Exploring New Approaches to Unsettled Legal Questions

Tag: Criminal Law and Procedure Page 2 of 3

Dismantling Crimmigration: Why No One Should Be Deported for a “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”

by Kameron Johnston*

Crimmigration is the intersection of immigration law and criminal law. At this intersection, officials are widening the net of deportable offenses at an alarming rate to make immigrants more susceptible to removal. The “crime involving moral turpitude” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been one means by which officials have arbitrarily expanded the reasons why a person may be deported out of the United States. But is the moral turpitude provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—used to justify deporting “criminal aliens,” including lawful permanent residents—void for vagueness pursuant to the Fifth Amendment? In this Contribution, Kameron Johnston (’21) argues that the recent Supreme Court decisions Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya require that the exacting vagueness test used in criminal contexts be applied to immigration law as well. Finally, this Contribution demonstrates that the moral turpitude provision has provoked unpredictability and judicial confusion that simply cannot be reconciled with the fair notice and enforcement standards that due process demands.

Fear of Needles or Guilty Conscience? The Fourth Amendment and the Use of BAC Test Refusal Evidence in DUI Prosecutions

by Max Baumbach*

When a motorist is arrested on suspicion of intoxicated driving, the government cannot compel him to submit to a blood draw without a warrant or warrant exception, nor can it make his refusal to submit to a blood draw a crime. But can the government use the refusal as evidence of guilt in a subsequent DUI prosecution on the basis of an implied consent statute? In this Contribution, Max Baumbach (’21) argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of blood test refusal evidence in a DUI prosecution where the test itself would have been unlawful to conduct in the first instance.

Does the Supreme Court’s Decision in Carpenter v. United States Implicate the Government’s Use of Pole Cameras?

by Jack Derewicz*

Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States constrain the government’s warrantless use of pole cameras to surveil people it suspects are engaging in criminal activity? In this contribution, Jack Derewicz (’21) argues that the Carpenter opinion does not implicate this particular investigatory technique because pole cameras do not retroactively collect the type of information that, when aggregated, present the government with information it could not have otherwise obtained.

Seizures Conducted Absent Physical Force: Momentary Compliance Versus Submission

by Dean S. Acheson*

This Contribution examines whether police have effectuated a Fourth Amendment seizure by show of authority when an individual flees from a momentary encounter. Dean S. Acheson (’21) argues that, under Fourth Amendment precedent, pre-flight compliance does not constitute submission to a show of authority in a police interaction that consists of answering brief questions and engaging in evasive behavior.

Language Conduit Theory After Crawford

By Caleb Younger*

Must interpreters be available for cross examination under the Confrontation Clause? In this Contribution, Caleb Younger (’19) discusses the conduit theory in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington and subsequent lower court findings. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that the Crawford Court properly interpreted the Sixth Amendment and that the language conduit theory fails under both Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Constitutional text.

Weighing Allegations of Terrorism & the Accused’s Criminal Record in the Probable Cause Calculous

By Daniel Kugler*

Do allegations of terrorist conduct along with the accused’s unrelated criminal records, establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment? In this Contribution, Daniel Kugler (’19) discusses how circuits have approached this and similar questions using the Supreme Court’s totality of the circumstances framework. This Contribution argues that an ex-spouse’s allegations of terrorism—such as stockpiling weapons and posting terrorist propaganda on social media—are insufficient to establish probable cause to search for contraband when accompanied only by the accused’s unrelated criminal records.

Criminalizing Poverty: Designing Constitutionally Sound Inquiries into Defendants’ Ability to Pay their Fees and Fines

by Leah Romm*

What principles should courts keep in mind when inquiring into a defendant’s financial situation? In this Contribution, Leah Romm (’19) discusses the equal protection and due process challenges to incarcerating individuals because of their inability to pay fees or fines. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that courts are constitutionally required to inquire into and determine the financial status of individuals who fail to pay the fees or fines they owe.

Reaffirming the ADA’s Promise: Disability Accommodation During Arrests

by Andrew Breland*

How should police officers take into account the different needs of a person with disabilities during an arrest? In this Contribution, Andrew Breland (’18) examines the role of the Americans with Disabilities Act in governing arrests and investigations by police of persons with disabilities. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement modifies what searches and seizures of individuals with disabilities are considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Innocent Until My Attorney Says So: The Sixth Amendment and Admissions of Guilt in Capital Cases

by Rona Li*

In a capital case, can a defense attorney, against his client’s express objections, concede his client’s guilt to the jury? In this Contribution, Rona Li (’19) discusses the trial strategy of a defense attorney conceding guilt to avoid a death sentence and the conflict with his client’s Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that when a defense attorney admits his client’s guilt to the jury over his client’s unequivocal objection, he violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to make fundamental decisions about his case, and further, that his actions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Cars in Castles: The Fourth Amendment’s Automobile Exception and the Curtilage of the Home

by Kristin Mulvey*

When an automobile is parked in a driveway in the curtilage of the home, does the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment still apply? In this Contribution, Kristin Mulvey (’19) argues that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment should not apply when the vehicle is in the curtilage of the home. Further, this Contribution demonstrates that the underlying justifications for the automobile exception do not support a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a driveway.

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