So Fast: Software “Structure” and Algorithmic Specificity in Computer-Implemented Means-plus-Function Patent Claims

On April 13, 2021

by Zachary Hadd*

Despite decades of Federal Circuit precedent, a clear definiteness rubric for functional patent claims covering software inventions remains evasive. Questions persist on what constitutes sufficient structure to absolve these claims of means-plus-function treatment. The level of algorithmic specificity required to ensure definiteness for claims that are drafted in means-plus-function form is similarly abstruse. In this Contribution, Zachary Hadd (’21) argues that even software-specific “structure” is best interpreted under the means-plus-function framework and that according definiteness to anything less than step-by-step algorithmic de-tail is not only unjustified, but ultimately inconsistent with Federal Circuit precedent.

Dismantling Crimmigration: Why No One Should Be Deported for a “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 29, 2021

In Contributions

by Kameron Johnston*

Crimmigration is the intersection of immigration law and criminal law. At this intersection, officials are widening the net of deportable offenses at an alarming rate to make immigrants more susceptible to removal. The “crime involving moral turpitude” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been one means by which officials have arbitrarily expanded the reasons why a person may be deported out of the United States. But is the moral turpitude provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—used to justify deporting “criminal aliens,” including lawful permanent residents—void for vagueness pursuant to the Fifth Amendment? In this Contribution, Kameron Johnston (’21) argues that the recent Supreme Court decisions Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya require that the exacting vagueness test used in criminal contexts be applied to immigration law as well. Finally, this Contribution demonstrates that the moral turpitude provision has provoked unpredictability and judicial confusion that simply cannot be reconciled with the fair notice and enforcement standards that due process demands.

How the Heeding Presumption Protects (And Does Not Hurt) Consumers in Strict Liability Failure-to-Warn Suits

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 9, 2021

In Contributions

by Jessica Christy*

Failure-to-warn claims in products liability suits face special problems in proving causation. Many courts have responded by establishing a rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff would have read and heeded an adequate warning if it had been provided. In this Contribution, Jessica Christy (’21) considers arguments that this “heeding presumption” ultimately undermines the well-being of consumers, and concludes that such concerns are best addressed by rigorously defining “warning defect,” not by abolishing the presumption of causation.

Fear of Needles or Guilty Conscience? The Fourth Amendment and the Use of BAC Test Refusal Evidence in DUI Prosecutions

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On March 2, 2021

In Contributions

by Max Baumbach*

When a motorist is arrested on suspicion of intoxicated driving, the government cannot compel him to submit to a blood draw without a warrant or warrant exception, nor can it make his refusal to submit to a blood draw a crime. But can the government use the refusal as evidence of guilt in a subsequent DUI prosecution on the basis of an implied consent statute? In this Contribution, Max Baumbach (’21) argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of blood test refusal evidence in a DUI prosecution where the test itself would have been unlawful to conduct in the first instance.

The Fifth Amendment: No Safe Harbor for First Amendment Retaliation

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On February 22, 2021

In Contributions

by Hannah Beattie*

This Contribution examines whether compliance with the Fifth Amendment should shield a federal condemnation action from a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hannah Beattie (’21) argues that the rationales for carving out safe harbors for government action to be free from First Amendment scrutiny if in compliance with the Fourth Amendment do not extend to the Fifth Amendment context. Ultimately, this Contribution concludes that an individual should be able to raise a First Amendment retaliation defense to a condemnation action, even if the government complied with the Fifth Amendment.

Two Swords for Bankruptcy’s Gordian Knot: Making Sense of Section 365

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On February 16, 2021

In Contributions

by Benjamin S. Winter*

Observers generally agree that the assumption of executory contracts by debtors in possession in Chapter 11 proceedings promotes the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and accords with Congress’ intent. Yet courts have been riven by the question of whether the plain text of section 365 allows the practice. This Contribution argues that courts forbidding assumption of executory contracts by debtors in possession have misdirected the focus of their textual analysis. Close examination of an overlooked phrase within section 365 and of the interactions between sections 365 and 1107 provides two independent textual bases for courts to read the Code in keeping with congressional intent.

Does the Supreme Court’s Decision in Carpenter v. United States Implicate the Government’s Use of Pole Cameras?

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On February 8, 2021

In Contributions

by Jack Derewicz*

Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States constrain the government’s warrantless use of pole cameras to surveil people it suspects are engaging in criminal activity? In this contribution, Jack Derewicz (’21) argues that the Carpenter opinion does not implicate this particular investigatory technique because pole cameras do not retroactively collect the type of information that, when aggregated, present the government with information it could not have otherwise obtained.

Maintaining the Narrow Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification: Rejecting Gender Discrimination in Bartender Hiring

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On February 2, 2021

In Contributions

by Matthew A. Peterson*

This Contribution examines whether a bar can discriminate on the basis of gender in its bartender hiring practices. Matthew Peterson (’21) argues that Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) exception should not shield bars from gender discrimination liability. The text and purpose of Title VII command a narrow interpretation of the BFOQ exception, and a bar catering to preferences for female bartenders is precisely the type of undesirable hiring practice that Title VII seeks to prohibit. The “essence” of a bar is making and distributing drinks, and the completion of these tasks does not depend upon the gender of a bartender. Courts should not permit bars to justify such discrimination with claims of supporting “authentic entertainment.” Unlike an actor or dancer, whose core job function is performance, a bartender’s primary responsibility is providing service.

Determining the Scope of Primary Liability in Securities Fraud Litigation

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On January 26, 2021

In Contributions

by Charles Bloom*

For decades, the private right of action for securities fraud has been narrowed, both by Congress and in the courts. In this Contribution, Charles Bloom (’21) considers the extent to which the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in a securities fraud case reverses that trend. Ultimately, this Contribution will argue that the Court has permissibly expanded private liability for securities fraud, closing certain loopholes created by its earlier precedents.

Necessary or Sufficient? The Applicability of the Exchange Act to Domestic Securities Transactions Under Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.

By Editor-in-Chief NYU Moot Court Board

On January 21, 2021

In Contributions

by William Bristow*

Do Section 10(b) the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 apply to securities transactions entered into in the United States where the security is not sold on a national exchange and is valued based on the price of a different security not sold within the United States? In this Contribution, William Bristow (’21) discusses the implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., where the Supreme Court held that the Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially and thus only applies to domestic securities transactions. This Contribution argues that Morrison’s “transactional test” establishes a sufficient condition for the application of the Exchange Act, not a necessary condition.

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