by Shara Safer*
A controversial Georgia law, the Election Integrity Act of 2021, prohibits non-profit organizations from handing out food or water to individuals waiting in line to vote. This Contribution argues that the law constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on free speech in a public forum.
by Bex Rothenberg-Montz*
Although members of the general public enjoy a right to free speech under the First Amendment, government employees’ speech is more constrained. Courts determine whether a government employee’s speech is protected by balancing the interests of the government and the employee. However, in practice, the deference afforded to the government typically tips the scales. Because courts defer to the government’s interests without requiring substantiating evidence, the government is able to stifle employee speech and erode First Amendment protections for its employees. Consequently, this deference conditions free speech protections upon public employment status. Abandoning this deference will bring First Amendment jurisprudence in line with the principles that animated its enactment.
by Alec Soghomonian*
The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The Religion Clauses clearly prohibit both the Federal and state governments from establishing an official state religion or hindering religious practice to such an extent that it results in a constitutional infringement. However, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that absent those two clear commands “there is room for play in the joints” when addressing the constitutionality of government action that implicates religious belief. Does a tax benefit that provides a financial benefit to a limited class of religious employees and their employers violate the Establishment Clause? In this Contribution, Alec Soghomonian (‘22) argues that the Parsonage Exemption, found in 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the United States tax code, unlawfully provides a benefit to religious employees and employers because it does not extend to similarly situated non-religious institutions.
by Hannah Beattie*
This Contribution examines whether compliance with the Fifth Amendment should shield a federal condemnation action from a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hannah Beattie (’21) argues that the rationales for carving out safe harbors for government action to be free from First Amendment scrutiny if in compliance with the Fourth Amendment do not extend to the Fifth Amendment context. Ultimately, this Contribution concludes that an individual should be able to raise a First Amendment retaliation defense to a condemnation action, even if the government complied with the Fifth Amendment.
by Leah Rosenberg*
When does a public official’s private social media account become a tool of governance subject to constitutional analysis? In this Contribution, Leah Rosenberg (’19) argues that public officials who use their personal social media pages to interact with the public and announce policy should be required to protect constituents’ constitutional rights and may not engage in viewpoint discrimination. This Contribution recommends that courts apply a context-specific approach to censorship claims against state officials and that court consider the specific activities challenged by assessing whether state resources and employees were used to take those actions, if the content pertained to government activities or policy, and whether the official was acting as an agent of the state at the time the censorship occurred.
By Maggie Seery*
Does a state official engage in viewpoint discrimination in a state-sponsored forum when they delete a constituent’s comments or block them from their social media pages? In this Contribution, Maggie Seery (’19) discusses the possible constitutional violations an official may make when using social media to interact with the public. Ultimately, this Contribution argues that deleting a comment or blocking a user from a public social media page constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
by Avery Medjuck*
May a school restrict a student’s online speech without violating the First Amendment? In this Contribution, Avery Medjuck (’18) explains how the omnipresence of digital communication challenges the Tinker framework for determining when a school administrator can lawfully restrict speech. This Contribution argues that only a test that considers the intent of the student speaker can adequately balance students’ free speech rights against administrators’ need to protect the school environment.
by Emily Several*
Can a public university terminate a professor for speech made related to the university? In this Contribution, Emily Several (’18) analyzes the scope of public employees’ First Amendment rights with regard to speech made in their personal and professional capacities. This Contribution ultimately argues that the Supreme Court should establish an exception to the threshold requirement set in Garcetti v. Ceballos in order to preserve academic freedom on public university campuses.
by Ben Lazarus*
How should the law determine whether a true threat was made with intent sufficient to not merit First Amendment protection? In this Contribution, Ben Lazarus (’18) analyzes the different approaches circuit courts have taken to answer this question. This Contribution argues that an objective test for what constitutes a threat is most in line with the Supreme Court’s precedents and reasoning when confronting threatening speech.
by Jesse Klinger*
If a baker has a religious objection to same-sex marriage, would a law that doesn’t allow him to refuse to sell to a same-sex couple for their wedding violate his First Amendment rights? In this Contribution, Jesse Klinger tackles the problem of whether public accommodations laws — laws that prohibit discrimination in the provision of goods and services — impermissibly compel a person to speak. The Contribution examines the Supreme Court’s compelled speech precedents and argues that message attribution is the key issue. In particular, because public accommodations laws are content-neutral, a speaker’s First Amendment rights are violated only if one would attribute a particular message to the provider of the goods or services in question.
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